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THE QUEEN OF BATTLE . .. 
Gl JOES WITH RIFLE, BAYONET; TOPPLING VAMPIRE 
NATIONS AND DICTATING HISTORY WITH DOUGHBOY 
SWEAT AND BLOOD IN THE CARNAGE OF THE VIRE, 
SIEGFRIED LINE, THE BULGE, THROUGH THE PLAINS AND 
MOUNTAINS OF EUROPE. 
SHELLED,,. BOMBED, STRAFED, BLITZED-STILL THE INFAN-
TRY, U.S.A., MOVES ON_:NO RIVER TOO FORMIDABLE-
NO TANK TOO MONSTROUS-NO LINE TOO STRONG-
NO PILLBOX TOO SECURE-NO FOE TOO TREACHEROUS 
-NO DAY TOO TEMPESTUOUS-FOR TH.E FOOT SOLDIER, 
SOVEREIGN OF THE BATTLEFIELD. 
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No history of the ngth Infantry Regiment would be complete without a smcere 
and profound expression of deep -gratitude to the Officers and men of the 197th Field 
Artillery Battalion. Your officers and men fought and died with us and for us. 
Many of your observer parties sacrificed their lives so that we might live. To no 
man, or group of men, can we owe more; there is none who could have given more. 
You have shared our suffering, our food, and our burdens. Under your fire we could 
sleep at night and move in the daylight. It would be unkind for us to display our 
laurels without the admission that to your efforts we are indebted for many of our 
victories, our confidence, and, for many of us, our lives. 
We salute you I 97th, "You're the best damn Artillery Battalion in the Army." 
HEADQUARTERS 119TH INFANTRY REGIMENT 
FORT JACKSON, S. C. 
* November 10, 1945 
SUBJECT: Regimental History. 
TO: All personnel, 119th Infantry Regiment. 
1. Those connected with the preparation of this brief history 
of the 119th Infantry Regiment covering its activities while in 
the European Theatre of Operations have been severely 
handicapped by a lack of complete files and by the separation 
from the regiment of the bulk of the personnel who were 
present during combat. As a consequence this history deals 
principally with the activities of the regiment as a whole and 
of necessity omits many personal interest stories, rosters, etc., 
which, if available would have added much to the book. It 
is hoped that these difficulties will be appreciated and that 
minor inaccuracies or omissions will be understood and 
condoned. 
2. With assurance that I express your desire I am suggest-
ing that the regimental history be dedicated to the memory of 
our comrades who fell in action. 
3. I should like again to wish you and yours continued 
success and much happiness in the years of peace to come 
which were made possible through your sacrifices and efforts 
and of those gallant men to whom I suggest this book be ded-
icated. 
~ 
R. A. BAKER 
Colonel, II9th Infantry 
Commanding 
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W. H. SIMPSON 
Lieutenant General, U.S .A. 
HEADQUARTERS SECOND ARMY 
Office of the Commanding General 
MEMPHIS 15, TENNESSEE 
* 
The breaching of the Siegfried Line, the Roer 
River crossings, and the drive to the Elbe River, 
are some of the landmarks on the hard and 
dangerous road to Victory traveled by the men 
of the 119th Infantry Regiment. Such land-
marks are monuments to courage and ability, 
and help to make the record of the I 19th Infan-
try a proud one. 
W.H.S~ 
W. H. SIMPSON 
Lieutenant General, United States Army 
6 
LELAND S. HOBBS 
Major General, U.S.A. 
Comanding the 30th Infantry DiYis£on 
My salute to a fighting organization-the I I gth Infan-
try Regiment of the 30th Infantry Division! 
By its deeds, by its superb fighting qualities, by its pride 
in accomplishment, it wrote into the pages of the history of 
World War II a serie ~ of campaigning that will live for-
ever. 
Under competent leadership, the I I gth Infantry Re·gi-
ment trained well, fought well, conducted itself with pride. 
No division commander could have been more fortunate than 
the Commanding General of the 30th Infantry Division, 
in having such integrated team work as was furnished by 
the Infantry and Artillery units of our division. 
The tasks were hard, and many of our comrades fell in 
the accomplishment of them. But the I I gth Infantry Regi-
ment always reached its objective. That is the true test of 
a combat unit. 
Let all of us who fought together resolve to retain in our 
future lives all that was best-all that made us better 
soldiers-all that made us proud of ourselves and of our 
organization. 
Your exploits in the European Theatre are now in his-
tory, but as individual Americans there is still work to be 
done. 
My congratulations to each and every member of the 
Regiment for the magnificient record you established, and 
my sincere, humble thanks for all your efforts. 
7 
/.J~ 
. . 
LELAND S. HOBBS, 
Major General, U. S. Army, 
Commanding the JOih Infantry Division 
HISTORY OF THE 
This is a history of the 119th Infantry Regiment from 
June 13, 1944, when it landed on the ~oast of France, to its 
actions around the Elbe River, and the formal collapse of 
Germany on May .8, 1945. Each man who fought in the 
Regiment had his personal memories. If all the memories 
of our men, living and dead, could be gathered together 
here, a complete, exact story of our suffering, sacrifice, cour-
age, and victories could be told. The passing of time, how-
ever, leaves only the War Department records and the mem-
ories of our survivors. An attempt has been made to fortify 
the official record with the lore of the Regiment. If any 
deviation from actual fact has been made in the attempt, it 
can only be attributed to the telling and retelling, and the 
fatigued minds of the handful of us left. 
JUNE 
Vire River-Airel-La Meaulle-St. Clair-sur l'Elle 
The 13th of June was a clear day and from the ship you 
could see the smoke and dust of explosions inland. Along 
1·he beach called Omaha were the sunken ships and wreckage 
of D-Day, a few days before. Then the first breach had 
}·een made in the West Wall of Fortress Europe. Now the 
question was whether we col)ld hold on until we had gath-
ered enough forces and supplies in the beachhead to fight our 
way out of the Normandy peninsula into the body of Europe, 
developing the action from a raid into an invasion. The 
Germans at this time were determined to pm;h us back into 
the Channel, as they had already done at Dieppe. 
The 119th expected and was exceptionally well prepared 
for a hard fight. It had had, considering the mission as-
signed to it, a short period of training. On September 7, 
1942, it had been activated as part of the 30th Division, at 
Fort Jackson, South Carolina. It was a new regiment, with 
cadre drawn mostly from the 117th and 120th Infantry. 
On December 7, 1942, it began the first phase of the Mobil-
ization Training Program at Camp Blanding, Florida. The 
second phase of the training was completed at Camp Bland-
ing and for the third phase the Regiment moved to Camp 
Forrest, Tennessee, on June 1, 1943. The Regiment estab-
lished such an outstanding record in its War Department 
Training Test that it was rapidly groomed for action. It 
8 
ll!JTH INFANTRY 
had broken all previous records for physical endurance, tac-
tics, condition of equipment, technical knowledge, and gen-
eral efficiency. Colonel A. V. Ednie, our commander, later 
brought us to France and fought with us during the Nor-
mandy campaign. 
On June 10, 1943, a letter from the Adjutant General's 
Office transferred to us the battle honors of the ol.d 
119th Infantry from World War I. The old 119th, 60th 
Brigade, 30th D ivision, had landed in France on May 29, 
1918 and first went into action in August. The 30th Di-
vision helped break the Hindenburg Line-as we were to 
break the Siegfried Line- and the 119th won the following 
battle honors: 
Aug. 16-Sept. 4, 1918-Ypres, Belgium Canal Sector. 
Sept. 29-0ct. 2, 191.8-Bellicourt, France, St. Quentin 
Canal Sector. 
Oct. 7-0ct. 12, 1918~Fremont, Busiguy. 
COLONEL A. V. EDNIE 
I I 9th Infantry Regiment 
Oct. 16-0ct. 20, 1'918~Ribesville, Esciellor, Majinghirn. 
Our connection with all this was tenuous, but it gave us a 
challenge and a great example. By similar connections our 
history reached back to the North Carolina State Guard, or-
ganized in 1879, to the Army of Occup,ation in Cuba, and 
to the coastal defense against the Cerveras Squadron in 
1898. Thus our history was fairly long as well as glorious. 
The final phase of the training program laste!f from Sep-
1 
tember 4, 1943, through October, and consisted of Third 
Army Maneuvers around Murfreesboro, Tennessee. After 
that the Regiment moved to Camp Atterbury, Indiana, to 
pursue refresher training before going overseas. There it re-
ceived replacements to bring it to full strength. 
On February 12, 1944, a cold and snowy day, the Regi-
ment left Boston Harbor on the U. S. Army Transport 
Brazil. It docked at Liverpool ·on the 23rd and went by train 
to southeastern England, billeting in the towns of Rusting-
ton, Middleton, and Little Hampton, Sussex. There the 
Regiment had still further training in bayonet and knife 
fighting, in dirty fighting, in destruction of equipment, and 
in chemical warfare, in aircraft identification, in squad tac-
tics, mines, the selection of observation posts, and so on. The 
. 
Regiment was to be prepared for anything, and some of this 
training turned out to be invaluable. 
On April 3, the Regiment moved to an area around Chal-
font St. Giles and Stoke Poges, in Buckinghamshire, and con-
tinued to train. On April15 it held a review for the English 
general, Montgomery, near Beaconsfield. His address won 
not only the admiration but the genuine liking of the Amer-
ican soldiers who heard him. The Regiment continued to 
train until it left Southampton for France. 
The soldiers, from all over America, were ready to engage 
in a major historical event, and they had different ideas 
about it. Some thought it was a job to be done. Some 
thought we were fighting England's war or Russia's war, 
or a war for imperialism. Some thought our war was ex-
clusively in the Pacific. Some thought it was an opportunity 
to prove ourselves heroes. Most of them thought we were 
fighting for liberty. 
After landing, the Regiment gathered near Isigny, organ-
ized, and waited for orders. Isigny was in ruins. On the 
march from the beach the Regiment had seen its first Ger-
man dead lying along the hedgerows. 
9 
Omaha Beach 
On June 15 the Regiment was assigned the mission of 
occupying a line along the Vire River, relieving elements 
of the 17 5th Infantry. We were to be prepared to attack on 
Division order. The line was occupied by K and L Com-
panies with M Company in support. The First and Second 
Battalions stayed in an assembly area awaiting the attack 
order. 
In the afternoon L Company took the village of Airel 
without opposition and sent one platoon under 1st Lt. Daniel 
A. Meade to cover the stone bridge across the river at Pont 
de St. Fromond and to protect it from further damage. (It 
already had a large hole blown in it.) At 1000 the next 
morning Lt. Meade, in company of an officer from the 
1 05th Engineers, walked out toward the bridge to examine 
it for repairs and was hit by a bullet from an enemy sniper 
across the river. Only a short time before an enlisted man 
from the platoon had crossed the bridge and returned un-
harmed. Lt. Meade was the first Regimental casualty by 
enemy action. 
On the same day the Regiment took its first prisoners. A 
German, wounded in the leg, had to be left behind when the 
others withdrew. After hiding in a house in Airel for three 
days, he turned himself in to the Third Battalion. A Polish 
soldier in the German army became separated from his unit 
and after wandering around for several days, turned himself 
in to the First Battalion in the neighborhood of Amy. 
The Regiment moved about two kilometers to the south 
and prepared to attack on the morning of the 17th. In the 
evening of the 16th, however, the attack was postponed. On 
June 17th, detailed plans were made and orders given for a 
jll
lll
l( 
~
 
~
 
=
 
~
 
~
 
~
 
I 
.
 
)1
1-
4 
~
 
~
 
~
 
<
 
;;.
-
;.-
~
 
c.
t:l
 
t:::=
 
)1
1-
4 
=
 
~
 

river crossing and attack to the west starting at 0130 June 
18. About noon this order was revoked and the two bat-
talions were ordered to take up a defensive position. The 
other Battalion, the Second, was ordered into Division re-
serve and occupied an assembly area near Le Essarts. 
Two patrols from the Regimental I & R Platoon crossed 
the river in the morning, penetrated up to 600 yards behind 
the enemy lines and returned safely. Several night patrols 
had failed even to get across. The patrol, consisting of 
Cpl. Harold Merz, Pfc. John F. McLacken, and Pfc. Ed-
win Watt, crossed in a boat in broad daylight. On reach-
ing the end of a hedgerow they looked over the intersecting 
hedge and saw an enemy machine gun crew, a sergeant, and 
three men. Corporal M,erz was very amused by this; the 
ethers were not. As they were about to withdraw, one Ger-
man looked up and saw them. Pfc. McLacken lobbed a gre-
nade over the hedge into the emplacement, destroying the 
gun and killing or wounding the crew. The explosion alerted 
other Germans ip the area who started excitedly firing at 
random. The patrol fired a few rounds in their direction 
and then withdrew. 
The only other noteworthy events of this day were the 
arrival of the Third Battalion Staff and Company I, which 
had been separated from the Regiment in the marshalling 
area in England; an informal visit to the CP by General Cor-
let, the Corps Commander; and the first distribution of mail 
in France. 
Division Field Order Three had ordered the Regiment 
ento the defensive. The Third Battalion (minus K Com-
pany) occupied the Regimental right, a sector alon·g the Vire 
River from Airel inland to a stream bend. The First Bat-
talion occupied the line of the river south from this point to 
La Meauffe. The 117th Infantry in Corps reserve sent in, 
one battalion to occupy the east bank of the river on the right 
of our Third Battalion. 
K Company became Regimental reserve and at first occu-
pied a portion of terrain in the rear of the Third Battalion; 
but, on June 18 at 1400, it moved south and occupied the 
gap between our First Battalion and the 17 5th Infantry to 
our left. 
On June 18, B Company moved south in the First Bat-
talion sector to occupy its position between the railroad and 
the river. It made a short advance against light machine 
12 
B Company await their turn to land on Omaha Beach 
gun fire and sniper fire from near the church in La Meauffe 
and from · the hedges near the .town. A number of casualties 
were sustained, and upon the order of the Regimental Com-
mander, B Company displaced to the north. Company .t\ 
took up the attack. 
This offensive action, the first by the Regiment, was 
opposed by snipers, the fire of automatic weapons-some of it 
from across the river-and an 88-mm. gun. Support was 
given by the 197th Field Artillery and by one platoon of 
Cannon Company, but even so, 33 casualties were sustained 
before the town of La Meauffe proper was cleared. Among 
them were 1st Lt. Clarence C. Dent, commander of C Com-
pany, and Lieutenant Missimir of Company A, who was 
captured (later he escaped from the Germans and joined 
the French Underground in Paris. He fought in the lib-
eration of the city). 
Early the next morning the Regimental Commander of-
fered Colonel Cantey, commanding the First Battalion, all 
available resources to complete his action, but the 175th 
Infantry withdrew on the Battalion left and General Har-
rison the Assistant Division Commander, ordered Colonel 
Cantey to break off the attack and take up a defensive posi-
tion. The Second Battalion, in Division reserve, was or-
dered south to an assembly area near La Gouterie to cover 
the gap between the 119th and the 175th. 
We were not yet prepared to carry out a major offensive 
and yet the holding action was to be exploited for what it 
would yield. In the afternoon an overlay arrived from Di-
vision giving a new attack plan. The Third Battalion would 
attack on the right and the Second Battalion on the left. 
The First Battalion would keep its defensive position until 
passed by the Second, when it would revert to Regimental 
reserve. The hour was fixed at 04100, but the day was to 
be determined later by the Division. The battalions were 
moved into line, but on the 22nd the attack plan was defi-
nitely cancelled, and a tentative defense line from Airel to 
Moon-sur-Elle to St. Clair-sur-l'Elle was reconnoitered by 
the Battalion Commanders. 
The battalions stayed in about the same positions for the 
next two weeks. Contact with the enemy was limited to 
wme artillery exchanges, and frequent patrols were sent out. 
On the 23rd, a platoon of the First Battalion occupied a 
strong position in La Meauffe, and numerous sniper points 
were set up. The enemy -also had sniper positions and obser-
Yation posts in the town, withdrawing them at night. 
Our principal observation post was a 150-foot smoke-
stack in a distillery in the northern part of town. The Ger-
mans sent a patrol of over 30 men across the river at night 
to demolish the stack. As they came within 50 yards of it 
and the first few started over the railroad embankment 
toward it, a guard saw them in the moonlight and threw a 
grenade. The leader was seriously wounded, and the others, 
not knowing where the grenade had come from and not 
being able to provoke any answer to their fire, lost enthu-
~iasm for the mission and gradually withdrew. The leader, 
who was found alive in the morning, gave considerable in-
formation concerning the German despositions across the 
nver. 
So we stayed in place, gathering strength and information 
tor the attack. On the 25th, the rear detachment, which we 
had been vainly trying to locate since our arrival in France, 
finally showed up. They had sat on the ship for eight days 
waiting for the wind to die down enough to permit landing. 
JULY 
Vire River Crossing-Pont De St. Fromond-Cavigny-
Belle Lande-Pont Hebert-Le Mesnil Durand-Hebe-
crevon-Romphaire-Troisgots. 
A new plan for an attack across the Vire had come down 
from Division on the last day of June, so the first few days of 
July were spent reconnoitering positions and completing de-
tails. On the night of the third, K Company sent Pfc. Bert-
13 
rand J. Mandeville and Pfc. Hans Richert on a patrol across 
the river in a heavy rain. A creeping barrage of artillery 
protected their crossing. Stripped to the essentials, each man 
had with him a D ration and a K ration, a carbine and one 
clip of ammull1ition. When they had gone about 400 yards 
into enemy territory a machine gun opened up on them. They 
managed to crawl around the flank of the position in the 
dark and had continued 200 yards farther when another ma-
chine gun opened up. They moved around the second ma-
chine gun and finally secreted themselves in a position a mile 
behind the enemy lines. 
They spent the Fourth of July sitting in a steady down-
pour observing enemy movements and plotting their positions. 
About midnight they returned with detailed information 
which later proved to be of the greatest importance to our 
artillery in covering our crossing of the Vire. 
In the early morning of the Fourth of July the Second 
Battalion occupied a new position near the crossroads at 
Moon-sur-Elle and prepared for an early crossing, only to 
have the attack again postponed. On the 6th a S-3 meet-
ing was held, at which units were ordered to emplace all 
guns after dark for fire support of the 117th Infantry. 
All reconnaissance was . to be completed before dark and 
trucks were to be driven back and forth during the night 
to give the impression of activity in our sector. The cross-
ing was actually to be made in the 117th Infantry sector 
to our right, by that unit with our Second Battalion follow-
Lt. Phillips and Capt. Mann 
mg them under Division control. H-Hour was to be an-
nounced at 2200; until then, great secrecy was to prevail. 
In the meantime, as we faced the river, our left flank was 
dubious, and that area to the south was to cause considerable 
difficulty, not only for the 35th Division, which was to clear 
out the east side of the river, but for us as we came down the 
other side. In the afternoon of the sixth, a combat patrol of 
34 men from C Company ran into stiff resistance from small 
arms and four machine guns 1,200 yards southwest of La 
Meauffe. The patrol sustained heavy casualties, though it 
inflicted a good many and knocked out at least one of the 
machine guns with mortar fire. 
Finally, on the seventh, at 0430, the crossing was started 
• just north of Airel by the Second Battalion, 117th Infantry. 
They made the crossing almost without resistance. The 
artillery concentration was probably the greatest used thus 
far in Europe. The ground shook from the rumble of the 
guns and the explosions a few hundred yards away. However, 
in the hedgerows on the other side, the men met considerable 
resistance, and it was not until 0755 that Phase Line One 
was reached, just south of Pont de St. Fromond, and the 
supporting fires of the 117th Infantry, opposite the position 
of the Third Battalion, were lifted from the northern half 
of the area. 
At 0800 our Second Battalion began to move on Division 
order. It crossed on the stone bridge at Pont de St. Fro-
mond, which had been strengthened by steel trusses laid over 
the center where a hole had been blown. Although heavy 
casualties were sustained in men and vehicles on this bridge, 
it itself did not suffer further material damage. During the 
14 
day many bridges were put in at at other points by the engi-
neers, only to be frequently blown by enemy artillery fire. 
Because of the congestion at the bridges and across the river 
it was late the next day before all the vehicles could cross. 
At 1250 the Second Battalion reached its assembly area 
I 
on the southern slope of the hill southwest of Pont de St. 
Fromond and secured the left flank of the 117th. In this 
move four enlisted men were casualties and a 197th Field 
Artillery liaison officer was killed. That evening the Second 
Battalion was attached to the 117th and the next morning 
accompanied their attachment southwest to take the cross-
roads south of St. Jean de Daye. The town itself had been 
captured on the seventh by the 120th Infantry. 
In the morning of the eighth, foot elements of the Third 
Battalion, Special Units, and Regimental Headquarters 
moved out to cross the river. Just before they moved, Colonel 
Ednie gave instructions to the eJ?,tire Regiment that pris-
uners would be taken whenever possible. This policy was 
repaid during the next few days when most of the Russians 
and Poles in the German forces opposing us allowed them-
selves to be captured. The backbone of the opposing troops 
was SS panzer grenadiers. 
During the night, elements of the Third Armored Di-
vision moved across the bridge at Pont de St. Fromond to 
Ruins caused by our artillery and bombers at Airel, France. 
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fill the fields and most of the roads with armor. Their move-
ments and attack had not been coordinated with ours. When 
Regimental Headquarters finally reached the new CP, a 
tank battle had just ended there. Five disabled enemy tanks 
were standing or lying around the area. One had had the 
turret completely blown off by a direct HE hit. One, which 
had run off the bridge in trying to withdraw, was intact. 
A platoon of 45 men from E Company, occupying a nearby 
church as an outpost, had suffered nine casualties, including 
Lieutenant Beatrice, the platoon leader, killed. The Regi-
mental Headquarters Commandant and a small patrol from 
B Company mopped up three snipers in the Regimental 
Command Post with little difficulty. 
That afternoon the Second Battalion returned to Regi-
mental control and continued the attack to the south. The 
Third Battalion was moved into position on their left. In 
this attack, fire from two enemy machine guns pinned down 
the Third Platoon of L Company when it tried to outflank 
the positions. A platoon leader and several others were casu-
alties. Sgt. John R. Church brought his 60-mm. mortar 
squad up to within 75 yards of the enemy and, firing at the 
dangerous and delicate angle of 82 degrees, killed the entire 
crew at one of the enemy positions and wounded most of the 
crew at the other. Men from the First and Third Platoons 
then moved up and wiped out what was left. 
The advance of the Third Battalion was slowed down 
not only by determined resistance, but by supply difficulties. 
V chicles from the rear could not reach the front because the 
few roads in the area received particular attention from the 
enemy heavy artillery. They were also reported to be mined. 
Men could not be spared from the lines to go back for sup-
plies, so carrying parties were organized in the rear to bring 
ammunition, food, and water on foot to the front line posi-
tions. These men worked all night under artillery and small 
arms fire, without guides and through unfamiliar territory. 
On the return trips they helped evacuate the wounded. The 
Battalion aid station had suffered many casualties and there 
were insufficient men left to evacuate the casualties from the 
lines unaided. This difficult situation continued for three 
days. 
On the morning of the 9th the attack was resumed with 
the same dispositions: The Third Battalion on the left, the 
Second Battalion on the right, and the !17th Infantry on the 
15 
Casualties began to pour in 
right of our Second Battalion. In the early afternoon the 
Third Battalion took Cavigny. At 1545 a counterattack 
by 50 enemy tanks struck the Division center and right, and 
the Regimental attacks were held up until this situation clar-
ified itself. 
F Company fired on six German tanks held in a defiladed 
position. E Company passed through F Company and at-
tacked the tanks, overcame them, and pursued the escaping 
troops. The main body of the counterattack was broken by 
Corps artillery. When the ·artillery fire lifted in the evening 
we continued our advance, and the Second Battalion took 
La Coquerie. 
The first two days of the attack south from the crossing 
site, the Regiment lost seven killed and 66 wounded. Among 
rhem were several Company Commanders. Most of the cas-
ualties were from artillery fire. We took 63 prisoners. Ten 
of them were taken by S/Sgt. Heinz K. Schwartz near Ca-
vigny. 
On July lOth at daylight the First Battalion started across 
the river to occupy an assembly area just north of the church 
at Cavigny. The Regimental CP moved to a position almost 
adjoining theirs. During the move Captain Mathwig, com-
mg Cannon Company, and his driver were both severely in-
jured when their vehicle detonated a mine. The road had 
been used by vehicles previously for 12 hours without acci-
dent. When it was swept 20 or more teller and box mines 
were found along the shoulders. 
The Second Battalion took up the attack at 0700 and, 
though the Third Battalion was delayed a few hours by lack 
of ammunition, the two battalions at 10'30 were moving 
approximately abreast of each other on a front extending 
northwest from a point just across the river from St. Gilles. 
They were meeting only light resistance and in the early 
afternoon were delayed mostly by the tanks of the Third 
Armored Division which were blocking routes of com-
munication and firing across the front of the troops. Still 
the Second Battalion swung forward, pivoting on its left 
until it was almost due west of St. Gilles, with its right 
flank resting on the Pont Hebert-St. Jean de Daye highway. 
The Third Battalion advanced to a line about 500 yards 
north of the highway from St. Lo to Pont Hebert, with its 
left close to the river. To cover the open Regimental left 
flank the First Battalion was moved 600 yards east from 
· its position at Cavigny and one company was sent south 
along the river. 
16 
General Hobbs and General Watson, the Commanding 
General of the Third Armored Division, with Colonel Roys-
don and Colonel Ednie, conferred on a method of keeping 
the tanks from· holding up the infantry advances. The con-
ference determined that the~e would have to be close co-
ordination of tactics between units. Tanks and infantry 
joined forces with satisfactory results. 
In the early evening E Company-was rej:o~ted in a field 
just west of the highway to St. Jean de Daye and approx-
imately the same distance south as the Third Battalion. 
Things looked promising, w the Second Battalion was or-
dered to take La Fontelaie and the high ground east of le 
Vignot, with the other two battalions covering the operation 
on the left flank. But at 1950 the Third Battalion was coun-
terattacked and the Second Battalion was held up tempo• 
rarily. Company G, moving wuth abreast of K Company 
against light resistance, held up on the edge of Belle Lande 
in order to send in preliminary reconnaissance .and a fe;v 
mo rtar shells. The plan was to go through the village to 
the high ground south of it, searching the buildings on the 
way. 
As the Company entered the main street' they received 
heavy bursts of machine gun fire. One man was killed out-
right, and the whole Co!lliPany faltered. They became still 
more disorganized when the Company Commander, a pla~oon 
leader, and several enlisted men were seriously wounded. 
Orders had -already come from Battalion to withdraw so that 
the town could be shelled. Lieutenant Krause of Cannon 
Company and Lieutenant Earll reorganized the Company, 
broke contact and withdrew to defensive positions. Here be-
gan the battle which soon enveloped the entire Regiment. 
The week that followed proved that we must destroy the en-
emy or die here. Tremendous masses of artillery were used 
on both sides. The enemy probably had the edge. All day 
and all ni·ght our lines were torn and twisted by heavy enemy 
concentrations. 
The enemy didn't hesitate long; preceded by a mortar 
barrage, they attacked fiercely with three tanks, machine 
guns, and an unknown, but large, number of infantry. The 
tanks could be seen firing point blank over the tops of the 
hedgerows not more than 1·00 yards away. Lieutenant 
Krause stood up and directed cannon fire against them until 
he became a casualty. T/Sgt. Guy M. Robinson with great 
vigor and determination held his men in position at their 
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hedgerow, firing at point-blank range. In the rear of the 
Company, enemy artillery and mortar fire were causing cas-
ualties. Pvt. William Seddon took command of his squad 
when its leader was hit and, shouting that he would fire to 
kill the first man to move back, held his position. 
The counterattack was stopped, their reserves dispe sed and 
halted by Division artillery before their full strength could 
develop. 
With a remarkable spirit of optimism an order wa3 given 
for the Second Battalion to continue the attack at 1100 on 
the next day, July 11. The First Batta:ion was to pass 
through the Third Battalion and attack on the left. It was 
to be a part of a highly coordinated Corps attack, and it was 
desired that careful reconnaissance be carried out so the mo-
mentum once gained would ROt be lost. 
The attack was launched, and dUJ ing the day three were 
killed and 92 wounded, including Lieutenant Dalton of G 
· Company and Captain Shackleton, S-3 of the Third Bat-
talion. Forty-two prisoners were taken. The fighting was 
bitter all afternoon and continued so into the night with 
little gain achieved. 
At 0630 the enemy counterattack broke loose again, accom-
panied hy artillery concentrations on the Regimental CP and 
the Third Battalion, now in reserve. Company L was at-
tached to the weakened First Battalion, and K Company was 
sent to cover its open left flank. 
Five hostile artillery concentrations came in on the Regi-
mental CP during the morning. The first wounded Captain 
Goldberg, one of the Regimental dentists. The second 
wounded Captain W orthland, the Civil Affairs officer at-
tached to the Regiment. The third killed Major Kanses, the 
Regimental surgeon. The fourth severely shell-shocked 
Captain Maskowita, the Regimental Communications officer, 
and his driver. In all there were 17 casualties in the CP. 
As our artillery located the enemy batteries and began 
counter-battery fire, the first and last round of the fifth 
enemy concentration came in. 
That night enemy tankt> and infantry crossed the Vire and 
infiltrated past the line units on our flank into our rear areas. 
A platoon of tanks approaching by a defiladed route came 
within 100 yards of the Second Battalion CP south of la 
Coquerie, when a guard saw the accompanying infantry and 
gave the alarm. Cpt Walter A. Scarborough awoke in his 
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foxhole to find most of the men in the area pinned down by 
intense small arms fire by the enemy infantry as well as by 
machine gun fire and direct 7 5-mm. fire from the tanks. He 
saw SISgt. Thomas E. Steele and Sgt. Fred F. Womack 
manning an AT gun in a point-blank fire fight with the lead-
ing enemy tank. 
Leaving his foxhole, he carried ammunition through the 
fire and relieved Womack, who was wounded, at loading. At 
the beginning of the attack Sergeant Steele had thought it was 
only an infantry action and had manned a machine gun 
mounted on a vehicle just behind an AT gun. The first tank 
appeared and destroyed the AT gun and one truck. He 
then fell back to a second AT gun and fired several rounds 
of AP ammunition into the tank, destroying it. Until Ser-
geant Womack arrived, he lQaded and fired single-handed. 
A bazooka team was moved in position to bolster the defense, 
and one of the rockets knocked the tread off the second 
tank. 
Lieutenant Wilson led a small patrol against the enemy 
force. He and another man engaged the enemy infantry 
single-handed. He continued to push the enemy ·force back 
until he was wounded and ran out of ammunition. At the 
end of the action all 5 tanks were knocked out and 21 enemy 
infantry were killed. 
Because of this and other enemy action in our rear areas 
during the morning, and because the Third Battalion was 
unable to get ammunition to the front, H-Hour was post-
poned from 1100 to 1200. Two companies of tapks arrived 
and were put in direct support of the Regiment, one to each 
of the attacking battalions. Before they could engage the 
enemy, they were order.ed to meet a number of enemy tanks 
reported near Pont Hebert. At 1530 the First and Second 
Battalions jumped off without tank support. In an hour 
they had completed an advance of 200 yards. As small as 
this distance may seem, in those days it was an advance of 
considerable import. 
That evening artillery concentrations began to fall in the 
First Battalion motor pool. The men were dug in along 
the hedgerows. One shell made a dirct hit on the hedge 
just above a foxhole and buried the two men in it under the 
sodden covering and the earth from the hedge. Spencer J. 
Smiley, the motor sergeant, upon hearing their weak cries, 
left his foxhole to help them. Under the continuing fire 
of the barrage he attempted to dig down to them, with his 
hands and his helmet, only stopping when concussion threw 
him flat. When he finally uncovered them he found that 
they were in serious need of medical attention. Loading one 
man upon his back, he started toward the aid station. After 
only a few steps he was cut down by shrapnel and died of his 
wounds. It was bravery like this that gave us the will to 
fight. 
During the day 17 men had been killed and 144 wounded. 
Fourteen prisoners had been taken, and from them it was 
learned that 12 German companies had been thrown in the 
line to start a drive to Isigny. The Germans had projected 
their attack more extravagantly than we could have, but ac-
complished even less. 
On July 12 the attack jumped on time-at 0900-with 
the Second Battalion on the t:ight and the First Battalion on 
the left. The attack was preceded by a ten-minute artillery 
barrage, including eight-inch howitzers. The Second Bat-
talion gained the town of Belle Lande and at 0945 their 
right was south of the highway leading west. Colonel Ednie 
requested that tanks protect the bridge at Pont Hebert to• 
our rear in case of another counterattack. The tanks sent 
reconnais~ance toward the bridge, while a reinforced plat6on 
of the Third Battalion was sent to a wooded draw about 
LO'OO yards northwest of the bridge to cover the tanks. 
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However, before noon the First Battalion was in another 
wooded draw only 300 yards from the bridge. 
The First Battalion was then ordered to cut southeast to 
the river, but almost at once an infantry counterattack was 
launched against this open left flank. Tanks were ordered to 
halt it, but as the 35th Division did not reach Pont Hebert 
on the other side of the rive~ until the 17th, the flank re-
mained open, and the First Battalion continued to receive 
enfilading fire at a range of 250 yards. 
On the right flank six tanks appeared from the direction of 
Hauts Vents threatening the Second Battalion at Belle 
Lande. Two of the tanks were set afire by artillery with 
two others reported to be dug in. Nevertheless, the Second 
Battalion was ordered to push south 600 yards to the high 
ground just south of Belle Lande, an.d the First Battalion 
was ordered to push to a point 200 yards south of the bridge. 
The Third Battalion was to attack due east from its position 
behind the Second Battalion, take the town of Pont Hebert, 
and close the gap between the other two battalions. The 
Second Battalion ran into an aggressive enemy force which 
almost wwed out one platoon of E Company; they refused 
to surrender and fought it out where they stood. Tanks. 
were called for, but they were slow in arriving and all units 
were finally forced to dig in. K Company was sent to the 
left flank to back up C Company, which was badly depleted 
and in command of a sergeant, George R. Day. 
Five minutes before the attack C Company had suffered 
15 casualties from enemy artillery and morale was low. 
Although heavy smalr' arms fire was brought against the 
enemy's positions 100 yards away, they held and, as one 
squad tried to get across, killed four men instantly and 
wounded two others. Pvt. Paul L. Howrie and Pvt. Wood-
row W. Shirah of the squad remained in the open under small 
arms and mortar fire to make sure that the wounded and 
were evacuated. Private Shirah and Private Howrie were 
killed in other actions later in July. 
During the same artillery barrage a shell made a direct hit 
on a foxhole with three me'n in it, killing two and wounding 
the other in the head. The survivor, Pfc. Sebastian A. Dech-
ario, was so dazed by his wound and the concussion that 
he did not realize the two others were dead and set out to 
get help for them while the barrage was still going on. 
On his way back to the aid station he thought he heard a 
cry for help. Stunned and half blinded by his blood, he 
searched the draw until he found a wounded man clinging to 
a tree, helpless and blind. Private Dechiaro led him toward 
the aid station, helping him up and down under barrages 
that fe!l in the draw and protecting him from the shrapnel 
with his own body. When he reached the aid station he re-
fused treatment and led the medics back to the front. 
Just before midnight the left flank was bombed and 
strafed, and there were 13 more casualties. The enemy air 
force was still a strong factor, and we often wondered where 
our superior numbers hid themselves. 
In the bloody fighting that followed, the First Battalion 
maintained a constant patrol to locate and evacuate the dead 
who were accumulating in the Company areas and depressing 
the men. 
On the 12th the Regiment lost 30 killed, 219 wounded, 
seven missing, and one captured. We took five prisoners. 
At ·0300 the next day the Division ordered us to straighten 
our lines and prepare for a heavy attack expected within 
hours, as the Division was now well ahead of the units on its 
right and left. The Division casualties up to this time stood 
at 13 per cent. 
Consequently the First Battalion made a limited attack to 
gain suitable ground for defense. Our lines then started 
just north of the town, ran west 300 yards, south for almost 
1000 yards, and then west to a junction with the 117th. 
The Second Battalion made a slow advance against the 
heavy fire from machine guns and small arms and finally 
reached the high ground they had been after for 24 hours. 
At this time G Company consisted of one officer and 69 men. 
That evening General Hobbs ordered us to take up an 
anti-tank defense. Colonel Ednie instructed both battalions 
to strengthen A.T. defenses and make stable contact with ad-
jacent units. The Second Battalion was unable to main-
tain contact with the 117th Infantry. During the day 19 
were killed and 139 wounded. Most of the casualties were 
inflicted by the German artillery, which was equal or su-
perior to ours, and fell without interruption day and night. 
The slightest movement of even one man brought fire. In 
the Second Battalion area particularly, active 88's on mobile 
mounts sent enfiladed fire down hedgerows occupied by our 
troops. 
By 1000 on the 14th, it became evident that the Germans 
were not going to attack, so B Company, supported by a 
platoon of tanks, hit the bridge at Pont Hebert. The at-
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tack was made easier by the advance of the 35th Division, 
which had drawn abreast on the other side of the r ilrer. 
Germans were seen withdrawing from the town, and they 
were followed back by our artillery. They realized that 
they were unable to hold against such determined forces and 
withdrew to positions farther inland. By 1135 Company B 
had taken the town of Pont Hebert and the approaches to 
the bridge. 
Colonel Ednie was relieved as Regimental Commander by 
Col. Edwin M. Sutherland, who had been in Alaska from 
1924 to 1927, in Tientsin from 1'931 to 1934, in Pekin from 
1935 to 1939, in the China-Burma-India theater from 1941 
to 1942, and in Kiska from 1942 to 1944. On the 13th, 
Col. James W. Cantey had been relieved as Commander of 
the First Battalion by Maj. Robert H. Herlong. Lt. Col. 
Edwin E. Wallis continued to command the Second Bat-
talion, and Lt. Col. Courtney P. Brown continued to com-
mand the Third Battalion. Colonel Ednie was assigned to 
the 29th Division, where he achieved considerable fame and 
glory by advancing with his leading elements in the taking 
of St. Lo. 
At 0500 of the 15th, preceded by concentrations of me-
dium artillery, and a rolling barrage of light artillery, the 
117th Infantry attacked south on the Division front. Our 
.Third Battalion was attached to them and their Second Bat-
talion was attached to us. This peculiar dep~oyment only 
further demonstrates our position in the early days of the 
war. All flanks were open and we were subject to attack 
from any direction. Our mis~ion was to suppo~t the attack 
and cover the- Division flanks. At 0730 our Second Battalion 
reported that the assault wave had gone slightly beyond 
their positions, that a battalion of the I 17th was a couple of 
hedgerows ahead on their right, and a little later that our 
Third Battalion was just ahead of them and pinned down. 
Somewhere on our right a tank battle was in progress. 
Company l had gone into' the attack with two platoom 
leading abreast, and the First and Fourth Platoom following 
at 100 yards. After an advance of 300 yards, the Company 
lost contact with the unit on its left and the two rear 
platoons lost contact with the rest of the Company. The 
fire from small arms and mortars was heavy, but they were 
still able to move. The two rear platoons, which were out of 
contact, drifted about 100 yards into the open area of the 
left flank and were pinned down by an enemy machine gun 
50 yards ahead. They then received a generous portion of 
an artillery barrage, and more mortar and small arms fire. 
One man was killed and two seriously wounded. A medic, 
Pfc. Maurice R. Bertrand, was also wounded in the head 
and knocked senseless. When he recovered, he crawled under 
the fire to the other wounded and gave them first aid. 
In the meantime, while the machine gun had the platoons 
pinned down, enemy infantry was working around their left 
flank to cut them off. Pfc. Henry J. Herchel, a machine 
gunner, spotted the enemy machine gun and began to crawl 
forward through the fire, carrying his light machine gun 
with him. After about 40 yards he set it up on a slight_ ri3e, 
and with accurate bursts of fire wounded both enemy gunners 
and destroyed their gun. The phtoons were able to withdraw 
to hedgerows 60 yards back and set up defen~es against the 
enemy pushing in from the left. Later they made contact 
with the Company and evacuated their three wounded. 
The advance of the Division was slow, against stubborn 
infantry and tanks. Enemy artillery covered both our front 
lines and our rear areas. Though the Second Battalion of 
the I 17th attached to I 19th was not committed during the 
day, it suffered 50 casualties from concentrations of artillery. 
Our Second Battalion was pulled back into reserve and in 
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its place the First Battalion was moved forward from Pont 
Hebert to follow up the Third Battalion, and also to clean 
out a quarry about 1,200 yards southwest of Belle Lande. 
The quarry, an enemy strongpoint, had been by-passed in 
the Division's attack. The First Battalion cleaned it out be-
fore nightfall, taking a number of p-risoners. 
During the day 22 men were killed, 100 wounded, and six 
were missing. Prisoners taken totalled 36. 
On the 16th· the Regiment sat in Division reserve with 
little to do but hold the bridge at Pont Hebert, and that was 
accomplished by a reinforced platoon of C Company and a 
platoon of AT Company. In the afternoon there was bright 
sunshine. Warm showers had been built in a rear division 
area and some of us had the first bath we had had in two 
weeks. It then seemed a long time to go unwashed. It was 
only during these short rest periods that a soldier again felt 
human and began to have his normal tastes and desires. 
The Third Battalion, however, was attacking south with 
the I 17th. K Company, with a strength of three officers 
and 50 men was held up by an enemy force consisting of two 
machine guns, a scout car, and 30 personnel well placed in and 
around a small group of buildings. Company K had a platoon 
of tanks attached to it, but they had not come up yet and · 
without them the enemy position could 'not be assaulted, by-
passed, or flanked. 
Sgt. William J. Callahan, a personal runner for the Com-
pany Commander, made his way back to the Battalion to ask 
for support. When he was told none could be sent, he de-
cided to steal a few tanks from some one else. 
He hunted around under the artillery fire and at last 
came upon a group of tanks idling. He explained the predica-
ment of K Company to the officer in command of the tanks 
and volunteered to guide them back to the Company. With 
the help of these tanks, K Company knocked out the resist-
ance and moved on. 
Advancing through the hedgerows, K Company was 
again held up by machine gun, mortar, and 88 fire. A num-
ber of men were wounded and the platoon became disorgan-
ized. As his platoon sergeant was seriously wounded, Sgt. 
Joseph Herring assumed command of the platoon, though he 
himself was wounded in the face . He rallied the men and 
led them over the next· hedgerow. An enemy machine gun 
killed him, but his comrades, inspired-by his courage, charged 
ahead and revenged his loss in the only way they could-in: 
kind. 
The Third Battalion was released from attachment to the 
117th and returned to us in the late afternoon. 
Activity on the 17th was in part confined to cleaning out 
the pockets of enemy resistance isolated behind the advance. 
In the early morning the movement of some unit was spotted 
400 yards in front of F Company, and a patrol was sent out 
to identify it. After crossing about 500 yards of hedgerows, 
the patrol ran into enemy machine gun fire, which killed two 
men of the patrol and wounded another. S/Sgt. James T. 
Pressnell fired and killed one of the enemy. This drew their 
fire to him and he was wounded in the head and pinned 
down. From 1100 to 1600 he lay in the same spot, from 
which he could see the enemy digging new positions jusf 70 
feet away, setting up mortars, and swinging an _88 into posi-
tion. The 88 then began firing directly over his head. At 
1600 the Germans apparently began to wonder about liim, 
for he saw one of them climbing a tree with a rifle and look-
ing in his direction, Sergeant Pressnell fired quickly and 
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killed the climbing German, who dropped clumsily out of the 
tree. The other Germans were now alarmed, and Sergeant 
Pressnell decided it was less dangerous to leave than to stay. 
He crawled back along the hedgerows and two hours later 
reached the Company CP. He reported what he had ob-
served, and the 88 was knocked out by artillery. 
At dusk word was received at Regiment that the 120th, 
leading the Division assault, had taken its objective below 
Le Memil Durand. Just before midnight a patrol from the 
First Battalion made contact with the 35th Division across 
the bridge at Pont Hebert. 
The next afternoon the Regiment moved forward to oc-
cupy the left of the Division sector. Our line started north 
of La Juganniere, extending east between La Houcharderie 
and La Godarderie, and continuing north along the Vire to a 
point east of La Crepiniere. The First Battalion occupied the 
left of the line and the Second Battalion the right. The Regi-
mental CP was established near the church in Les Mesnil 
Durand. In the church, part of the wall of the bell tower 
was still standing, while most of the other buildings were 
almost entirely destroyed. There were no civilians--the Ger-
mans had evacuated them, as they had all other civilians since 
our croo:sing of the Vire. It was a desolate place. The same 
night the radio announced that St. Lo had fallen, K Com-
pany officers and men rejoiced as "Captain Harry" (Hop-
craft) returned from the hospital. 
On July 1'9th, the Regiment was ordered to advance 500 
yards and establish a main line of resistance along the north 
bank of a tributary which empties into the Vire opposite Rou-
loux Godard. The left of the line was to extend some 700 · 
yards back along the Vire. The First and Second Bat-
talions jumped off at 1 WO, and it took less than an hour to 
occupy the new line. That afternoon the First Battalion 
sent a series of patrols to hol:d the creek crossings and to de-
termine the enemy strength on the other side. The first patrol 
drew fire from the right flank and, because of the depth . 
of the stream, could not get across. A later patrol got across 
only with great difficulty. 
That evening prisoners were captured who said that on the 
20th all hell would break loose. Perhaps because of thi~ 
report, orders were given to carry gas masks at all times, 
The attempted assassination of Hitler on the 20th by some 
officers of the W ehrmacht and the abortive revolt in Ger-
many must have been the "hell," for nothing else broke 
loose. 
Colonel Edwin M. Sutherland 
The next morning the Second Battalion had orders to 
secure the bridge to their left front and build another with 
the help of engineers. By the middle of the afternoon both 
bridges were completed and two platoons of E Company were 
across the stream. 
Colonel Sutherland and the. Battalion Commanders re· 
ported to Division to receive the plan of attack. After a very 
heavy air and artillery barrage, two battalions were to push 
forward rapidly with the support of . two platoons of tanks 
each and take up positions near Hebecrevon. For the next 
three days the Regiment waited for the weather to clear. 
A number of patrols were sent to se'i:ure the stream cross-
ings, to maintain contact with the enemy and with friendly 
troops, and to take prisoners. On the 23rd a patrol of nine 
men was sent across the stream by Comp,any A to capture 
prisoners. They found an approach to one of the enemy 
forward positions, a draw covered by machine gun fire. 
Sgt. Robert F. Kee, to distract the attention and the fire 
of the enemy from the patrol as they came up the draw, 
worked his way around and fired on the enemy from the 
flank. On the way back down the draw with the pris-
oners, the other men of the patrol were discovered and fired 
upon. Two were wounded, but all managed to escape and to 
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bring the prisoners with them. Sergeant Kee, whose initiative 
had made the operation a success, attempted to withdraw, 
but was killed by machine gun fire. 
On the 24th the attack was to have been preceded by 80 
minutes of air and artillery bombardment by 3,000 planes 
and 50 battalions of artillery. In spite of the overcast, the 
attack planes and bombers appeared and dropped a large 
number of bombs, some within our lines. About 30 minutes 
before H-Hour, the attack was cancelled by First Army. Our 
casualties were five killed, 28 wounded, and one missing, 
almost all due to the bombing. Five prisoners were cap-
tured when they fled into our lines to escape the bombing. 
They would have done better to stay where they were. 
July 25 was the blackest day in the history of the Regiment 
and probably the brighteSt for the free world. About the 
same order was issued as for the day before. During the 
night all troops except mortar and artillery observers were 
to withdraw behind the bomb line, 1,200 yards back from 
the stream. At H-minus-120 all remaining troops were to 
begin to withdraw and at H-minus-85 to have finished with-
drawing. At H -minus-SO, fighters were to strafe and bomb 
the German lines, followed by L200 heavy bombers. The 
bombing and shelling were to move progressively south after 
H-Hour. 
At H-Hour the Third Battalion, supported by one platoon 
of medium tanks and one platoon of light tanks from the 
743rd Tank Battalion, was to move rapidly south through 
Hebecrevon and occupy an are~ east of St. Gilles (not the 
St. Gilles just southwst of LaMeauffe). The Second Bat-
talion and Special Units were to follow the Third Battalion. 
The First Battalion, supported by the two platoons of me-
dium tanks from the 743rd Tank Battalion, was to follow 
the 120th Infantry on the right, attack Hebecrevon from the 
west, pass through it, occupy a position to the east of it, 
and then be prepared to move, on Division order, east into 
the loop of the Vire west of St. Lo. The purpose of the 
operation was to crack the German defenses west of St. Lo 
and clear a path for a further attack by the Second Armored 
Division. 
H-Hour was set at 1100 and the troops moved back ac-
cording to schedule into an area one-half mile south of the 
Regimental CP at Le Mesnil Durand. The bombing struck 
on time and the action by the first planes, the P-47s, seemed 
to be successful in spite of the heavy flak thrown up by the 
Germans. Then the bombers, B-17s and B-24s, appeared 
and still heavier flak came up at them. At least two of them 
were shot down within view. 
The bombers came, moving south, and with great pre-
cision and effectiveness bombed the Regiment around Le 
Mesnil Durand and pass~d on. Approximately a squadron 
released their load of medium and heavy bombs. 
Of the 14 medics at Regiment, half were casualties, six 
of them being buried alive. The other men of the detachment 
left their foxholes while the bombs were still falling and 
dug out the buried. One of them, Technician Fifth Grade 
Lindeman, was able to help dig out the others and treat the 
wounded before he had to be evacuated. There were many 
dead and seriously wounded in the Regimental CP and the 
fields around it. Not only did the medics have to reach and 
work on emergency cases while the bombs were still falling, 
but the Germans were pouring in barrages of artillery be-
sides. Twelve vehicles carrying gasoline and ammunition had 
been set afire and were steadily exploding. 
In the Third Battalion area Captain Henry E. Schlegel. 
the Battalion Surgeon, went within 20 feet of an explod-
ing ammunition trailer to arrest the hemorrhages of a man. 
Many men were shaking or stupefied, while others were 
driven hysterical by the enormous concussions. We had be-
come accustomed to seeing the dead, particularly enemy dead, 
gradually blacken and rot within a few days in the hot, damp 
weather, but we were not prepared to see this devastating 
annihilation and dismemberment. 
Technical Sergeant Clark and Technician Fourth Grade 
Marshall loaded a number of severely wounded on a one-
fourth-ton truck and started back to the collecting point near 
Pont Hebert. On the way, about 1120, another squadron 
of planes, B-26s, released their bombs over our area and 
near the road. Men jumped from speeding vehicles, and 
some jeeps went charging along the roads without their 
drivers. Yet T /4 Marshall continued to drive his truck 
while T /Sgt. Clark stayed on it, administering blood plasma. 
It has been estimated that one bomb had been dropped for 
every 25 yards of enemy front. 
In spite of all this, at H-Hour, 1100, the attack had some-
how got under way. The tanks supporting the Third Bat-
talion had moved past the church at Le Mesnil Durand and 
were followed by K Company. Although the second bomb-
ing caught them on the road, the Third Battalion had 
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reached the creek at La Nouillerie by 1200. There were 
mines at the crossings, plus considerable artillery fire, but the 
attack progressed up the hill and down the other side until 
the supporting tanks were stopped in a defile by mine fields 
covered by direct fire from dug-in enemv tanks. 
The infantry made several attempts to outflank the tanks. 
Against their mutually supporting fires, no progress was 
made, and we suffered a good many casualties. Since the 
tanks were dug-in, they could not be reached with bazookas. 
An attempt was made to withdraw far enough to let our 
artillery work. In withdrawing, the infantry abandoned its 
defilade and suffered additional casualties from enemy mor-
tar and artillery fire. 
Finally the First Battalion was sent around the left flank 
along the Vire. Though their route was exposed to artillery 
observers on the hills southwest of St. Lo, they succeeded 
in reaching the high ground southeast of La Nouillerie. The 
enemy, with their defenses flanked, began to withdraw, not 
only here, but also in front of the 120th to our right, which 
had been held up by a like resistance. 
At 2200 the assault was resumed, with infantry and tanks, 
in an attempt to surround and capture Hebecrevon. The 
enemy resisted with considerable artillery and some small 
arms outside the town. Company A, advancing with a com-
pany of tanks on a road leading to Hebecrevon, was pinned 
down by small arms fire and machine guns. The point 
scouts reported to Capt. Ross Y. Simmons that the road 
blocks, with a peculiar systP.m of wires no doubt attached to 
mines or booby traps, were holding up the tanks. Captain 
Simmons went forward under the machine gun fire to the 
road blocks and by the dim starlight neutralized the wires. 
After clearing the road, he waved the tanks forward. He 
remained at the head of his Company and led the final attack 
which captured the town. 
When the night's action was completed, the First Battalion 
was dug in east of Hebecrevon, the Third Battalion north 
of it, and the Second Battalion to the south. The high 
ground to the south had been stoutly defended by artillery 
and mortar fire. Captain Parlavocchia, leading F Company 
in the attack, had been seriously wounded by shrapnel 200 
yards before the objective was reached. His leadership had 
givPn the attack an impetus which carried his troops on 
to the objective. He died of his wounds on July 31st. 
On the ·25th of July the Regiment lost 40 killed, 22/) 
The "Battle of the Hedgerows" was dirty, close-range fighting. This infantryman waits to 
draw a bead on an enemy sniper. 
wounded, and ten missing. Thirty-two prisoners were taken. 
That morning Technician Fourth Grade Barbato, the Regi-
mental journal clerk, was hit directly by a heavy bomb. All 
the maps and overlays for July 24 and 25 in his possession 
were destroyed, and on the 26th the journal was not kept, so 
that these sources are lacking to the Regimental history. 
The 26th .brought orders for the First Battalion to attack 
southeast 500 yards, to an area near Le Gros Cailloux. The 
First Battalion was to be preceded by tanks and followed 
by the Third and Second Battalions in column. Assembling 
for the attack, at 0735 the medium tanks appeared in Hebe-
crevon from the west to make contact with the light tanks 
east of the town. As the head of the coiumn reached the 
eastern edge of the town, two tanks were knocked out by 
· direct fire from 88s. The tank column withdrew and halted. 
Finally contact was established, but as the First Battalion 
had to take a route across country for the first few hundred 
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yards, the tanks were reluctant to start. At 0900 the First 
Battalion moved over the route they had chosen. The tanks 
did run into some resistance, but changed their route east-
ward and continued to advance. 
The town of Hebecrevon and the fields and apple orchards 
around it were at this time very crowded. In the area were 
troops of the Second and Third Battalions, the Regimental 
CP, and the Forward CP of the First Battalion. Head-
quarters Company of the Second Battalion came in at 1000 
and began digging in positions in an orchard at the edge 
of town. 
It was common German tactics during this campaign to 
withdraw from a town and, after our troops had .entered 
it in some force, to pour artillery in. Though the bombing 
had destroyed ,much of their equipment and personnel, and 
the persistent attacks by our tanks and infantry had dis-
organized any concerted resistance, they were able to main-
tain artillery barrages on Hebecrevon through the late morn- · 
ing and most of the afternoon. One barrage landed in the 
orchard where the Second Battalion was digging in and 
caused a number of casualties from tree bursts. As the 
barrage continued, those who could withdraw, did. The 
wounded were left in the area. The Battalion medics tried 
to get back into the orchard, only to suffer casualties them-
selves, among them the Assistant Battalion Su~geon and the 
Section Leader. Rescue squads were organized by T/Sgt. 
Rex Lunsford and T/4 Frank J. Olivero, a clerk in the 
aid station who was himself wounded. One squad after 
another ventured again into the bursting orchard. They 
were all led by Technical Sergeant Lunsford. Thus all the 
wounded were finally carried to safety. 
The barrages inflicted many casualties in the other areas 
around Hebecrevon, particularly in the Regimental CP and 
the First Battalion CP. When the wounded could n~t be 
evacuated, Captain Ferrier moved under the fire into the open 
fields to administer first aid and blood plasma. 
Before dark, the Regimental CP moved up and set up 
temporarily about one-half mile north of La Tremblee. Dur-
ing this move the CP caught up with the lead batta1ion and 
was often up with Company A, which was leading. Colonel 
Sutherland was a rugged and irrascible colonel and he meant 
to push the attack as far as it would go. He was willing to 
lead the forward troops himself. For this he was awarded 
the Silver Star for gallantry in action, but he accepted it, he 
said, for the Regiment which had earned it. 
About 2100 the Regimental CP was set up in an area be-
tween St. Gilles and Le Bas Mesnil, and the battalions were 
slightly to the south. The rear elements, however, were still 
back at Hebecrevon or even at Le Mesnil Durand, where 
most of the vehicles were. A patrol of the I & R Platoon 
was dispatched to guide the rear of the Regimental CP for-
ward, and at same time to turn in to the PW cage at Les 
Mesnil Durand two French Fascists in civilian clothes who 
had been caught sending up flares. 
The .patrol had driven LOOO yards to the rear when they 
saw a column of about 40 men approaching in the darkness. 
On coming closer they found the men were Germans and 
supposed them to be prisoners. "Lieutenant Wilson, who was 
leading the patrol, asked who was in charge. They imme-
diately began firing, killing Lieutenant Wilson and Cor-
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poral Merz, and severely wounding a driver, Pius Wing, 
who later died of his wounds. The two remaining men of the 
patrol, Pfc. John F. McLacken and Pfc. Edwin Watt, killed 
the two French Fascists as they broke away, and five or six 
of the Germans in the column, before they made their own 
escape in the darkness. The Germans set up a machine gun 
at a turn in the road and ambushed vehicles until they 
realized that they were isolated behind a considerable force. 
Throughout the night, individual Germans and groups 
tried to work their way through our lines back into theirs. 
Men woke up with strange German foxhole comrades the 
next morning. We had slept with them, and they with us. 
Early in the morning, 27 armed Germans, including two 
burp (machine pistol) gunners, approached the sentry at the 
entrance to the Regimental CP. Before he had time to do 
anything but drop his jaw, they had entered and dropped 
their equipment on the ground. They then looked around 
for som.eone to attend to their surrender. The Regimental 
Adjutant led them into a field nearby, and in a few hours 
nearly 200 prisoners, including a German colonel, had been 
gathered there. 
On the 27th, the Regiment moved south again. The 
First Battalion, with tanks, followed by the Second Bat-
talion, moved along the main route to Gourfaleur with the 
object of clearing areas along the west bank of the Vire and 
protecting the crossings. The Third Battalion moved by a 
parallel route closer to the river, toward J eigne, with the 
same object. The Regimental CP plannd to move with the 
Second Battalion, but because of enemy resistance, mostly 
scattered strongpoints, the column moved rather slowly. 
The Regimental CP pulled off the road, and after a number 
of short moves, set up in a house by the crossroads 400 yards 
north of Le Haut Coquerel. Here the rear echelon of the 
CP caught up with the others during the afternoon, and 
the Staff was together for the first time since the morning 
of the 25th. 
Early afternoon found the First Battalion moving up a hill 
about 400 yards northwest of Gourfaleur with B Company 
on the left of the road and C Company on the right, each 
with a platoon of tanks in support. The Second Platoon of 
. 
C Company was moving through a draw, and the lead ele-
ments had reached a point some 150 yards from the crest 
of the ridge overlooking the draw, when a machine gun and 
small arms fire pinned the platoon down. The Third Platoon 
Lieutenant Colonel C. P. Brown 
was sent around to the left to outflank the enemy positions in 
and near some houses at the crest of the hill and was also 
pinned down by machine guns, small arms and mortar fire, 
which caused heavy casualties. The platoons called back to 
the tanks for direct fire into the houses, but after considering 
the incoming mortar fire, the tanks could not make up their 
minds to move forward. While they were thinking it over, 
the mortar barrage grew more and more intense and orders 
came for the 11 men left in the Second Platoon to withdraw 
to a covered area 200 yards back and reorganize. All of 
the men who were able withdrew, except for the lead scout, 
Keith L. Sy, who was on the crest of the ridge. Three 
men not far behind him had been wounded in the barrages, 
two of them so seriously that they could not withdraw. Sy 
stayed to give them first aid and drag them back to cover. 
There he cared for them as best he could, and prevented 
their bleeding to death. 
The Battalion Commander, Major Herlong, who was in 
the front lines, went to the rear of C Company to bring up 
the tanks. Under the continued mortar and machine gun 
fire he moved in the open from tank to tank, encouraging 
them, insisting on their advance, and directing their fire. 
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The Company began to move forward and as the Second 
Platoon came up again, it found Sy still holding the ground. 
In spite of resistance, the battalions had reached their ob-
jectives by 1530. They established blocks on the bridge over 
the Vire and set up for all-round defense. Headquarters 
Company of the Second Battalion again found itself in an 
apple orchard full of artillery, and three 'men were killed. 
l\1ajor Laney, the Battalion Executive Officer, was wounded. 
During the day 24 men of the Regiment were killed, 116 
were wounded, and 29 were missing. A count of prisoners 
showed that 236 had been taken. 
On the 28th the Third Battalion moved a short distance 
to the south to continue its former mission of preventing the 
enemy from crossing the Vire into the division flank. About 
- noon, the Regiment, with its two remaining battalions, was 
ordered south to an assembly area near St. Romphaire, but as 
the area was being fought in by the 117th, we did not occupy' 
it until 1-645. The CP set up just south of Le Ronceur. Hot 
food was served to some units for the first time. 
The next day the Regiment was ordered to attack south 
between the 117th and 1.20th and seize the area east of 
Etourniere and Troisgots to the Vire. The First and Second 
Battalions attacked abreast, the First Battalion on the right, 
and later in the morning, the Third Battalion was released 
from its mission and joined the attack on the right of the 
First Battalion. Tough resistance was met all day and little 
progress was made. The Germans were withdrawing eastward 
from the peninsula through Tessy to the south, and their 
firm defense of Troisgots was part of an action to cover their 
withdrawal. We ran into their Second SS Panzer Division. 
Our advance from Pont Hebert had required some such com-
mitment on their part. 
I Company was held up by two tanks with machine guns 
and rifles in support firing from somewhere behind the next 
hedgerow. T/Sgt. Fred D. Steelman, an acting platoon 
leader, was unwilling to send his men first into this fire and 
acted as lead scout himself. Five separate times he led his 
platoon up to the hedgerow, and each time was forced back 
by direct fire from the tanks which shredded the hedgerow 
before him. Through large gaps in the opposite hedgerow 
came heavy machine gun fire from unseen positions some dis-
tance behind. 
Five times Sergeant Steelman had prevented his men from 
scattering over the open field, and had managed careful with-
drawals to safety. He brought them up to the hedgerow a 
sixth time as they heard the nearest tank changing its position. 
Sergeant Steelman planned to clear his way by getting at the 
tank with a bazooka, and then eliminating the machine guns. 
To locate the guns, he deliberately walked across the gaps, 
provoking the machine gun ~rews into declaring themselves. 
In crossing the second gap,, he was killed instantly. 
Company A lost its commanding officer, a platoon leader, 
and others from the artillery. That afternoon, the Company 
consisted of 42 men. Company strength in most companies 
was approximately a platoon. Company A had only one 
mortar left and it was the only effective weapon they had 
against the well dug-in enemy. This mortar was set up in 
the middle of the clearing before a hedgerow to get suffi-
cient mass clearance. Pfc. George B. Boston and Pfc. Na-
than Daniels manned the mortar under continuous small 
arms and artillery fire without cover. They refused to inter-
rupt their fire to dig. They fired 136 rounds, and by their 
persistance and accuracy disorganized the enemy so that they 
fled, leaving their dead and wounded lying over the entire 
area. This was remarka:ble, because the Germans almost 
always took pains to bury or evacuate their dead. We sel-
dom had the consolation of comparing their casualties to ours. 
When the advance of C Company was stopped by ex-
tremely heavy fire, Sergeant Robert W. Chapin chose to 
lead his squad around the flank through a deep draw. It was 
a dangerous maneuver, yet when he took the position of 
lead scout, his squad moved out. On the way, he was mor-
tally wounded by a machine gun covering the draw, but be-
fore he died, he was able to direct his squad by a slightly 
different route into the enemy flank. The enemy, with his 
position flanked, withdrew. 
By evening, we were at least in sight of Troisgots. Dur-
ing the day eight men were killed, 86 wounded, and seven 
were missing. In the early morning, the Third Battalion 
had suffered casualties from an enemy bombing and strafing. 
That afternoon, we were given air support, the fire of 
which fell short and was withdrawn by request. During 
the night, enemy planes bombed the Regimental and rear 
areas, causing some loss in personnel and vehicles. After 
that, enemy planes apP'eared with such regularity each night 
that they were referred to as "Bed-Check Charlie," and no 
one went to sleep until Charlie had his go at us. 
The Regiment had about the same mission on the 30th. 
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The attack began late in the morning, supported by tanks. 
The Germans also used a good many tanks, very effectively, 
two of which took pleasure running through the First Bat-
talion lines, seemingly unaffected by the fire placed upon 
them. They soon found that a bazooka packs a terrific 
wallop. 
Throughout the day, we maintained strong pressure, but 
with little progress. In the afternoon General Hobbs di-
rected for the first time that a church steeple-at Troisgots--
be knocked out since it might be an artillery observation 
post. In a short time it was hit and burning, and that much 
we had accomplished. 
The understrength platoon of tanks with the Third Bat-
talion was lost to the action; one had been hit, two had 
engine trouble, and the remaining one was forced to with-
draw. Before nightfall, the 35th Division attacked south on 
the opposite side of the Vire, and there was some hope that 
the deadlock would be broken. During the day there were 
nine killed, 79 wounded, and five missing. 
According to the attack order for the 31st, Troisgots was 
to be attacked simultaneously from both flanks as well as 
frontally from the north. The western flank was to be at-
tacked by K Company with a company of tanks from the 
743rd Tank Battalion, and the eastern flank was to be at-
/~ 
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tacked by the Second Battalion, also with a company of 
tanks from the 74-3rd. The First and Third Battalions were 
to move up from their previous positions, the First being 
on the left. A company of light tanks, D Company, was 
sent to cover our left rear along the river. The push jumped 
at 0700 with slow progress. The enemy had most of the 
roads blocked and mined. and resisted actively with artil-
lery, mortars, small arm~, and a considerable force of tanks. 
In the Third Battalion sector, Sgt. Joseph K. Deike and 
Pfc. Robert E. Look were engaged in clearing the roads. To 
reach one road block under observation of the enemy, they 
had to crawl 200 yards on their stomachs. After reaching 
the block, they crawled around from one mine to another, 
digging them out with trench knives and neutralizing a large 
number of attached booby traps. They labored in this manner 
for two hours before the block was neutralized. 
Company L located the position of one very obstinate tank 
and found a possible route of getting at it, A call was sent 
for bazooka men, only to find that all the bazooka men of the 
two lead platoons had become casualties. S/ S·gt. Frank H. 
Owens and Pfc. Elbert Whisnant, amateurs with a bazooka, 
volunteered to take a crack at the tank. They obtained a 
bazooka and crawled with it along a hedgerow some distance 
ahead of the foremost troops. Then, making a dash across an 
open space, they reached a firing position within close range 
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of the tank. The first rocket launched struck the turret, 
killing the ·gunner and knocking the tank out. Company L 
was able to move up several rows. 
With the help of artillery applied to enemy strong points 
and tanks, the attack staggered slowly ahead. The tanks 
with the Second Battalion were sent off to help the First 
Battalion, and as a result, the Second Battalion, without 
them, was slowed down by small arms fire. Around noon, 
K Company's tanks were ready to move into Troisgots, but 
were held up by fire from enemy tanks inside the town. The 
light tanks were brought up from the left rear and com-
mitted in the Second Battalion sector, only to be promptly 
stopped by enemy artillery. 
In the course of the afternoon, the enemy tanks inside 
Troisgots were knocked out one by one, and by 1630 both 
the First and Third Battalions were in the town while the 
rest of the Second Battalion cleaned up outside the town. 
By nightfall, practically all resistance had ceased. All ele-
ments dug in covering the river crossing and reverted to 
Division reserve. 
Seventeen men were killed, 80 wounded, and eight miss-
ing. Twenty-one prisoners were captured. 
AUGUST 
Le Mesnil Adelee-Le Mesnil Tove--Romagny-Mortain 
-Les Forges- Brezolles- Droisy-Evreax-Flacourt-
Seine Crossing- Porcheville- Ablemont-Vigny-Livil-
lerex. 
We had· broken out of the Normandy Peninsula by the 
end of July and the Third Army was heading south across 
the Brittany Peninsula. The German line still held against 
the English at Caen and was anchored at Vire, to the south-
east of St. Lo, but below there it seemed to have given way 
completely. The Germans had not succeeded very well ) n 
stopping the drive south by attacking its flank at Troisgots, 
nor had they been successful in withdrawing any great num-
ber of their troops out of the Normandy Peninsula. 
For the first few days in August, the 119th Infantry 
rested from its hard fighting. Some were able to get hot 
showers, and a USO troupe showed up to entertain us. Red 
Cross clubmobiles also appeared and though there was no 
time to make coffee, there were doughnuts and girls. Less 
officially, of course, there was calvados. 
On the third of August, the Second Battalion was at-
tached to Combat Command A of the Second Armored Di-
vision on a mission to the south. The balance of the Regi-
ment rested two more days in the same area between St. 
Romphaire and Troisgots. The Luftwaffe still paid us his 
nightly visit and rocked us to sleep. 
During this period, the Second Battalion suffered heavy 
losses. Later, when they returned victorious, they had a. 
strange look in their eyes and renewed hatred for the enemy. 
The Regiment, on the sixth, with two battalions, made a 
long move to the south passing through Tescy-sur-Vire, 
Percy, Villadieu, Brecey, and. then southeast toward Juvigny-
le-Tertre, to an assembly area in the fields around La Blairie. 
The entire Division with attachments and ~everal other units 
were on the road, so there were frequent halts. It was 
summer weather, and from Percy on there was almost no 
evidence of war. The civilians had not been evacuated and 
stood along the road with flowers, calvados, and cider for 
the troops as they passed. And, although our hearts were 
softened by the French gratitude, our eyes were blackened 
by the apples they tossed as we passed. It did look now as if 
the liberation was going to be a successful proposition, and 
everyone became very excited. 
The Division area had been occupied recently by the Third 
Armored Division. The First Infantry Division had just 
moved out, expecting a long move to the south. We also 
made plans, in accordance with a Division order, or a long 
move in the early morning to Domfront. 
Adolf Hitler, however, had another idea. Along the line 
from Cherence le Roussel through St. Barthelemy to Mor-
tain he had massed four SS Panzer Divisions, among them 
the First-which had been withdrawn from Caen to Trois-
gots and was now east of Mortain-and the 116th, which at 
this time was not particularly formidable, though in the fall 
it became the principal trouble-shooting outfit all along the 
front. This massing of force was the preparation for a thrust 
west throtigh Mortain to Avranches on the Channel, which 
was to cut the American armies in two. The plan ha~ a fair 
chance of succeeding because the distance was not great; 
many of our units in the way of the trust were weary and 
badly depleted, and . the town of Avranches controlled the 
main routes of supply between the forces in Normandy and 
those who had driven south. 
The attack began late the night of the sixth. The First 
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Division had held the sector rather loosely, and we had just 
moved in. We were not organized and there was even a. 
great shortage. of maps. The 120th Infantry, which had 
moved into the sector before us, had one battalion on the 
high ground east of Mortain, its Regimental CP in the west-
ern outskirts, and a number of road blocks set up covering 
the approaches to the town. The Germans, in a regulation 
pincer movement, attacked Mortain from the northeast and 
southeast, drove out the Regimental CP of the 120th and 
isolated the Battalion on the hill. They began a less con-
centrated attack by infiltration of armor and infantry all 
along the Division front. On the strategic level, the war 
was getting to be a very interesting affair. • 
The first we knew of the action was a report that came in 
at 0400 of enemy movement to the northeast of us, near 
Cherence le Roussel. The move to Domfront was indefinitely 
postponed. A good many reports came in from the 117th 
to the southeast of us as the masses of German armor pierced 
their area in the darkness, frequently moving within touch-
ing distance of our troops. At 0700, a 197th Field Artillery 
observer reported a hostile tank: attack forming at Romagny, 
and that the Germans were within Le Mesnil Tove. 
A few minutes later, the First Battalion was ordered into 
Division reserve, to an assembly area close to the Division 
CP and not very far from Romagny. All light tanks of the 
743rd Tank Battalion with the Regiment went with the First 
Battalion. Upon request, B Company was allowed to remain 
as Regimental reserve and was given the mission of setting 
up a road block in Le Mesnil Adelee with the help of two 
guns of the Battalion AT Platoon. They found that Le 
Mesnil Adelee was full of enemy tanks, two of which they 
saw. Motors of about ten others could be heard in the town. 
They established positions 7{)0 yardsfrom the first tank, and 
with the trap baited, waited. 
The Third Battalion, supported by medium tanks from 
the 743rd Tank Battalion, was ordered to move north from 
Juvigny-e-Terte and capture Le Mesnil Tove. Five hundred 
yards south of Le Mesnil Tove, near the crossroads at La 
Prevetiere, their tanks were engaged and one was knocked 
out. The infantry was pinned down by small arms and 
automatic fire. S/Sgt. Merlin C. Johnson, a mortar observer 
with L Company, went forward along a trail east of the 
main road, through some open woods to find a position from 
which he could direct mortar fire on an enemy tank and 
three vehicles. He knocked out the tank: and at least one of 
the vehicles, which burned. From the same location, he was 
able to break up an attempt by enemy troops to take up posi-
tions along the road running east out of Le Mesnil Tove. 
The Second Platoon of K Company had fought its way 
60 yards into a field beyond the crossroads when tracked 
vehicles were heard coming down the road into their right 
flank. Pfc. Leonard V. Henry grabbed a light machine gun 
and ran back towards the crossroads to defend it. He found 
that one enemy half-track had already parked and unleaded a 
group of infantrymen who w~re on their way to positions on 
the west side of the main road opposite the Second Platoon. 
As a second half-track approached, Pfc. Henry fired and 
it came to a halt. The enemy infantry jwnped to the 
ground and began to fire back. Pfc. Henry wounded the 
two foremost men, and the other seven threw down their 
weapons and surrendered. When he had taken his prisoners 
to the rear, he returned with incendiary grenades and de-
stroyed both half-tracks. 
L Company advanced some 100 yards beyond the cross-
jQ 
roads before it was pinned down. Behind a hedgerow 50 
yards ahead were enemy riflemen and a machine-gun nest. 
One man with a burp-gun was firing from an enemy half-
track which had been knocked out near the hedge. 
S/ Sgt. Ralph E. Markley ran to the side of a barn 
where he could remain hidden and still observe the enemy 
machine gun. He had a rifle with a grenade launcher, and 
with the first grenade he knocked out the gun. As the Ger-
mans in the wrecked half-track withdrew, the enemy rifleman 
spotted Sergeant Markley and turned their fire on him. 
He made a break from the barn in full view of the enemy 
and jumped for the cover of a sunken road 25 yards away. 
On landing, he found himself in the midst of five Germans 
who were setting up a mortar. 
In the confusion, the enemy fled. As they ran he fired a 
grenade, killing one and wounding two others. The enemy 
soon became disorganized, and L Company was able to make 
a short advance before it was held up again. The Germans 
had begun using a great volume of artillery to defend the 
town. The Third Battalion made no more progress the 
rest of the day. 
Company I was ordered first on a separate mission to estab-
lish a road block at the road junction 800 yards west of 
La Prevetiere, and then they had been instructed to move 
down the road to Le Mesnil Adelee and join B Company. 
They had five tanks with them and were proceeding west-
ward cautiously, for 35 enemy half-tracks were reported to 
be loose in the area. Early in the afternoon some planes 
were sighted, but, since they were identified as American 
P-47s and British Typhoons, neither I Company nor the 
tanks took cover. The planes however, dived on the unit, 
firing rockets, machine guns, and dropping bombs. 
Three of the tanks were disabled and the unit was scat-
tered and disorganized. These planes, especially the British 
Typhoons, tho~gh they fired on other units of the Third 
Battalion all along the line, were mainly responsible for halt-
ing the Germans' counter-offensive in this immediate sector. 
It was reported that the Germans had been firing red smoke 
shells over I Company and B Company so that the planes 
would take them for their targets 
I Company and its tanks had not yet reorganized from 
the strafing and bombing when a large force of enemy tanks 
and infantry moved out of Le Mesnil Adelee to capture 
part of the unit. A platoon leader was captured, and Pfc. 
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Daniel ]. Noyes, who tried to find him, was driven back 
by an armored car. 
The Germans had withdrawn from Le Mesnil Adelee 
when tombat Command B of the Third Armored Division 
fi nally came up behind B Company. Combat Command B 
moved into L e l\1esnil Adelee and then east toward Le M es-
nil Tove. B Company moved into Le Mesnil Adelee and a 
task force was formed under Captain Stewart, consist-
ing of B Company, I Company, a platoon of AT Com-
pany, and a platoon of engineers. Captain Stewart was or-
dered to block the town after he had withdrawn the greater 
number of his troops from it. Though we had been rein-
forced, we could as yet do little more than hold. 
The Regimental CP of the 117th in front of St. Barthelmy 
had been overrun by Tiger tanks, and though three of them 
had been knocked out in the CP by bazookas, there were 
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others roaming about. Groups of the enemy had infiltrated 
around the rear of the Third Battalion before Le Mesnil 
Tove, and a platoon of B Company with one platoon and 
two squads of the 105th Engineers were sent to take care of 
the"n. 
That night, Cannon Company reported _that they had 
knocked out one Panther, one Tiger, two ammunition dumps, 
and two machine guns. The Regiment's Third Battalion and 
Special Units suffered the loss of 28 wounded and six missing. 
The First Battalion, operating on Division order under Ma-
jor Herlong, was committed and stopped cold close to 
Romagny, where it fought all night. The Second Battalion 
was expected back from its mission with the Second Armored 
Division during the night, and the Third Battalion was noti-
fied that the Second would help them take L e Mesnil Tove 
the next day. 
The Second Armored Division, with our Second Battalion 
still attached, had had the mission of capturing Vire, one 
of the principal anchors of the German line. This town con-
trolled seve:·al routes of supply north and south. The Ger-
mans were defending it with tanks, artillery, mortars, and 
infantry, and were bringing in fresh troops and supplies. 
As the Second Armored with infantry riding, approached 
the high gmund west of the town, it drew considerable 
artillery and both tanks and infantry suffered losses. Never-
theless, they deployed at the summit of the long slope down 
into the town, G Company with a company of medium tanks 
on the right for flanking movement on the town, and on the 
left E and F Companies with a company of light and a com-
pany of medium tanks for a direct assault down the slope. 
On the evening of the sixth the attack began. The main 
body of the attack got no closer to the town than 2,000 
yards. One platoon of E Company reached the first houses on 
the outskirts of Vire but was driven back by a superior force 
of enemy infantry. Having suffered heavy losses in armor 
and infantry, the Second Armored pulled all its forces back 
over the hill onto the reverse slope to avoid the direct tank 
fire, and dug in for the night. 
The Germans sustained their artillery fires most of the 
night and we replied. Our tanks set a large German ammuni-
ton dump afire, and the Germans, among other successes, 
blew up one of our half-tracks which contained cases of C 
rations. The C rations were blown over 100 feet into the 
air and descended, cooked through, over several hedgerows, 
providing the infantry with chow, but little consolation. 
On the morning· of the seventh the attack was renewed 
with about the same dispositions, and again failed with heavy 
losses. As the Second Armored withdrew, elements of the 
fresh 29th Division, which eventually took the town, were 
approaching it. from the northwest. The Second Battalion, 
in returning to the Regiment without maps, became scattered 
and arrived in small groups during the night and the early 
morning of the eighth. Instead of being sent to help the 
Third Battalion to take Le Mesnil Tove as previously 
planned, it went into Division reserve to rest and reorganize. 
During the day, the Third Battalion helped stop an enemy 
breakthrough between the I I 7th Infantry and the 39th 
Infantry. 
That night the First Platoon of AT Company, attached to 
the Third Battalion, had placed a gun at the crossroads be-
fore Le Mesnil Tove. They had emplaced after dark to avoid 
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Lt. Col. Carlton E. Stewart 
enemy observation. They had no sooner dug in around the 
gun than a barrage of artillery and mortars came in. The 
enemy fire on the area between the crossroads and the town 
was almost constant, and the fields and road were filling with 
debris. 
Early in the morning a barrage killed a squad leader, and 
wounded a Third Armored Division officer and four men 
who had a position about a hundred yards up the road from 
the AT gun. Pfc. Eldred Viard and Pfc. William L. Lind-
quist raced from the gun to the wounded under the fire and 
began carrying them back to the Battalion Aid Station; they 
had to make four trips. The enemy was probably watching 
their movements, because shortly after they had returned to 
their squad, enemy shells came in on the gun and one of 
them hit the ammunition truck, setting it afire. Another 
struck beside it, wounding a member of the squad and caving 
his foxhole in on top of him. Pfcs Viard and Lindquist 
again left their holes to dig him out and save him from suffo-
cation. They were both hit by shrapnel. Still, in spite of 
their wounds and the exploding ammunition truck, they dug 
the man out and carried him away from the truck to the 
other side of the road. There was only one foxhole there 
and they put the wounded man in it while they gave-him first 
aid, remaining exposed to the continued fire themselves. 
The Third Battalion was to move to the northeast and 
take up a position on the hills east of Le Mesnil Tove in 
preparation for a descent on the town from that flank. They 
were reinforced for this operation by the return of I Com-
pany and the attachment of Task Force One, Combat Com-
mand B, of the Third Armored. Task Force Two of that 
Command was to cover their right flank and keep in contact 
with them. · 
But the Germans, whose grand attack had been disor-
ganized on the seventh, mainly by the Typhoons and their 
rockets, renewed the push on the eighth; we held, but only 
at great cost. That morning the Luftwaffe was up in great 
numbers, but for once we were not bombed. Either the planes 
had business elsewhere or they were clearing the air for the 
ground attack. 
The Third Battalion, with Task Force One to its left, 
jumped off at 1330. For a couple of hours its attack failed 
to gain Le Mesnil Tove because of the enemy artillery. The 
town was being defended to cover the passage of tanks, 
a.mong them those which ·had already withdrawn from Le 
Mesnil Adelee, or to hold a base, if the main attack from 
the east could come up and 5Upport them in a second thrust 
toward A vranches. 
When the Third Battalion was finally able to gain the 
town, the tanks of the task force had it almost completely 
surrounded, and eight medium tanks and a platoon of in-
fantry were already inside it. Later, the task force was 
driven out of the town by the Germans, and it was finally 
cleared by Captain Stewart's task force. 
The German tanks withdrew from the neighborhood very 
gradually. At this time Charence le Roussel to the north 
was in our hands, and Company A had made contact with 
the Eighth Infantry there. At 1700 the Third Battalion had 
reduced La Bernadaye to the east of Le Mesnil Tove and was 
heading farther east, though not rapidly. One German tank 
in front of L Company proved the delaying factor. For a 
while, Task Force One was cut off from the Third Battalion 
by the fire around Le Mesnil Tove. Task Force Two came 
up on the right flank of the Third Battalion, southwest of 
Le Grand Dove. At 2150, when the Third Battalion dug 
in, it was in contact with both forces. 
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On the ninth at 0700, Task Force Two, with L Company 
on its left, moved north to cut the road running east of 
Le Mesnil Tove, at a point just east of La Bernadaye. A 
tank in front of L Company opposed the advance, but with-
drew before the road was cut behind it. The mission was 
changed, and the force advanced to Grand Dove. We had 
cut the road more to block the advance of tanks coming from 
the east than to cut off those around Le l\1esnil Tove, and 
we were now heading into the enemy line of advance. 
Task Force One was on our left, and Task Force Two 
on our right. Both forces suffered very heavy casualties 
from enemy artillery, _ and one shell landed· in a group of 
officers of Task Force Two, killing Colonel CoFnog, the unit 
commander, and making casualties of almost all the officers. 
This disrupted the plans for the attack. 
The Third Battalion was finally ordered to move on at 
1920 withou't the tanks. L Company advanced astride the 
road, with K Company on its left and somewhat to the 
rear, and with I Company following. Company K was held 
up by stiff resistance, so L Company halted and waited for 
them to come abreast. The lead platoon of L Company 
was running short of ammunition and, while they halted, a 
small group was sent back to the rear to get more. During 
the halt the platoon cleared three houses in the area and set 
up a defense. Sgt. Edwin J. Schaeffer was standing guard 
in the doorway of one of the houses when he noticed an en-
emy soldier leaving a patch of woods and entering a trail 
nearby. Sergeant Schaeffer called to him in German to sur-
render; but he turned around, fired a shot and took off behind 
the hedgerow. Sgt. Schaeffer ran after him, alternately 
firing and waving at him to come back. After 150 yards of 
this, Sergeant Shaeffer came upon a group of 25 Germans 
and assumed they were prisoners of K Company. He asked 
for K Company. One of them answered with a burp gun 
and all hell broke loose. 
Segeant Shaeffer turned his BAR on them and they all hit 
the ground. His fire proved persuasive, for 'an officer among 
them held up his hands and the group. surrendered. 
At 2020 the companies were instructed to make physical 
contact with each other, to close up the gaps, and to protect 
the tanks, which were more or less following. The infantry 
of Task Force Two was committed to secure the left flank, 
and the tanks were held in defilade. Before the Third Bat-
talion dug in, they had advanced with difficulty about 500 
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yards. During the day three men had been killed, 51 
wounded, and one was missing. 
The Third Battalion made a rap·id advance on the tenth 
to reach an o:·chard just west of Grand Dove by 1000. Al-
though enemy artillery was still severe and a few tanks were 
reported prowling around Le Mesnil Tove, infantry resist-
ance was slight. 
That afternoon we dug in on the forward slope east of 
Grand Dove and organized a main line of resistance. On the 
11th there was almo~t no activity. The Third Battalion 
merely maintained their defensive positions. The hard fight-
ng on these two days was done by the First and Second Bat· 
talions, which were with the Third Armored Division at-
tacking the town of Mortain and the hills west and north of 
it in an effort to reach the isolated battalion of the 120th. 
The enemy defended the hills and the town vigorously with 
artillery, tanks, entrenched infant~y, and frequent counter-
attacks. 
On the morning of the tenth, the Second Battalion suc-
ceeded in pushing the enemy off the high ground a half mile 
to the west of Mortain, but when they attempted to take 
the hills north of the town they were held up. Capt. War-
ren L. Fox of E Company dismounted from his tank and led 
his Company forward through the artillery and heavy small 
arms fire. He made a steady advance before he was mor-
tally wounded. In the early afternoon the enemy attacked 
E Company with three tanks and at least one company of 
infantry. E Company was forced to withdraw, and the en-
emy followed, pressing to within 200 yards of the Company 
front. 
Sgt. Joseph C. Leve moved his light machine gun squad 
100 yards to the right. He and his squad held the enemy 
for th ree hours, while E Company withdrew 400 yards and 
reorganized. Other units of the Battalion sustained similar 
attacks and suffered heavy casualties. 
First Sgt. Thomas H. Kirkman was sent back to the Bat-
talion CP to bring up replacements. They were later to be 
known more pleasantly as reinforcements, but at this time 
they were replacements. Sergeant Kirkman went back to the 
CP on foot, where he loaded one hundred replacements onto 
thr~e two-and-a-half-ton trucks. They rode to a point 1,700 
yards behind the forward elements and then unloaded. Ser-
geant Kirkman assigned them to company groups and started 
the march forward. As they passed through a draw and came 
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up over a hill, the enemy spotted them and began laying on 
artillery, mo~tar, and machine grm fire. 
As this was their first fire, the replacements started running 
in panic to the rear. Two of them were killed and several 
were wounded. Sergeant Kirkman ran to the rear of the 
column and stopped the fleeing men. Heatedly, he told them 
to follow him, that the Battalion would be wiped out if it 
did not get help. The men followed him. Late in the after-
noon the enemy launched another attack which Sergeant 
Kirkman, leading a group of the replacements, helped stop. 
During the attacks, patrols were sent to the right and left 
flanks to ascertain if there was any possibilty of flanking to 
envelope the enemy. The patrols found that the Second 
Battalion had more chance of being enveloped by the enemy 
than of flanking the enemy them~elves. Lt. Charles N. 
Blodgett was given the mission of reinforcing the right and 
left flanks of the Battalion with two reinforced machine gun 
platoons. While the fire fight was at its bitterest, Lieutenant 
Blodgett placed his men first to the left where the threat was 
greatest, and then to the right, throwing back the enemy 
envelopment of the Battalion flanks. 
The First Battalion was in similar difficulties to the wuth 
of the Second. On the outskirts of the town, Company A ran 
into a minefield, which stopped the platoon of medium tanks 
with the Company. The sergeant of the Third Platoon, 
Francis M. Cordle, maneuvered his men into positions cover-
ing the tanks and at the same time gradually continuing the 
advance. While the tanks cleared a way through the mine-
field and advanced cautiously through it, the infantry platoon 
pushed forward with the help of one tank-dozer, which was 
opening gaps in the hed·gerows for them. 
Suddenly the enemy opened up• with accurate cannon fire 
on the do2er and it was presently in flames. The Third 
Platoon broke and headed for cover. Sergeant Cordle ex-
posed himself to the fire of the enemy hidden only 300 yards 
away, in an attempt to hold the line. In spite of his efforts, 
he was only able to rally four men. Since he had no order 
to withdraw, he and his four men remained to stop the 
enemy who now cam.e charging down the hill. The enemy 
came within 2,00 yards and began concentrating their fire on 
the remaining tanks and men. Only after the tanks were 
able to withdraw to covered positions did Sergeant Cordle 
pull his men' back. With the enemy at close range he covered 
the withdrawal of his four men before he himself left. A 
few men with stout hearts can do great things. 
Lt. Col. Robert H. Herlong 
Our mortars did a large part of the work in holding off 
the counterattacks and preventing further withdrawals. The 
enemy, however, was also making good use of its artillery 
and mortars. A particularly heavy barrage fell on C Com-
pany, which had committed all four of its platoons. The 
Third Platoon, on the Company right was driven back un-
der heavy pressure, leaving a wide gap between C Company 
and B Company on their right. 
Lt. Earl C. Bowers exposed himself to the barrage and 
o:mall arms fi ~e to reorganize the rlatoon and to fight it back 
into its position. Although the Battalion sustained heavy 
casualties, it was successful in stemming the German drive. 
Here our mission was to hold against a vastly superior 
force, but Major Herlong realized that the best defense was 
offense. The enemy found each attack counterattacked, each 
penetration pinched off. Clever deployment and patroling on 
our open right flank confused the enemy. The enemy out-
numbered our forces at least three-to-one. A push on the 
right flank or an all-out push any place in the sector would 
have broken through. A rough-rid·ing major from South 
Carolina out-bluffed and out-smarted the best Hitler had 
to offer. 
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When the attack was renewed, one of our tanks was hit 
and started burning. The crew, with the exception of one 
member, escaped and fled from the tank. The man inside 
had been hit by fragments and was calling for help. The 
ammunition was expected to start exploding at any minute. 
Sgt. Agaptio B. Morales of D Company climbed up on 
the burning tank and dragged the man out to safety. When 
the tanker was safe he said to Sergeant Morales, "May God 
be with you." It was a good time to be in a religious state 
of mind. This man had found, as many another had, that 
in time of need there was a religion and a God for every 
man. 
On the 11th, the Second Battalion, with the Third Ar-
mored Division, assaulted the town of L'Abbaye Blanche· on 
a hill to the north of Mortain. A forward observer for the 
81 -mm mortar section of H Company, Sgt. Frederick W. 
Unger, was in a Sherman tank on a forward knoll of the 
hill when the tank was hit and set afire by an enemy AT 
gun. Sergeant Unger crawled out of the tank, took up a 
position behind a hedgerow 15 yards away and continued to 
direct mortar fire. The mortar section itself had suffered 
casualties and was becoming disorganized under the enemy 
fire. Lt. Clair Askew crawled from section to section of his 
phtoon reorganizing the gun crews and setting an example 
of courage, until he was killed. Under his example the mor-
tars made it possible for the infantry to move forward. 
Toward dusk the tanks and infantry moved back several 
fields to organize defenses for the night. Almost imme-
diately they had to fight off an enemy counterattack. The 
Second Battalion, like the First, was barely holding its 
ground. For the two days the Regiment su~ered 53 killed, 
290 wounded, and 13 missing. 
On the 12th the Germans abruptly changed their plans 
and began to withdraw. lt was not an easy withdrawal; an 
observer from the isolated battlaion on the east of Mortain 
was able to direct artiU, ~ry on their troops and convoys as 
they moved back from the town. In withdrawing from 
Mortain they abandone i the counter-offensive on Avranches, 
together with the hor ~ of pushing the Allies back into the 
Channel and restoriHg the Atlantic wall. 
They changed t·.1eir whole Continental strategy and de-
termined to fall 1: ~ck on Paris and the Seine line, fighting 
only delaying act; ,ns between Mortain and the Seine. They 
probably did not seriously expect to hold the Seine very long, 
and it was to be held only as a wearing action and to gain 
time for strengthening the Siegfried Line and the defenses 
of Germany itself. 
General Dittmar, who in the last few days of the Euro-
pean war surrendered to the 117th Infantry at Magdeburg, 
said that the failure of the Avranches counteroffensive was 
the turning point of the war, at least it precipitated matters. 
the Germans had been badly battered by the Allied air 
forces and also, on the night of the 11th, by their own Luft-
waffe. They might perhaps have pushed through us at 
Mortain, but the cost of getting through such resistan~e as 
the 30th Division put UP' must have seemed very high for an 
objective like Avranches, ·whose value was daily declining. 
.In the morning K Company was sent to help the First 
Battalion, and with this fresh strength and the gradual with-
drawal of the Germans, and ' the First Battalion was east of 
Mortain by noon. Elements of the 35th Infantry had al-
ready pushed past them and relieved the battalion of the 
DOth. In the afternoon, the Third Battalion pushed as far 
as La Graviere without much difficulty. That evening the 
XIX Corps attacked across our front to end our action 
around Mortain. As a result of the rapid and complicated 
movement of the action, and the flexible construction of the 
American army, the Regiment now consisted of parts of spe-
cial units, the First Battalion of the 120th Infantry, at-
tached, and the .Second Battalion of the 117th Infantry, at-
tached. The original Regiment (not counting attached 
units) suffered 11 killed 52 wounded, and 11 missing during 
the day. 
On the 13th, the Regiment was somewhat untangled. The 
Third Battalion came back and the Second Battalion of the 
117th left. The Division was getting straightened out to 
move on, after the long interruption, to Domfort. 
For route security, K Company occupied the high ground 
The First Battalion Doughboys mo'Ye through the streets of Mortain, which were littered with 
destroyed American equipment. 
American men pick their way through the debris and rubble as they adYance through the 
French town of Domfront in pursuit of the fleeing German forces. 
southeast of Mortain to cover the road to Barenton, while 
the rest of the Third Battalion was sent just north of Baren-
ton itself. On the 14th the Division moved to an area east 
of Barenton, and the Regiment, in reserve, stopped just east 
of St. Cyr du Bailleul. On the 15th, the Regiment moved 
up around Domfort, relieving elements of the 120th. The 
Second Battalion took the high ground just northwest of 
Domfort and east of La Haute Chapelle without meeting 
the enemy. The Third Battalion took up defensive positions 
on the high ground between the main roads running east 
_from Domfort and St. Front de Colliere. The First Bat-
talion moved northeast along the road running south of the 
V arenne toward Dompierre. 
They met little resistance, except from some scattered 
tanks, which did not last long. Morale was high after the 
previous victory, and resistance met sudden death. There 
were no casualties during the day and two prisoners were 
taken, 
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On the 16th we continued to move northeast until contact 
was made with the First Division coming up from the south. 
Then we moved slightly north and set up• defensive positions 
in what amounted to a semi-rest area. The Regimental CP 
sat in a rather large house LOOO yards southeast of Les 
Forges. 
This house was referred to as a chateau. 'It was nothing 
of the kind, hardly even a manor, but the CP, being accus-
tomed to holes dug into hedgerows by a dozer, or farm-
houses at the most, assumed delusions of grandeur on hav-
ing a residence In any case, the whole Regiment, in holes 
and houses, rested and laughed for the first time in days. 
For three days, reorganization took place and the units were 
partially brought up to TIO strength. 
On the 19th, the Regiment made a long motor move. We 
cruised east from Domfront through Juvigny-sous-Andaine, 
Alencon, Belleme, Mauves, Longny, Senonches, and stopped 
just northeast of Brezolles. The French civilians along the 
American Infantrymen of the 30th DiYision look at the American Flag flying from the 
damaged front of the town hall of the French town of Argentan, which is a symbol of 
liberation to the inhabitants, a sign of Yictory to these fighting men, and another step 
forward on the road to Berlin. 
roa~ were feeling the first excitement of the liberation and 
greeted us wildly as we passed. They yelled "vive !'Amer-
ique" as they tossed flowers and apples to us. During stops, 
they brought cider, wine, and cognac to the trucks. We gave 
them cigarettes. 
The French children, with their customary cynicism, soon 
turned this into a racket and invented the famous question, 
"Cigarette pour Papa?" The gesture of two fingers raised 
to represent V for Victory was soon lowered to the lips as 
sign language for "how about a smoke?" 
The feeling between the French population and the Amer-
ican army was declared by the press and public persons to be 
excellent, but through misunderstandings and impatience on 
both sides it soon deteriorated to a dangerous degree. In late 
August and early September, however, it really was almost 
as good as advertised. On the 19th of August, the French 
had some satisfaction for their exasperated pride, in the news 
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from Paris. The French Forces of the Interior, the FFL 
or the "fifis," had started an insurrection in the capital 
and were thus threatening the base of German operations in 
France. 
On the 20th, the Regiment began what amounted to a 
pursuit of the Germans, from Brezolles to Le Mesnil Morin, 
northeast of Evreux. It was the first of a series of rapid 
moves which came to be known as "rat races." 
The assault jumped off at 0800 with the First Battalion on 
the right in contact with the I 20th, and the Second Battalion 
on the left in contact with the I 13th Cavalry. The Third 
Battalion, in reserve, followed the Second Battalion. We 
were movmg northeast to an objective near Droisy on the 
other side of the Avre River. There was very little resist-
ance until we reached the river, where we found the 'bridges 
blown and drew some small arms fire. The First Battalion 
fought across the river at a ford east of Aeon, and before 
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noon, the Second Battalion was crossing at Breux. The 
First Battalion, on the right, drove ahead rapidly in spite 
of the rough terrain, but the Second Battalion, on the left, 
ran into difficulties. The two leading platoons crossed a small 
bridge over a gully 500 yards short of the high ground be-
fore Droisy. 
The enemy occupied the high ground and had excellent ob-
servation on the bridge. After the two platoons had crossed, 
the enemy dropped artillery on the bridge and laid in a quan-
tity of mortar and small arms fire on the platoons. The 
bridge was destroyed and the Company split. The two lead 
platoons thought the Company was following and went on 
-into a stretch of woods. Artillery and small arms fell so 
heavily at both ends of the bridge that the rest of the Com-
pany, after four attempts to approach it, was forced to with-
draw. 
Sergeant Alexander K. Harvey volunteered to get across 
the gulley and contact the lead platoons. On leaving cover 
he was pinned down by machine gun fire, but succeeded in 
crawling the 40 yards to the edge of the gulley beside the 
bridge. Even in the gulley1 he had to hit the ground becau:e 
of artillery fire. When he had crawled out on the other 
side he had to continue crawling because of machiLle gun fire, 
and shortly afterwards a sniper opened up on him. 
Two of the sniper's bullets struck only a few inches from 
Sergeant ·Harvey's arm, and at the third shot he saw the 
sniper behind a tree 150 yards away. He rolled over into 
the road and killed the sniper with his first shot. Fighting 
his way forward, he finally caught up with the leading pla-
toons, and then went back to guide the rest of the Company 
across the gully. 
The Second Battalion moved on in a column of com-
pames. Late that afternoon a Ge:·man column consisting of 
four half-tracks, with 20MM guns and three tanks, came 
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along from the left and hit the crossroads, and our column 
was cut by enemy infantry which deployed across our line 
of march. 
Private George P. Kocotis, a radio operator marching at 
the head of the column, had taken cover in the woods to the 
northwest of the crossroads. The woods were receiving con-
siderable fire from the 20MM guns mounted on the half-
tracks. Private Kocotis tried to slip back to the rear half of 
his column by following a path parallel to the dirt road on 
which the Germans were advancing. As he came out on the 
road, a burp gun rinned him down in a ditch. 
The fire ceased and the burp gunner seemed to have moved 
on, so Private Kocotis cawled back into the woods and went 
back to his radio by the same path. He destroyed the radio, 
and finding a BAR which had been abandoned, returned to 
the road. He observed a German standing in the doorway 
of a church nearby and shot him in the stomach. A German 
corporal fired a rifle at Private Kocotis, but with the BAR 
he was permaded to surrender. Six more Germans apreared 
with their hands on top of their heads. Kocotis took advan-
tage of the confusion and herded his prisoners th--ough the 
lines to the rear element. 
Lt. Harold D. Fayette had also been cut off with F Com-
pany at the head of the column. He had moved back toward 
the crossroads to help G Company reo rganize, and became 
completely cut off from friendly forces. He managed to 
fight his way through the enemy to the. river, which he 
swam, and at last reached the CP. 
He explained the situation of F Company, which had cap-
tured a large ammunition dump· but was now in danger of 
losing it, and the s:tuation of G Company, which had suf-
fered 54 casualties. This action had developed into one of 
considerable intensity. The Third Battalion was ordered 
up to re::tore the column. The Germans, who had run into 
our column while withdrawing from positions along the 
Avre, were at last driven back and the movement was con-
tinued. 
Droisy and the objectives near it were taken before night-
fall. The First Battalion had moved its tanks across the 
Avre by the ford. The river bottom and banks became a 
bog and the other tanks had to wait until bridges were built. 
Before noon, two bridges were in use and others were under 
construction. 
We made good progress against spasmodic resistance and 
by nightfall had reached Les Authieux and Le Pare. "A" 
Company was given the mission of taking Le Pare. The 
First and Third platoons had advanced half way through 
the town, meeting very light resistance, when suddenly they 
came under very heavy fire from an enemy rifle company sup-
ported by three tanks. The two platoons suffered 21 casual-
ties from the concentration of machine gun, mortar, and 
tank fire. 
The First Platoon withdrew from the area entirely, and 
the Third Platoon disintegrated and was forced to with-
draw, leaving only 12 men with the platoon leader, Lt. 
Robert J. Henglein, to face the enemy. The tanks were 
200 yards away, two of them forward and one behind on 
the main road. Lieutenant Henglein crawled along the 
buildings SO yards ahead of his men and from an exposed 
po~ition fired a bazooka. The second rocket knocked out 
the nearest tank and thereupon the other two tanks and the 
infantry began to withdraw. Lieutenant Heng1ein was 
wounded by a shellburst from one of the tanks, but when the 
tanks had withdrawn a safe distance, he ·returned to his pla-
toon, reorganized it, and led it back into the fight for the 
town until he was too weak to continue. 
The Second Platoon of B Company, attacking across a 
level wheat field, was pinned down by rifle, burp gun, and 
machine gun fire coming from the buildings of a lone farm 
200 yards ahead. The platoon leader and the platoon ser-
geant were pinned down in an exposed position and were 
unable to move. Casualties began to mount until Sgt. Ken-
neth R. Beason, the platoon guide at the rear of the platoon, 
suddenly stood up and walked forward, calling to the men to 
follow him. He hit the ground, fired two shots and then, 
though artillery was falling in the area and the enemy con-
centrated their fire on him, he got up for another dash for-
ward, firing steadily. An enemy bullet hit him in the head, 
killing him. 
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The platoon, enraged by this, charged forward, capturing 
the enemy position, killing five, and capturing 22 Germans 
and three machine guns . 
The Regimental CP had moved up to Droisy and through 
Chavigny-Bailleul to an enormous brick ruin overgrown with 
grass and small Lees, which in the distant past had been the 
Chateau de Bailleul. 
On the 22nd, the pursuit was resumed, with the Third 
Battalion leading, the First Battalion following, and the 
Second Battalion bringing up the rear. There was wme re-
sistance in Prey, but, in general, units of the enemy that 
had been cut off in their withdrawal to the Seine or actually 
surrounded by our forces would surrender easily. We took 
202 prisoners during the day, plus a complete battery of horse-
drawn guns with aU personnel. Parts of B and C Company 
became mounted infantry for the next two days. At night-
fall, the Third Battalion was near Le Mesnil Morin, the 
First Battalion near H uest, and the Second Battalion just 
southeast of Evreux. 
The Division was making plans for crossing the I ton River 
north of Evreux to occupy the high ground on the west bank. 
Colonel Sutherland spent the night reconnoitering and plan-
ning the crossing. At the same time, a patrol from the Regi-
mental I & R Platoon went into the city of Evreux. Various 
FFI agents had reported that the Germans had withdrawn 
from the city and that it could be occupied without diffi-
culty. The patrol had gone well into the city when it met a 
group of men who seemed to be French. In the darkness the 
patrol was not sure, and they were not sure of the patrol. 
There was a mistake about the French password and a 
grenade was thrown into one of the jeeps, wounding two 
men. Not knowing whether it was a German ambush or not, 
the patrol withdrew. 
The next day the city was occupied without resistance, 
though in the northern outskirts there were still small groups 
of Germans who gave the FFI a lively day's hunt. 
The 117th occupied the town itself while we crossed the 
Iton north of the town and occuried the high ground to the 
north and northwest without difficulty. 
The city of Evreux was in a frenzy of liberation. Riots 
were stopped, .but were always ready to break out again. The 
populace went after the collaborators, especially the prosti-
tutes who had dealt too openly with the German soldiers. 
For the first time we found that the French hair dressers 
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had styled a new haircut for women of dubious character. 
All in all, they didn't look as badly as some of our own hair-
cuts. These Quislings were rather summarily tried by popu-
lar voice and their hair was shaved off publicly. Similar 
scenes were to occur in other French towns, and in Belgium 
and Holland. This confusion of a biological urge with polit-
ical policy was not a European sprecialty. We also privately 
confused the two issues in dealing with the queston of fra-
ternization in Germany. 
On the 23rd the Regiment lost two killed and three 
wounded. The dead were a platoon leader of AT Company, 
Lieutenant Rivets, and his driver, who had been ambushed 
by a group of Germans on the road just before dawn. One 
hundred and twenty-nine prisoners were taken. A large 
number more refused to acceprt our hospitality and K rations, 
so were promptly sent on a visit to Hades. 
There had been rumors that we would be able to rest for 
several days, and we prepared to do so in spite of the heavy 
rains that were now beginning. During the afternoon of the 
24th, Dinah Shore sang to us from under a tarpaulin in 
front of the chateau. She sang Milkman, Keep Those Bot-
tles Qu;et, I Walk Alone, and other popular songs. 
Our rest was short-lived, for, on the morning of the 25th, 
we were ordered to move north toward Luviers and to sup-
port the Second Armored Division, which was meeting strong 
resistance in Elbeuf. On the way to Louviers we received 
numerous reports of German groups from the French. By 
the time we reached their reprorted location, there was nothing 
but more information that came too late. But, considering 
what the FFI had to work with, they proved invaluable. 
There were no Germans available for extermination when 
we reached the Chateau des Angls, and the owners were very 
indignant that the Germans had buried one of their dead 
in the middle of a flower bed. It was of no consolation to 
them that the corpse was an officer of an enemy army. 
We reached an assembly area around Sur.ville, west of 
Louviers, in the early afternoon, only to be ordered to with-
draw south of the highway between Neubourg and Louviers 
to make way for the Fourth British Armored Division. All 
motorized elements moved to the south the same night and 
the Regimental CP set up in a very handsome white chateau 
in a large formal park a mile north of Le Mesnil Jourdain. 
On this day the French and American armies had entered 
Paris and the radio broadcast nothing but announcements 
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and descriptions. The lady of the chateau, who had white 
hair and rather weary good manners, sat in the front seat of 
one of our jeeps listening to the excited announcer in Paris. 
She prayed that our tanks would not wreck the city. 
The foot troops moved south of the highway on the morn-
ing of the 26th, and the rest of the day was spent by the 
Regiment moving by motor through Evreux, St. Andre de 
PEure, la Ivry la Bataille, Tilly, and Dammartin, to an as-
sembly area near Flacourt. We had no casualties and we 
took one prisoner during the day. 
A small bridgehead across the Seine had been established 
by the 79th Division at Mantes-Gassicourt. We crossed on 
the morning of the 27th and occupied the eastern edge of the 
bridgehead, from Porcheville north towards Guitrancourt. 
The Second Battalion held the right, by the river, with the 
First Battalion on the left, next to the 117th. We were now 
in the defenses of the Seine Line, and though Paris had 
fallen, the Germans were expected to defend the river as 
best they could; if only to cover their withdrawal to the 
Siegfried Line. 
They held a loose system of positions in the key hills and 
towns along the north bank of the Seine, and there were 
some scattered forces on the southern bank and the small 
'-.#*DAM MARTIN 
islands. The positions on the northern bank were held with 
great tenacity. In the late afternoon the Regiment attacked 
northeast but was held up-the First Battalion near Issou 
and the Second Battalion near Juziers. Company B, ad-
vancing across a bare open hill, was pinned down by severe 
rifle, machine gun, and mortar fire from the enemy dug in 
along a ridge 250 yards ahead. Artillery was called for, 
and Company B withdrew Lorn the hill by dark, preparing 
to renew the attack the next morning. 
Near Juziers, the Regimental I & R Platoon had pre-
ceded the attack to locate the enemy along the river. The 
platoon advanced 700 yards along the crest and sides of · a, 
wooded ridge until they hit a small group of the enemy, 
who first feinte·d at surrender and then fired. Immediately 
the platoon received rifle and burp gun fire from the left 
flank as well, and machine gun fire from the enemy located 
in barges across the river. The enemy on the ridge applied 
grenades and mortars, so that the platoon was entirely sur-
rounded by fire. 
Lt. Agnew C. LeFevre organized the withdrawal of the 
forward group of his platoon a few hundred yards back to a, 
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defensive position, and then braved the fire for the length 
of the ridge to bring up a machine gun and send back for 
support from the Second Battalion. Company G was late 
in arriving, but the ground was held against superior fire 
and odds until they arrived. Company G made little prog-
ress and dug in for the night. The next morning, with 
the aid of artillery, the First and Second Battalions took the 
ridges and made fairly rapid progress. The Second Bat-
talion pushed a reinforced company as far as Meulan to set 
up road blocks, though there were numerous snipers to be 
cleaned out in the villages along the river road. 
The 120th Infantry came up on our right, relieving parts 
of the Second Battalion, ~nd our attack swung north toward 
Serincourt, J ambville, and the territory east toward the 
Aubette River. Before we turned north we had been hop-
ing to get to Paris; at least we were able to see the Eiffel 
Tower at a distance. Before nightfall the First Battalion 
had taken Oinville and the Second had taken Gaillon. The 
Regiment CP was in another chateau, in Albemont. The 
grounds had been an ordnance depot, and the Germans had 
aJbandoned it only the night before. 
Early on the 29th the attack was resumed, with the Third 
Battalion on the left and the First Battalion on the right. 
The Second Battalion, in reserve, protected the supply routes, 
the right flank, and mopped up when necessary. The First 
Battalion took Serain-court, which it had been unable to take 
the day before, and advanced to Rueil. The Third Battalion 
took J ambville and drove on toward Fremainville, where it 
met serious resistance. In a factory on the ou~skirts of town 
a small German garrison equipped with 75MM guns, AT 
guns, a dug-in half-track, mortars, machine guns, and rifles 
was delivering enough fire to hold up the advance of both 
the First and Third Battalions. Colonel Brown, command-
ing the Third Battalion, brought to bear on the factory all 
the fire available to him, including AT guns, which proved 
effective against the larger enemy guns and the half-track.· 
This neutralized the enemy fire enough to allow the First 
Battalion to by-pass and to continue on to its objective. 
At the same time, Colonel Brown sent Company K, under 
the command of Captain Hopcraft, around the left flank by 
a concealed route toward Avernes, with the mission of tak-
ing the town and the bridge over the Aubette north of the 
town. This move would cut the escape route of the Ger-
mans in Fremainville and the sector below Avernes. Captain 
Hopcraft rapidly took the enemy outposts on his route with-
out giving the alarm of his approach. The town fell, with 
89 prisoners. He surprised and captured a number of 
enemy self-propelled artillery pieces, blocked the river cross-
ing, and directed artillery fire on an enemy force preparing 
to counterattack from the other side of the river. In this 
operation Company K lost only one man. 
At Fremainville, however, the garrison in the factory 
fought ferociously, and though anti-tank fire was poured into 
the buildings, they had to be cleaned out room by room with 
grenades and rifles. The Second Battalion was sent north-
east from Gaillon against Condecourt. They met no resist-
nee until they came down a forward slope one-quarter mile 
west of the town. Company F and Company E were lead-
ing, with Company E on the right and somewhat ahead of 
Company F. Company E was caught in the crossfire of 
m;achine guns located ahead and in the woods to their left 
front. They were trapped in the open fields. The enemy 
began laying in artillery and mortar barrages. 
The mortars were late in coming up to support the rifle 
companies. The leading elements had for a while gone for-
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ward rapidly and were out of supporting range of the mortar 
platoon. Lt. Earl A. Fay and his driver, Pfc. Robert ]. 
Lorenz, started back to the platoon to bring them forward. 
A stretch of the road back for about 300 yards was covered 
by machine gun and small arms fire from enemy positions 
that had either been by-passed or established after the for-
ward elements had gone by. 
Before reaching the platoon, Lieutenant Fay and his driver 
found three wounded American soldiers lying in the road 
and beside them, two dead Germans. 
Sergeant Unger was, as a forward mortar observer, at-
tached to Company F , but at this time was directing his fire 
on the enemy in front of Company E, which was receiving 
the brunt of the attack. When he stood up to observe, an 
enemy bullet struck him in the hip and knocked him down. 
Nevertheless he crawled forward for better observation and 
continued to direct fire. A shell from. an enemy 88 landed five 
yards in front of him; the concussion brought blood from 
his nose, but he refused to withdraw. 
Lt. Harold A. Clifford, a forward observer of the 197th 
Field Artillery, lost communication with his guns when his 
radio went out. He came forward into the area where Com-
pany E was p[nned down to use a radio being operated by a 
member of that Company. Each time he arose to observe 
his shellbursts he was fired at. Although he was wounded 
when the enemy drove to within 150 yards of him, he 
stayed until the end of the action and even left plans for 
fire missions in case of a n;newal of the counterattack after 
he was evacuated. 
Under cover of artillery and mortar barrages, an enemy 
force of infantry developed an attack from a wooded draw at 
the base of the hill. Company E had suffered many wounded 
and killed, and was not capable of continuing a prolonged 
engagement. The Company Commander, who had been ob-
serving the terrain closely, realized that a position 100 yards 
farther down the slope would allow a stronger defense 
against the coming infantry attack. He led his support pla-
toon around the right fl ank of the assault echelon and, as he 
came abreast of them, ordered them to move forward with 
him to support his advance. He advanced 50 yards before 
• he was wounded and the increasing fire pinned his men to 
the ground again. 
A few minutes later Germans dashed out of a barn not 
far to the front, apparently to take prisoners. Seeing them 
the Company Commander struggled to his feet and shouted 
to his men, "Fire! Fire on them!" He was killed imme-
diately by a burst of machine gun fire. Though no man 
could move without drawing machine gun fire or raise him-
self up without being hit, the enemy group was cut down 
one by one. Unfortunately, two men of Com"pany E, unable 
to fire because of their jammed weapons, were forced to sur~ 
render to the enemy. Two heavy machine guns had been 
abandoned. 
Lt. John L. Goods tried to reorganize the men that were 
left in the crews, and managed to obtain support from several 
machine guns from Company E. Pfc. Harvey K. Bates was 
the only man left of his squad. He destroyed two enemy 
machine gun squads and the personnel of a horse-drawn 
artillery piece. 
Pfc. Harold L. Gilbert remained at hi:> gun during the 
counterattack and caused the enemy many casualties before 
they concentrated their small arms fire and killed him. S/Sgt. 
Charles Curtis, with a section of heavy machine guns, not 
only emplaced the guns in effective positions and directed 
thtir fire along a draw, but, from a haystack where he had 
excellent observation, he was able to help the artillery ob-
server in directing his fire. Later Sergeant Curtis drove a 
jeep into the area at great risk and loaded it with those who 
were most seriously wounded. 
It was especially the fire of the mortars and the artillery 
that at last threw back the enemy infantry, composed largely 
of paratroopers. Companies E and F were able to organize 
their lines for the night. 
On the 30th the Regiment prepared to continue to its ob-
jective at Courcelles-sur-Viosne, where it was to be pinched 
out by the two other regiments of the Division and re-
vert to reserve. We jumped off at 0800 and in a little 
more than an hour the First Battalion was in Longuesse and 
Vigny, and the Second Battalion had made contact with the 
120th at Condecomt. The Third Battalion took Sagry and 
then drove 14 miles cross country to just short of Gain-
court. 
The Regiment moved from the Aubette to the Viosne, 
• 
with the First Battalion taking Villeneuve St. Martin. We 
reached Courcelles in the early afternoon and were ordered 
to follow the other two_ regiments. Our Second Battalion 
followed our Third Battalion, which followed the First Bat-
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talion of the 120th, and our First Battalion followed the 
First Battalion of the 117th. Units of all three regiments 
became thoroughly tangled with each other on the roads 
rluring the afternoon, and it was 2200 before the Regiment 
was settled near Livilliers just north of Pontoise. The Regi-
mental CP set up in some wet woods 300 yards west of the 
town. 
On the 31st. we continued in reserve and struggled for-
ward against our own traffic. There were no casualties and 
no prisoners taken. Late that afternoon the Regimental CP 
moved near Fresnoy-en-Thelle into a school full of refugee 
~hildren and called it a chateau. 
SEPTEMBER 
Fresnoy-en-Thelle-Peronne-Cambrai-Somme-Belgium 
Tournai-Bousvalodeur-Meuse River-Albert Canal--
Vise-Dalhem, Longehamp---.Holland-Banhol t-Ter lin-
den-Margraten-V alkenburg-Gulpen-Heerlen-Groen-
stratt-German Border. 
With Paris gone and the Seine Line unhinged and broken, 
the Germans now tried to withdraw their armies to the 
Siegfried Line, defending as they fell back such natural bar-
riers as the Meuse River. Our problem was to cut their 
withdrawal before they reached the Siegfried Line by mov-
ing so rapidly that they could not organize any serious de-
fenses at the Meuse or at the approaches to the Siegfried 
Line. We hoped to win the major portion of the war, if not 
all of it, outside Germany. 
At 0400 on the First of September the Regiment received 
orders from Division to join another rat-race, the most spec-
tacular so far. We were to ' drive 178 miles northeast to 
Tournai, Belgium, without stopping, except as the enemy 
might interfere. Tournai is a large city dating back to the. 
days of the Romans. Its strategic position has made it a 
choice plum for invading armies for nearly 1,000 years. It 
controlled the road-net of southwestern Belgium and the 
main old Roman road to Brussels and to the east. The Ger-
mans were using this city as an army headquarters for the 
troops on the channel coast and in western Belgium. 
The enemy was withdrawing across the route in consider-
able force, and we expected to fight our way through. Our 
speed and momentum was to be our security until other 
forces could move up and consolidate our gains. It was a 
long gamble, but our present advanced position gave us an 
o.pportunity to deliver a serious blow to the German forces 
on the channel coast. 
Leading the drive was a task force under the command of 
General Harrison and composed of our First Battalion, cav-
alry, tanks, engineers, and artillery. Our Regimental Com-
bat Team was to follow the task force, with the 120th Regi-
mental Combat Team following. 
After the task force got under way, the Regiment left 
Fresnoy-en-Thelle and crossed the IP at the crossroads south 
of Tillet in the early afternoon. There was little resistance 
at first, and before midnight we had passed through Roy and 
Peronne. Our orders were to by-pass resistance and to con-
tinue our drive to the north. Again the struggle with our 
own traffic was the worst of it. However, the Germans 
were having a much worse time with their transportation, 
for the sides of the roads were littered with their trucks and 
wagons which had broken down or run out of fuel. The 
road was often blocked by civilian cars, motorcycles, bicycles, 
and baby carriages they had stolen from the French to carry 
their loot back from the Seine. 
In the early morning of the second we began to run into 
some resistance; German artillery which was cut off to our 
left shelled the road. General Harrison, the Task Force 
Commander, moved ahead of the main body to the point. 
He came under observation, and when a mobile gun threw 
a shell into the radiator of his vehicle, he was wounded. He 
abandoned his vehicle and, although in great pain, refused 
assistance as he crawled/several hundred yards to cover. As 
he was evacuated back past the column, tears could be seen 
!n his eyes. The bearded, hollow-eyed J oes snapped to at-
tention and threw him the first salute they had given in 
months. 
At this time we were entering towns which our Regiment 
had fought for and taken during the last war. They re-
membered us, and the FFI seemed to take heart at this news 
and gave us at least temporary security from snipers as we 
hurried along. 
One of our French-speaking officers with the usual Amer-
ican audacity found that the civilian phone system was still 
in operation. He calmly called the burgomeister of the towns 
ahead, introduced himself, and requested the local German 
disposition. One call was placed as far as Tournai, our 
objective. 
Colonel Sutherland assumed command of the Task Force, 
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and in his place Lieutenant Colonel Quinn took command of 
the Regiment. Shortly before noon the German traffic and 
ours collided at an intersection in Cambrai. A German tank 
column was passing through when our Task Force came up. 
After a brief engagement two of the German tanks were 
burning at the intersection and the rest withdrew. They 
were reported in various pJaces in and near Cambrai for 
some time afterward, but there was no second battle with 
them. Shortly after noon the Third Battalion, which had 
been sent forward to help the Task Force clear the town, 
reached the railroad tracks in the northeastern outskirts, and 
the way through town was clear for the column. We were 
delayed approximately two hours in Cambri, by the enemy 
and by, let us say, "local hospitality." 
The Task Force struck the town of Douchy and was 
stopped by small arms and a battle between the Germans 
and the FFI. The majority of the enemy was taken care of 
by the FFI, but there still remained a small group holding 
out strongly in a large house and its courtyard. 
The command group of the First Battalion dismounted 
and closed in for a little sport. The streets were filled with 
om: tanks and vehicles and a great crowd of civilians cele-
brating their liberation and at the same time excited over the 
little battle. It was a miniature of what the liberation of 
Paris must have been. We would tear ourselves away from 
the women who seemed to adore us, though we were black 
with dirt and hardly fragrant; finish our wine, and con-
tinue the scrap. 
A sniper in the house wounded a member of the FFI. 
which caused a great commotion among the civilians. One 
of our tanks parked along the sidewalk trained its gun on 
Our column mo'Yes through Cambrai 
the house, knocked o.ff a corner of the roof, and finally per-
suaded the Germans to surrender. We were surprised when 
they came out of the house. They were :Mongolians. 
Later in the afternoon, near Valenciennes, we were held 
up again by somewhat heavier small arms fire, which was 
directed on the column after the leading tank-mounted in-
fantry had gone through. The following tanks were not 
sure what they were getting into and could not be persuaded 
to advance. Finally Major Herlong ordered the hesitant 
commander of the first tank to follow him, and he drove his 
jeep through the enemy rifle fire with the entire column fol-
lowing. 
That afternoon, we crossed the border into Belgium. The 
Belgians waved enormous flags, shouted, and threw tomatoes 
and appJes to us. It was certainly well meant, but we found 
the Belgian apples extremely hard. 
At 1935 the Regimental CP was set up in a farmhouse a 
mile south of Tournai, and at 22'30 the First Battalion was 
meeting small arms fire across the river inside the town. 
Fighting continued throughout the night. The entire move 
.had been made in about 52 hours. Here we were again with 
enemy on {our sides and with only one road of communica-
tion. The Regimental casualties were only five men wounded. 
We were the first Allied troops to enter Belgium. Sev-
eral days later we heard that our friends, the 79th Division, 
also claimed that honor, w, to save argument, we shall divide 
the honor with them. This drive was heralded by military 
men 11s the longest and fastest opposed advance in the history 
of warfare. 
We met no friendly troops in the area, with the excep-
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tion of a few members of the Beiglan White Army, who 
helped us clear out scattered pockets of resistance. About 
1030 on the morn ing of the third, the First Battalion made 
contact with an advance guard of the British 11th Armored 
Division. Outlying patrols and road blocks were withdrawn 
to let the British pass. When their long motorized column 
came through Tournai, we were astonished, for they were 
very well washed and pressed, and had a well-fed look. 
After a high Mass was celebrated for us in the city's an-
cient cathedral, and Colonel Sutherland and Major Herlong 
wtre introd_uced to the celebrating populace, we officially 
turned the city over to the British Seventh Battalion "Green 
Howards" of the 69th Brigade, 50th N orthumbrian Division. 
We spent the next day cleaning out pockts of resistance 
and engaged in some hot street fights. Over a hundred 
Germans were flushed out of the woods a mile southwest of 
the Regimen tal CP. We also washed and soon were as pink 
as the British, though not pressed. 
We fraternized with the Belgians, and at this time most 
of the Americans got along with them better than with the 
French. 
The Belgians were never ironic and they seemed to have 
direct; comprehensible feelings . Later, however, their small 
mercantile class began charging prices that would soon re-
store the national economy, so relations between us grew 
strained. By then we began to grow fond of the Dutch, who 
to the end returned our mutual respect and admiration. 
On the seventh of September we turned east toward the 
Meuse. The Regiment crossed its IP in Bruxelles at 0700 
and went south through Valenciennes, then east through 
l\1ons, La Lovien~, and Nivelles, and arrived in the area 
around Bousval before noon. The Regimental CP had a 
choice of chateaux and settled on one with out a moat, south 
of Bousval. 
The trucks were released, and on the Eighth the Regiment 
weut on foot to an area near Autre Eglise, southeast of 
J oduigne. There were constant reports of small or large 
groups of the enemy hiding in the woods and houses near 
our line of march, and patrols were sent out to investigate. 
Iuvariably 'the Germans had withdrawn before the patrols 
arrived . The Belgian White Army was well organized. 
They had concealed command posts and PW cages full of 
Germans and Rexists, but had little means of communica-
tion except by bicycle. Their information unfortunately 
c<.me to us too late. We did make contact with the enemy 
in the Bois de Buis, but the TDs and engineers soon settled 
the matter, and the march continued without event. 
From Autre Eglise we moved to Thys, southwest of 
Tongres, on the ninth, and completed the move to the Albert 
Canal and the Meuse River during the afternoon of the 
lOth. Our path was clear as far as the canal, with the ex-
ception of machine gun fire which came from the island be-
twten the canal and the Meuse. We knew that the enemy 
intended to defend the Meuse in that sector, and we had 
v~:ry little info- mation beyond that. In the rapidity of events 
that followed, we lost contact with the enemy forces, took 
up defensive positions, and emplaced cannon against a coun-
terd.ttack. Patrols were sent up and down the west bank of 
the canal to prevent a surprise attack by the enemy on our 
side or a crossing from the other. 
We then made plans to cross without delay ourselves. A 
reconnaissance patrol reached the east bank of the Meuse 
shortly after midnight with the help of darkness and fog. 
On the morning of the 11th, the Second and Third Battalions 
ftrried the canal and met no opposition on the island. The 
cros~ing of the river was made in assault boats and a few small 
Tank mounted infantry cross the Belgium border 
An old man remembers our division 
civilian rowboats which were found along the bank. At 
timts there was a good deal of machine gun fire from the far 
side of the river on the boats and on the west bank. It was 
not accurate at first because of the light fog still on the river; 
later, while Company L was crossing, the fire severely 
wounded a member of a light machine gun squad as he 
moved down the bank. 
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Although a foot bridge was built across the canal later in 
the afternoon, all three battalions had already crossed. As 
they had only hand-carried weapons, and could not expect 
to do more than hold the bridgehead, Company G was left 
or. the island to protect the rear around Richelle, south of 
Vi,e. A few ve~icles were able to cross the river through 
the southern end of Liege, where the First Division had 
buiLt two pontoon bridges. All the original bridges in Liege 
had been bombed or blown. The road along the east bank of 
the river was free of resistance from Liege to the bridge-
head, with the exception of machine gun fire frol1). the enemy 
whc. held positions on the bluffs. Some loss in men and 
vehicles was caused by our artillery falling short, and five 
ammunition jeeps were lost from a convoy in Liege during 
tht: nigh~ and did not reach the companies until the next day. 
Nevertheless the bridgehead was not only held but slightly 
enlarged before morning. 
Company K, learning of a German column approaching 
from the northeast to attack the bridgehead, held their fire 
until, the Germans were on top of them, and then opened up, 
annihilatitrg the entire column. The First Battalion remained 
in contact with the enemy all night. Before daylight the 
enemy withdrew, so the First Battalion strengthened the pla-
toon already in Vise. The town had been generously treated 
with artillery, and the Germans did not defend it. The Third 
Battalion struck eastward away from the river to Dalheim 
and then northeast through Bombaye to W arsage, without 
meeting resistance. 
The First Battalion, with the Second Battalion follow-
ing, raced as far as Fouron-le-Comte before it met determined 
resistance. In spite of 20-mm. and rifle fir.e, the First Bat-
talion pushed one company into Fouron-Le-Comte shortly 
after noon and sent two companies to help the Third Bat-
talion, which was held up by AT guns and entrenched in-
fantry holding the ridge northeast of W arsage. Both bat-
talions were ordered to hold up and wait for the artillery to 
cross the river. A vehicle bridge had been completed at 1230; 
our artill-ery crossed and was in position at 1530. 
The First Battalion companies established a line from 
Fouron-le-Comte across the front of the enemy positions 
on the ridge, while the Third Battalion, pushing around the 
right flank of this line, made a dash into Holland to take the 
town of N orbeek before dark. They pushed on and were 
held up again a mile south of Terlinden. Company K engaged 
the enemy while Company L, under Lt. Leslie E. Stanford, 
began a flanking maneuver to enter the town from the west. 
They were delayed by counterattacking half-tracks, 20-mm. 
fire, and some machine gun fire. Sgt. Daniel W. Petersen 
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ldt his squad and ran through an orchard to head off one 
half-track. When it came within 35 yards he fired his M-I 
and shot the driver through the head. After the half-track 
crashed into a tree, the enemy slowly withdrew, and Com-
pany L entered the town, taking 54 prisoners. 
Though out of communication with the Battalion, they 
held their position against a renewed attack and knocked out 
another half-track, two motorcycles, and a considerable force 
uf infantry. 
The First Battalion broke loose from its position around 
Fouron-le-Comte with the help of tanks and drove into 
Holland towards Banholt. They ran into some resistance at 
Mheer, for the enemy still occupied part of the town and 
was laying artillery in on the rest. While most of the at-
tacking force took cover, Staff Sergeant Burroughs set up a 
heavy machine gun by himself in the middle of the street. 
From this position he was able to take by surprise a group of 
tnemy crossing an intersection about 75 yards in front of 
him. He killed 17 of them before they could get away. Those 
who could get away abandoned the town and the Battalion 
moved on. Although it was now well after dark, the Bat-
talion continued to .push the enemy, who was just five minutes 
ahead on the same road. The Battalion moved in a column 
of companies, with Company C leading, and the Second Pla-
toon, under Lt. Sylvester Shetter, acting as advance guard. 
Approaching Banholt, the platoon was suddenly fired upon 
by a 20'-mm. gun at a range of 50 yards. Lieutenant Shetter 
ran back and forth along the road deploying his men under 
the fire, trusting to the darkness to hide him. He sent a 
squad of riflemen and one light machine gun around the left 
flank, along a graveyard and a house, to attack the enemy 
fl <lnk. While the enemy was occupied with this attack, Lieu-
tenant Shett-er deployed the other squads in positions from 
which they could bring fire on these guns and on two others 
which had joined the fight. The platoon's fire set ablaze a 
Luilding 50 yards away containing an ammunition dump. 
Even in the bright light of the fire, Leutenant Shetter con-
tinued to move about, directing the movements of his platoon. 
At last. he stood up within 60 yards of the enemy position 
and called his men on to a frontal assault. The men left thei1 
cover, charged, and captured from the confused and disor-
ganized enemy three 20-mm. guns, two heavy machine guns, 
and a quantity of small arms. Although the enemy fled, 
three prisoners were taken and three men of the platoon 
were wounded. 
The Battalion dug in near Banholt, which fell to us with-
out further resistance. The Regiment lost three killed, 27 
wounded and one missing during the day. Fifty-six pris-
or.ers were taken. This Regiment was again the first Allied 
unit to enter an enemy-held country-so far ahead of all 
others this time that our claim was never contested. 
On the morning of the 13th the attack was resumed. The 
First Battalion passed through Banholt in a column of com-
panies while the Third Battalion moved forward from Ter-
Lnden with two companies abreast. The First Battalion was 
held up by enemy fire from Termaar, but after a platoon of 
tanks was sent up to help them, Company B took the town. 
Friendly artillry held the Battalion up shortly. When the 
hre lifted, they moved on through Margraten to Sibbe. 
Here the First Battalion executed an attack which was 
r-erfection to the last degree. The enemy had constructed an 
elaborate series of trenches just outside the town. They lay 
across the main road in a line through an orchard on the right 
and along a fence line on the left. The approach for 1,500 
yards before them was a level Stubblefield. Their observation 
:-.nd fields of fire were excellent. As the point of the First 
Battalion was fired on, the Battalion Commander came for-
"' ard and began to develop, the action. The support platoons 
were committed, and two companies deployed. As ar-
tilltry fire pinned the enemy down and neutralized their fire, 
the infantry advanced rapidly across the open field. Tanks 
followed in the gaps and added their carman fire against the 
machine gun nests. The infantry advanced on the double, 
firing even light machine guns from their hips. When they 
had ad.vanced too close to continue the artillery fire, our 
mortars took up the fire without a pause. Then as the 
troops massed for the final assault some 50 yards from the 
trenches, the mortar fire ceased, and into the trenches went 
the infantry with bayonets. Approximately three German 
companies were removed from circulation. 
A strange incident occurred here. The Commanding Offi-
cer of the enemy defenses in this area had been a Luftwaffe 
Major. He had been killed. In his rocket was found a heav-
ily thumbed Fort Benning booklet on infantry tactics which 
ltad been lost by Lieutenant Pearson several months before in 
France. ~trange as it may seem we had defeated our own 
tactics, something the enemy had never been able to do. 
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The Third Battalion took Reijmerstok, but ran into 
20-mm. and small arms fire near the railroad cut northeast of 
the town in such volume that tanks were sent to help them. 
When that resistance was cleared, the Third Battalion had 
little trouble in reaching Ingber and the nearby villages. 
Company G, on an independent mission, took Hontem, and 
the rest of the Second Battalion moved from the assembly 
area near Altembrouck up to Margraten and Termaar. 
Here began our first supply difficulties which continued to 
grow more serious as the days continued-short rations, little 
ammunition, and even less fuel. The lack of supplies and 
follow-up troops almost stopped our advance. We had ad-
vanced so rapidly that supplies were still coming directly 
from the beachhead in France. A fresh Corps with supplies 
might have gone a long way. 
At 2130 Cannon Company repelled a counterattack at 
Grotwelsden and even captured six Germans. In Ingber 
meanwhile, two heavy machine gun crews set up road blocks 
c.ommanding the road to Gulpen. The guns were approx-
imately 400 yards apart. A little after midnight a patrol of 
eight Germans approached the first gun on their way into 
Ingber. The gunner tried to fire but the gun would not func-
tion. He sent a rifleman on the double to alert the squad while 
he attempted to repair the malfunction. The rifleman woke 
the squad in a building 40 yards away, and, as Sgt. Robert 
S. Baker came out the door, the enemy patrol, hearing the 
activity, opened fire on the doors and windows with burp guns 
aud rifles. Under the fire Sergeant Baker ran to the machine 
gun and in the darkness swiftly repaired the malfunction and 
turned the machine gun fire on the patrol. He killed one 
German and wounded two others. As the enemy withdrew 
une of them turned , fired a burp gun, and mortally wounded 
Sergeant Baker. During the day the Regiment had suffered 
4 1 wounded and had taken 172 prisoners. 
Early on the 14th, patrols were sent to determine the con-
dition of crossing over the Geul River. The First Battalion 
fuund a bridge intact over the southern branch of the river 
in V alkenburg. They were ordered to seize and hold the 
bridge with a company if necessary. Unfortunately the en-
emy blew the bridge before we could stop them. Colonel 
Sutherland entertained the pwject of holding four other cross-
ing sites with a platoon each, but finally directed the First 
Battalion to send a full company, supported by heavy 
weapons, to the site in Valkenburg. The enemy had already 
Troops of the First Battalion move up on Sibbe, Holland. 
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begun mortar and artillery barrages on the southe~n end of 
town and the roads leading into it. 
As the fighting in the town grew more vicious and the 
enemy barrages heavier, it became apparent that they might 
<>ttempt to recross the river on the ruins of the bridge. Be-
cause of the lack of observation in the closely-built town, our 
artillery could not reach the bridge, and the complete destruc-
tion of it became a mission for mortars, or for demolition, if 
it could be reached. 
A patrol from Company C and Sergeant Moushon, a mo·-
tar observer from Company D, left in the early afte -noon 
to finish destroying the bridge. By slipping through the laby-
rinth of caves under the hills of V alkenburg, they were able 
to emerge at a point 4'00 yards behind the enemy lines, only 
to find a platoon of enemy troops between that point and the 
Lridge. The leader of the patrol deployed his men around 
the en trance to the caves less than 100 yards from enemy 
troops. Then Sergeant Moushon crawled forward to obtain 
observation on the bridge. He had only crawled 25 yards 
when the enemy spotted him and opened up. Thanks to the 
irregularities of the terrain. he was able to continue, and in 
20 minutes had reached an observation rost. 
He remained at this post for more than two hours, and 
when the bridge was thoroughly destroyed by his fire, he 
withdrew back through the caves to our lines. 
Meanwhile, the entire First Battalion had moved up into 
Valkenburg and was engaged in a violent fire fight. Against 
the severe artillery fire almost no progress was made. Tanks 
were called for, but as they confused the names Valkenburg 
and Oud Valkenbtirg, they did not arrive until 2050. On 
the road into town two tanks were ~nocked out by the enemy 
artillery, with several casualties. In view of this, they were 
ordered back for the night to avoid further losses. 
Here the First Battalion received the heaviest fire it had 
received since the early days of the beachhead near Pont He-
bert. The enemy fire blanketed the town in a sheet of flame 
and shrapnel. The enemy occupied the hills to the _north 
c.nd could look down into the city streets. Three AT guns 
were lost in a matter of almost minutes. 
The local underground was headed by the baker and a 
fi1·eman. It was extremely well organized but lacked 
weapons. Their spies worked their way through the lines 
e<ich night and repo~ted to us the full enemy disposition. 
However, the shortage of artillery ammunition prevented us 
from exploiting this information. 
The Third Battalion had less trouble. Company K had 
occupied a defensive position 2,000 yards west of Wijlre and 
m the early morning sent a patrol to reconnoiter this town 
and the next one, Fromberg. S/Sgt. Joseph Mascari and 
tte eight men of his patrol came across an unmanned enemy . 
75-mm. howitzer on the bank of the Geul. They rolled it 
into the water, crossed the river, and found another howit-
zn, in good condition, with ammunition near by. This gun 
they destroyed . with thermite grenades. A thi ·d howitzer 
was found which had already been destroyed by the enemy. 
Wijlre was passed through without difficulty, but as they 
approached Fromberg, machine ·guns 300 yards to their right 
front opened up. 
1 'hey crawled under the fire and reached the edge of town. 
Here they found a member of the Dutch underground who 
informed them that there were 1 )O Germans in the town 
itself. So, they went no further, but returned to Wijlre by 
another route, observing as they went a number of enemy 
entrenchments, some of them manned. 
The Third Battalion sent patrols into Strucht and cap-
tured a number of prisoners who supplied information con-
ceruing defenses on the far side of the Geul. Company L was 
sent to secure a bridgehead over the Geul near Schinop-Geu. 
There was little active resistance in this sector, however, · 
until a few days later, when the Third Battalion crossed the 
rivtr at Wijlre and the Second Battalion crossed at Strucht, 
and even then the resistance was not enthusiastic. On the 
14th the Regiment lost. seven men killed and 17 wounded, 
most of them from the artillery in Valkenburg. Seventy-
three prisoners were taken. 
During the morning of the 15th, the First Battalion was 
umtble to push forward. Their position on the south bank 
of the river received volumes of enemy artillery. The fight-
ing was bitter and dirty, house-to-house and at close quar-
ters. Short gains were made by tunneling through tlie build-
mg-s. All companies were far below their organizational 
strength; much less than 50% in most cases. 
But in the afternoon Ccmpany B, with the support of 
Company D, waded acro:s the river and reached the island 
between the two branches of the Geul. They crossed the 
island and found intact a bridge leading from the island to 
the northern half of town. Lt. Hobert Howling and his 
depleted platoon of 12 men had made the first crossing to the 
island and had covered the cro:sing of Company B .. They 
were now giv'en the mission of mopping up the snipers in the 
western end of the island. Enemy artillery, mortar, and 
small arms fire continued to blanket the town and the island, 
so that the Battalion w as unable tci make little gain into the 
northern half of the town itself. 
Enemy fire p·revented the rebuilding of the bridge to the 
island. Communications, ammunition, food, and the evac-
uation of the wounded depended on the dogged bravery of 
parties wading the river again and again under constant fire. 
Medics of the First Battalion Aid Station, the messengers, 
ar.d the headquarters group of Company B had two days of 
this before a causeway could be built out of the rubble. When 
the cooks of Company D carried hot chow up to the machine 
gun and mortar p()sitions, five of their food containers were 
destroyed by shrapnel. 
To hold the bridge reaching from the island to the north-
ern part of town, several machine gun positions were estab-
lished on the northern bank. Sgt. Leroy E. N app, Pfc. War-
ren E. Hall, and Pvt. Louis D. Gena set up this gun in the 
show window of a garage 10 yards from the bridge. They 
had not been long in !=Osition when the enemy launched a; 
counterattack which drove Company B back to the bridge and 
over it onto the island. The machine guns, however, firing 
furiuusly, kept the enemy from reaching the bridge either to 
cross it or blo~ it up. They drove the enemy into prepared 
r-· 
I 
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dugouts near the bridge. A second attack was launched from 
there and they were again driven back. 
About dusk an enemy squad started moving down the 
street toward the bridge. There was firing at the western 
end of the island where Lieutenant Howling and his platoon 
were mopping up. Hearing it, the enemy may have inter-
preted it as evidence that their attack had reached that far. 
At any rate the group came toward the bridge, boldly enough. 
S/Sgt. Charles P. Gurien, who had a heavy machine gun 
squad at the bridge, told his men to hold their fire and walked 
out into the street. We waved to the Germans to come down 
to the bridge and they, supposing he was one of their own 
men in the dimness, waved back and came cheerfully on to 
destruction. When they came within 40 yards the squad 
opened fire; no one escaped. Through the night the enemy 
continued the fight against the machine guns with grenades. 
The Battalion renewed the attack in the morning, crossed 
the bridge, and brought ammunition in to the machine guns. 
Progress was slow against heavy resistance. The heaviest 
fire came from the high ground to the northeast of the town, 
above Sint Pieter. In the early afternoon approximately 100 
enemy infantry with three tanks in support launched a coun-
terattack to seize the principal road junction in the northern 
part of town. They were thrown back with heavy casualties, 
and the Second Armored moved up and took up positions at 
the road junction. With the help of the Second Armored, the 
First Battalion was able to clean out most of the town and 
push toward the road junction near St. Pieter. 
The Third Battalion made steady progress from Wiljre 
after our artillery knocked out some dug-in enemy tanks and 
cannon. 
Elkenraad, Kruishoef, Kolmont, and Ubachsberg were 
rapidly taken. Mortar and artillery fire and some small 
arms fire were received, but in no great concentrations. Near 
Ubachsberg the roads were filled with blocks, mines and 
booby traps. Sgt. Hubert Gentry and Pfc. James Ben tis 
went 200 yards ahead of our leading elements toward a set 
uf these obstacles. Before they reached them, two machine 
guns, set back from the road on either side of it, opened up. 
Sergeant Gentry and Pfc. Bentis crawled for 100 yards di-
rectly through their crossfire, removing mine&--Often doubly 
booby-trapped-from both sides of the road. For an hour and 
z. half they inched forward, going from one side of the road 
to the other digging out the mines with their trench-knives. 
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After they had removed 40 mines and a large number of 
booby traps, the Battalion proceeded to its objective. 
The Second Battalion held contact between the two assault 
battalions and covered the river crossings between them. 
Companies E and G remained at the Geul until they were 
relieved by the 117th and then followed Company F on the 
left flank of the Third Battalion. They had little trouble 
except with the bridge at Strucht, which had been blown 
by the enemy. The enemy left snipers and sent in some light 
artillery to delay its reconstruction. A bridge was built, 
however, and the Battalion vehicles and meager supplies 
passed over to follow the foot elements. 
We had broken through the enemy defenses along the 
Geul River, which was the last natural barrier before the 
Siegfried Line. On the 15th and 16th the Regiment lost one 
man killed and 42 wounded, and took 95 prisoners. 
On the 17th the enemy still resisted the progress of the 
First Battalion out of Valkenburg. After the Battalion 
made contact with Combat A on its left and had committed 
its attached tanks, the enemy fell back. Here, for one of the 
few times, we received and welcomed air support. Three 
dive bombers did a beautiful job of removing four machine 
gun nests which were holding us up. 
The enemy offered only sporadic resistance, and the First 
Battalion moved rapidly east, occupying Klimmen, Ransdaal, 
and Kunrade. In the middle of the afernoon they entered 
Heerlen, one of Holland's largest cities. The Third Bat-
talion was subjected to some artillery fire, but it failed to 
stop them as they went on to occupy Bengenrade, Heerler-
baan, and Ondersp,ekholz. 
As the Battalion moved on toward Terwinselen, a Mark 
IV tank was seen approaching the flank at a point well be-
hind otir tanks. An AT squad was in the vicinity and real-
ized that if they moved their gun to meet the tank, their 
prime mover would be heard. 
The squad unhooked the gun from the truck and pulled it 
by hand to a position on the tank's route of advance. Then, 
as the tank with its accompanying infantry came within point-
blank range, the AT gun opened up, destroyed the tank, and 
routed the infantry. The column moved on to Terwinselen, 
where they were informed by a civilian that enemy tanks 
were approaching the town from the opposite side. SISgt. 
David S. Whittaker went forward to reconnoiter and, as he 
reached the outskirts of town, could hear five tanks. He re-
turned to his Company and, with a small patrol, went for-
ward again until tanks were sighted. Enemy fire superiority 
drove the patrol back until they flanked the tanks and 
advanced to a position within bazooka range. The bazooka 
damaged the lead tank, and the remaining tanks and infantry 
withdrew. 
The Second Battalion, moving behind the Third, and the 
Regimental CP closed into Heerlerbaan in the afternoon. 
During the day four were killed, 26 wounded, and 104 pris-
oners were taken. Company G was attached to the First Bat-
talion on the 18th moving northeast toward Schaesberg. The 
forward elements of the Company, including the Company 
Commander and Lt. Leonard J. Kraus, were pinned down 
by three enemy machine guns. A radio operator was se-
riously wounded, and though they were pinned down in an 
open field with only haystacks and a few hollows in the 
ground for protection, Lieutenant Kraus ran 50 yards to help 
his operator. He rendered first aid and tried to carry the 
wounded man to cover. He had only moved about 15 yard3 
when he was seriously wounded himself. Neither he nor the 
soldier was able to move, and no one was able to reach them. 
The Company mortars came up within effective range of the 
forward enemy machine gun and knocked it out, but could 
do nothing against the other two. Tanks were called for, 
but they were being repaired in Heerlen and were slow in 
arriving. Artillery was called for, but it also was delayed. 
Finally four tanks arrived and started working on the enemy 
gun positions. They were persuaded by Pvt. Walden G. 
McElroy to move in while he covered their advance, so that 
he could reach Lieutenant Kraus and the radio operator. 
The tanks at last knocked out the machine gun positions and 
the Company moved into the town. 
As they arrived, the artillery, which had been called on the 
town, also arrived. It did no harm. With Lieutenant 
Kraus evacuated the Regiment suffered a great loss. As an 
observer, he had no equal. Many times he had led the in-
fantry when their leaders were killed or wounded. He was 
always well forward near the advance scouts and often ahead 
of them. 
The First and Second Battalions pushed forward through 
Nieuwenhagen to reach Groenstraat that evening. A short 
time later the Third Battalion reached the western side of 
W au bach. During the day three were killed, 14 wounded, 
and 21 prisoners were taken. 
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Yeah! !-"Queen of Battle" 
We were now facing the Siegfried Line and expected to 
assault it at once, since we had the momentum. But we had 
outrun our supplies and were obliged to hold up and wait 
for a solid backing. 
The pillboxes ahead of us were unoccupied, for we had 
pursued the enemy the last 800· yards on the double. Here 
again lay a great victory within our grasp. At least the first 
line of Siegfried defenses could have been taken with ease. 
Yet we realized, as did the enemy, that we could not have 
held long. The Regiment sat and waited for ammunition 
and equipment while the enemy feverishly pushed troops into 
the area. 
The "Red Ball Express," the famous emergency truck line• 
labored day and night transporting supplies from the beaches. 
The majority of these men were negroes and through their 
efforts we were permitted to hold that which we had gained 
at such a terrific cost. Ammunition was rationed. Frequently 
the mortars had only one or two rounds a day artillery fre-
quently less than we needed to fire one mission. 
The infantry received a semi-rest. Many had their first 
baths in several months. We were deloused and received, 
for the first time, hot food for three meals a day without an 
interruption. For the many days past, fighting and marching 
·with full equipment 30 to 35 miles a 'day had become routine. 
Squads and platoons had disintegrated to almost a memory. 
Few non-commissioned officers were left and even fewer of-
cers. More than one squad or platoon had been ably led by 
privates. Men who had dreamed of sleep since we joined 
The fighting trio of Herlong, Simmons, and Kraus 
is decorated. 
the British to close the Faloise Gap, slept the clock around. 
Several days and much soap later, we began to recognize old 
friends as they asked the supply sergeant for pants, two and 
three sizes smaller. 
The last days of September were spent in patrolling and 
reconnoitering. Patrols were sent into the Siegfried Line 
itself, and training was conducted on terrain similar to that 
we would find in the actual assault. 
We soon found that our Intelligence had been operating in 
the area for some time. We began to receive enlarged maps 
of the Line, which not only showed the location of each pill-
box, but also its field of fire. Many were so cleverly dis-
guised that our patrols often could not find them, although 
they knew their exact location. Some were disguised as 
houses, others as stores, and some were built to resemble 
hay stacks. 
The clean habits and living of the people of Holland gave 
us daily surprises. After months of the filth and manure 
piles of the French and Belgians we found people and cus-
toms very similar to our own. Each morning, whether the 
area was quiet or under shell fire, the house fronts, sidewalks 
and streets were scrubbed. The people showed a marked i!:-
difference to shell fire. This display of courage seemed to 
reflect the pain of their years under occupation. Children 
were instantly rebuked by their mothers for any expression 
of fear. "It's only the diay Bache," they would be told; 
then the children would smile and finally laugh as if they 
were just discovering something new. 
They shared their homes, meager meals, and looted cellars 
56 
with us. Romance budded and bloomed under the smiling 
eyes of the watchful parents. The townspeople furnished 
churches and choirs for us. Regular religious services were 
packed to capacity daily. They prayed with us and for us as 
we prayed for our lost comrades and for courage and safety 
in the coming attack. 
While the days pas"ed, the enemy continued to build up 
his strength. Their artillery was actively committed as it 
an ived. Each day the town received increasingly heavy 
fire, and there seemed to be no shortage of ammunition in the 
German army. We were enjoying our rest, so we let them 
have fun while they could. 
OCTOBER 
Rimburg- Siegfried Line- Merkstein- He,·zogenrath-
Bardenburg N. Wurselen-Kehlscheid-Richterick. 
The assault on the Siegfried Line changed the character 
of the war. Germany was now fighting not for Europe, but 
for her own existence. The propaganda machine denied this, 
and stated that Germany began east of the Rhine. Indeed, 
for the rest of the war the Germans were busy changing 
their convictions as to Germany's exact location. As the 
provinces disappeared, Germany moved to Berlin and, when 
Berlin was directly threatened, Germany started to move to 
Munich, the capital of the Nazi movement, but the propa-
ganda did not convince anybody. Germany was invaded. 
The Germans, however, took pains to point out to U5 
tltat we were fighting now in thoroughly hostile territory and 
that we would not have civilian or an organized underground 
to help us. The foreign workers in Germany were in no . 
position to do more than sabotage, as usual, and could not 
help us directly. It still should not be forgotten that many 
of us might owe our lives to the many duds produced by 
these workers in the German factories. During one period 
in France, app•roximately 30: per cent of their artillery am-
munition failed to explode. 
The first stage of the invasion was to be the capture of 
Aix-la-Chapelle, which was consistently called by its German 
name, Aachen, so that everyone would understand that it 
was not a French, but a German city. The Germans could 
not help taking this city seriously. It had been the capital 
city fur Charlemagne, who was a German and the master of 
Europe in his time. The Germans continued to call all the 
subsequent actions as far as Cologne "The Battle for 
Aachen." This helped them feel that the direction of the 
war was not east, but west, and enlivened the hallucination 
that sustained their last important counterattack in Decem-
ber. It was all very clever, but not of much use. 
We now transferred from the . First Army to become the 
backbone of the newly formed "phantom" Ninth Army un-
der Lt. Gen. W. H. Simpson, our old Division Commander. 
In the battle for Aachen, the First Division drove into the 
city from the south, and the 30th Division came down from 
the north and cut it off. On the first of October the .119th 
Infantry was deployed opposite the Siegfried line, near Rim-
burg and Broekhuzen, Holland. The troops had been trained 
specifically for the assault, and patrols had already crossed 
into the line and blown pillboxes with pole or satchel charges. 
The patrols were more useful for reconnaissance and harass-
ing agents than as actual destroyers of the line. 
The Germans destroyed all bridges as they withdrew into 
the Siegfried Line, Herr/en, Holland. 
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2nd Battalion Headquarters 
Since the 26th of September, artillery had been firing at 
the more conspicuous pillboxes with moderate success. The 
line was to be bombed from the air for two hours before the 
infantry assault, unfortunately the bombers became confused 
and the strike was an almost total failure. The mortar bar-
rages and the rolling artillery barrage; that preceded the 
infantry in the actual attack were more effective, but the 
cracking of the line was primarily a job for infantry and 
armor. 
During this period Capt. Earl Bowers of C Company was 
killed. His bravery and concern for his men (a patrol in the 
outskirts of Rimburg) caused his death. His dream and 
cherished desire was to see his Battalion win a Unit Citation. 
The men of the First Battalion must have remembered his 
dream, for several months later it was achieved in the 
"Bulge." 
At 1100 on the second of October the 117 th and 119th 
attacked abreast on the Division front, with the 119th on the 
right . On the Regimental front the First Battalion attacked 
through Broekhuizen on the right of the Second Battalion, 
which i ttacked through Rimburg. The Third Battalion fol-
lowed the First, echeloned to the right rear. 
The First Battalion, with two platoons of tanks, reached 
the river by noon, and the engineers began building a tread-
" ay bridge for the tanks. Companies A and C crossed under 
fire on the portable foot bridges they had carried with them. 
In the woods on the other side of the river they ran into very 
heavy machine gun fire from the pillboxes along the railroad 
tracks and were obliged to hold up. The bridge for the 
tanks was finished in the middle of the afternoon in spite of 
small arms, mortar, and artillery fire; still the tanks were 
unable to push the at.tack because of the extremely soggy 
ground on the opposite bank. Without them the Battalion 
made little progress against the machine guns located in the 
boxes. 
Company C came within 150 yards of the enemy posi-
tions before it was pinned down by the machine gun and then 
by artillery fire. The Third Platoon, which was covered by 
fire from twin p·illboxes, suffered 15 casualties, including all 
its non-coms. 
Pfc. Francis P. Smith kept a cool head and managed to 
hold the platoon and prevent a gap in the Company lines. 
In the course of the afternoon all wounded were successfully 
evacuated. On the return trips a~munition, food, and water 
were brought up. Company D, in support of C Company, 
attempted to bring machine gun fire on the enemy pillboxes 
and the entrenchments outside them. A squad of the First 
Platoon, making its way through the scattered woods, was 
pinned down by automatic fire. By a sudden dash across a 
clearing, Privates Gena, Kline, and Warren Hall reached a 
shallow draw along the creek between the river and the rail-
road and set up their gun. The enemy maintained a steady 
stream of fire on the position, so that the gunners were unable 
to lift their heads to observe or to man the gun. 
Little support was possib.le from this position, so they at-
tenJpted to withdraw. As they did, Private Kline was 
wounded and helpless in the clearing between the gun and 
the woods. Private Gena shouted encouragement to him 
and tried to get him to crawl out of the clearing, but the 
wounded man was too weak from shock and loss of blood. 
Gena and Hall then crawled into the clearing through the 
unabated machine gun fire and dragged the wounded man 
back to the woods. 
Another heavy machine gun from D Company had been 
emplaced beyond the stream and then abandoned when the 
crew was driven back. In the evening Sgt. Leroy E. N app 
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and Pvt. William J. Geiger crawled forward to recover the 
gun, wading through the icy stream up to their waists. Al-
though the enemy was still blanketing the narrow front with 
fire, Sergeant N app and Private Geiger came back with the 
gun. 
The weight of our artillery during the first few hours of 
the attack had neutralized a large portion of the enemy ar-
tillery. Again, had it not been for the ammunition diffi-
culties, our artillery could have continued this neutralization, 
and many casualties might have been averted. There are, 
hov; ever, many other factors to consider. If we had remained 
immobile until we had built up sufficient ammunition for all 
purposes, the enemy would have also had additional time to 
shift reserves and strengthen his western front. This would 
not only have seriously affected us, but the whole Allied drive 
and conduct of the war. 
The papers at home proposed and editorialized on the 
former opinion, with much criticism aimed in almost every 
direLtion. It was proved later that the the proper course 
had been pursued. Further delay at this period of the war 
would have given Germany new life. Daily her jet-propelled 
fighters and bue:z bombs were reaching a hurried perfection. 
As it was, they became a formidable argument during the 
next months. There has been much speculation as to what 
would have occurred if they had had time to produce them 
~n quantity. An intelligence investigation board found that 
German production actually was greater during the closing 
months of the war than at any other period. 
1'he Second Battalion and one platoon of tanks had 
readted the edge of Rimburg at noon. There they met sav-
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age resistance supported by machine gun fire from, a castle 
across the river. The resistance was overcome, though 
snipers continued to roam the woods north of the town. One 
platoon of E Company succeeded in crossing the river by port-
able foot bridges and took up positions on the far bank. 
Two of the Battalion tanks were able to cross the river on 
the bridge and worked north toward Rimburg castle. The 
ground was somewhat less soggy in that direct ion. The road 
to the west of the castle was heavily mined, and covered by 
ten machine guns. The castle itself was defended by a pla-
toon of infantry well dug in along the walls. The com-
mauding officer of E Company crossed the river with a small 
patrol to reconnoiter positons and to plan the crossing and 
the attack on the castle. 
Immediately upon crossing they were pinned down for 
20 minutes by machine gun fire. When the Company Com-
mander had made his p1ans, he found that he could not con-
tat:t his platoons by rad io, so he sent Pfc. Lazarus C. Mon-
talvo back for them. Moving back, he was fired on at the 
bridge and the flat open ground near the river. Nevertheless 
he brought the platoons up one by one. The enemy artillery 
snwthered the area in a vain attempt to stop the Company. 
After the platoons were in position Private First Class 
Montalvo returned again with instructions for the tanks and 
to Lring additional medics. On the way a bursting shell 
knocked him down and wounded him in the left arm and 
right hip. Handicapped and suffering from the pain, he 
limped on to accomplish his mission. 
By evening the en~my infantry defending the castle along 
the road had been captured, and with the help of the tanks, 
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the castle was surrounded. However, the force inside was 
stubborn, and the Second Battalion dug in for the night along 
berth banks of the river. During the day the magnitude of the 
ene1ny fire had prevented the construction of a vehicular 
l:nidge at Rimburg. A bridge was begun that night and 
completed early the next morning. It was to be knocked out 
twice and damaged several times in the days that followed. 
1. be next morning the castle was taken, with the aid of 
tanks. The infantry had to fight for it room by room. The 
First and Third Battalions were still stopped by the machine 
gun fire from the pillboxes along the railroad. A task force 
composed of I and B Companies, a company of tanks, and a 
company of TDs was organized under Lieutenant Quinn. 
Their plan was to cross the river at Marienberg in the zone of 
the !17th and then proceed south, flanking and destroying 
the enemy holding up our advance. 
The tanks, with a platoon of infantry riding, and followed 
by the TDs, crossed at Marienberg and on the way south 
clea1 ed up the resistance along the east bank, capturing 85 
prisoners. Company I and parts of Company B waited at a 
footbridge midway between Rimburg and Marienburg. When 
the Task Force came opposite that point, they crossed and 
joined it in a drive south across the Regimental front. Their 
drive relieved the pressure on the Second, First, and Third 
Battalions in turn, sufficiently to permit maneuver. The 
Task Force knocked out six key pillboxes and captured more 
than 400 prisoners. 
The First Battalion moved up its left flank to attack south 
into the pillboxes. Because of the marshy ground, our tanks 
had limited maneuverability, and though they brought fire 
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on SIX of the pillboxes, three had to be reduced by the in-
fantry alone. In general, the Germans defended the boxes 
from the outside, in trenches and tank traps, using the boxes 
only as shelter from artillery and mortar barrages. The ma-
jority of the pillboxes contained nothing larger than a ma-
chille gun. The enemy troops were specially trained fortress 
troops generously equipped with automatic weapons. It 
proved difficult to drive them from their trenches even with 
mo1 tars and artillery. 
The First Battalion drove across the railroad tracks, as 
did Company D on the extreme right. The balance of the 
Thifd Battalion was unable to come abreast. When the Task 
Force was disbanded, I Company moved up to cover the 
right flank of the First Battalion. Both the First and Second 
Battalions then attacked vigorously through the woods and 
up tiie steep slope toward the high ground west of Herbach. 
The enemy had excellent observation on the entire area and 
laid in some of the heaviest concentrations of artillery we had 
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ever received. In one period of 4()1 minutes the enemy fired 
a battery concentration every five seconds. 
However, the bulk of this artillery did not land on our 
forward elements who were fighting the enemy infantry at 
ranges of 25 to 100 yards. This situation also limited our 
use of artillery and mortars, and the tanks and TDs were 
hampered by terrain which was both too soft and too rough. 
When the First and Second Battalions reached the edge of 
the woods at the top of the ridge, they were stopped by direct 
fi re from enemy self-propelled guns. They dug and fought 
off patrols the rest of the night. The woods were still under 
heavy enemy fire, and many of the wounded had not yet 
beeu evacuated. 
Pvt. Joseph P . Mehelich, a medic in Company B, was 
him3elf wounded, once in the leg and once through the 
shoulder, yet he ignored the orders of his platoon sergeant 
to withdraw for treatment and stumbled and crawled about 
the area under fire, rendering first aid to six wounded men. 
He then crawled to the Company CP in a captured pillbox 
and arranged for litters to evacuate them. 
Company E sent a patrol of five men against a pillbox in 
their area. The patrol, armed with rifles and grenades, 
crawled up to the pillbox and tos:ed grenades into the em-
brasure; the 12 enemy soldiers inside the pillbox surrendered. 
Sddom was it as simple as that, since such proceedure re-
quited excellent aim and unstinted daring. 
The firing continued throughout the night and the area 
carr.e to be known as Shrapnel Hill. There were at least six 
enetny tanks 200 yards ahead of Company E, firing into their 
area. Pvt. Norman M. Rose, a rifleman, stood in the trench 
outside a pillbox and directed artillery on the tanks call-
ing his information into the pillbox where it was relayed 
by· a 300 radio to the artillery. The tanks were held off and 
gradually pushed back. 
The enemy laid a heavy concentration of flak and flat 
trajtctory time fire on the positions of Company I on the 
right flank of the First Battalion, causing numerous casual-
ties and wounding Lt. Seymour Shefrin, of Cannon Com-
pany, I Company's only observer, in both legs, his left arm, 
and about the face. He was ordered to be evacuated, but he 
refused for he realized that the enemy would counterattack 
in strength at daybreak. 
First aid was given to him and, being unable to move 
about himself, he was helped by two men to an enemy troop 
shelter located on a slight knoll in the woods. From there 
he wuld adjust fire by the sound of movement and German 
voices a few hundred yards ahead. About 0300 enemy activi-
ity increased greatly, and at daybreak the enemy counter-
attack came, with tanks pouring out machine gun fire, fol-
lowed by two reinforced companies of infantry. The attack 
stmck squarely into I Company's line of defense, and those 
who were not completely overrun and killed were forced to 
withdraw, leaving the area in which Lieutenant Shefrin was 
observing open and unprotected. The attack came over him 
and the last thing we heard was his voice over the. radio call-
ing for more fire on his position. 
Company C, to the left of Company I, saw the stream 
of casualties coming throu·gh their area to the rear, and pres-
ently the remaining men of Company I came too. The en-
emy shelled the Company C area, and then the infantry 
moved up, firing steadily. When they were within 75 yards 
of the first foxholes the order was given to commence firing. 
The enemy fire so completely covered the terrain that our 
riflemen fired a round or two at a time before ducking into 
tl1eir foxholes, and then looked out to fire again. 
Pfc. Harmon W. Butler and Pfc. Ray Tucket of Com-
pally D, attached to Company C, left their foxholes to man 
their machine guns in spite of the inten£e enemy fire. They 
were alone manning their guns, for the other members were 
firing rifles to build up a section fire line against the enemy. 
Pvt. Samuel A. Breyer had a foxhole between the two ma-
chine guns, and by running out under their terrific fire, he 
kept them supplied with ammunition. Small arms fire st . uck 
the cradles of both guns, damaging them in such a manner 
that they could only be traversed by dragging the tripods 
from side to side. They fired 5,500 rounds with the enemy 
dead piled up as close as 15 yards. 
Company C, like Company I, was finally obliged to with-
draw. The enemy attack was finally stopped by Companies 
A and B, with the help of our tanks and the enemy artillery. 
When the enemy left the open ground and entered the 
woods, they ran into their own fire. 
The tactical clumsiness was not all on their side, however, 
fur one platoon of Company I had occupied a pillbox with 
weak outpost security and were taken by surprise when an 
enemy tank drove up to the pillbox, trained its guns on the 
embrasure, and ordered the entire platoon to surrender. 
The Town of Ubach had been reduced on the third by the 
117th Infantry, part of the 743rd Tank Battalion, and Com-
pany B of the Second Armored. On the fourth, our Second 
Battalion was ordered to Ubach to join the 117th in an at-
tack.: south from the town. There was a traffic problem in 
Ubach between the southbound infantry and the Second 
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Armored, which was headed north and northwest to Palen-
berg and Frelenberg. The enemy took advantage of the 
concentration of our units in that spot and laid in tremen-
dous barrages of artillery. The Second Battalion dug in for 
the night, and dug deep near Ubach. 
In the afternoon the First Battalion turned south and at-
tempted to mop up in the immediate area. Two pillboxes 
pinr.ed down Company B and held up the entire Battalion. 
An attack on the first pillbox was driven off by fire from the 
second pillbox. The only way to knock out the first box 
seemed to be to slip a man across the fire lane of the second 
with a satchel charge to apply to the blind side of the first. 
S/Sgt. Harley Carson said he thought he could make it. 
With one man behind him for covering fire he slipped 
across to reconnoiter the first box, some 35 yards away. 
Undetected he made a dash back to our lines and informed 
his platoon leader that he had heard an estimated eight Ger-
mans talking inside the pillbox. 
He then returned with a satchel charge and, coming around 
the blind side of the box, placed the charge close under the 
embrasure. He dove for cover and, after the explosion, 
rushed the pillbox again and threw grenades into the em-
brasure. The satchel charge had not blown the box (for that 
matter, they usually did not), but the grenades killed two 
Germans who were trying to escape, and the others surren-
dered. The second box, deprived of the support of the first, 
was surrounded and taken. It often happened this way-
if one pillbox in a system of pillboxes covering each other 
was taken, the rest would eventually fall. As often as not, 
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the Germans were infatuated with the ingenuities of their 
system and became discouraged at the least interference. 
In any case, the Battalion was able to move forward some-
what, away from the area most violently raked by the enemy 
artillery barrages. The Third Battalion, less Company I, 
which had been pulled back to reorganize, and two platoons 
of Company K, which were covering the bridge area at 
Rimburg, continued to mop up in their sector and block the 
Wurm Valley from the south. 
The morning of the fifth, the Second Battalion attacked 
south from Ubach and a line running east from Herbach. 
Company E led the Battalion, and the platoon of T/Sgt. 
Harold L. Holycross led Company E. Ahead of the platoon 
by some 800 yards was a group of scouts, S/Sgt. Roy Kissel-
buch, Sgt. Frank Stabile, Pfc. John Perez, and Pfc. Glen 
W. Miller, with the mission o~ locating hidden pillboxes and • 
weapons. 
As the attack progressed up a gradual slope they spotted the 
first pillbox, and at the same time they were fired on by a 
machine gun in the woods to their left flank. The scouts 
directed the fire of two self-propelled tank destroyers, and un-
der the cover of this fire moved to within 100 yards of the 
box. 
At this point the TDs were signalled to lift their fire, and 
the four men rushed to within 20 yards of the pillbox. Pri-
vate First Class Perez threw a grenade into the aperture and, 
1mmediately after the explosion, 25 Germans, five of them 
wounded, ran out to surrender. The capture of this pillbox 
allowed the Company to continue the attack without de-
ploying and set the pace for the capture of ten more boxes dur-
ing the day. A large part of the day's work was done by 
Sergeant Holycross and his platoon, with the help of the 
tanks and tank destroyers. There were a number of casual-
ties late in the day, and when the Company dug in for the 
night, some of them were lying in a pillbox somewhere to the 
right front. Successful evacuation of the wounded during 
daylight had become almost impossible. 
The enemy occupied trenches 600 yards to the front and 
a pillbox 400 yards to the right front. Pvt. David J. Leo and 
Pfc. Wilfred A. Everard volunteered to find the wounded 
and evacuate them. They left at 2100, and after scouting 
the front for two hours in the darkness they found the pill-
box and evacuated the wounded men in it. 
The First Battalion continued to fight south in its zone, 
eliminating three pillboxes, one of which was a two-story 
blockhouse vigorously defended. The Battalion dug in for 
t!Je night, with C Company's r ight flank and right rear still 
containing enemy-held boxes. Early on the 6th the enemy 
b1 oke loose again. The attack was preceded by heavy sus-
tained barrages of artillery and mortar fire followed by four 
tanks and masses of infantry. The main force of the attack 
~truck Company F in the flank, rolled it up, and captured 
65 of our men who were trapped. The enemy advance pushed 
deeper into the sector while the machine guns which they had 
put into action on top of the pillboxes denied the commitment 
pf our support. 
By this time all Company F's mortars had been lost. T/Sgt. 
W. W. Pierce sent back to Company G for one. When it 
arrived, he found that the sight was missing. By guess and 
prayer, his first two rounds made direct hits. killing or 
wounding the crew of one gun. Meanwhile, Lt. Edward Arn 
rallied 40 men who refused to withdraw and held fast. The 
e11emy attack had now fully developed. Company E lost 
two pillboxes and 38 men. The large number of wounded 
ieft Lt. Warne Parker with 35 men. L ike Lieutenant Arn, 
!Je held fast and, with the aid of artillery and TD fire, des-
perately struggled to hold his ground. Near one of the pill-
Loxes under attack 20 men from both companies were oc-
cupying a .trench. 
The intense enemy fire had almost neutralized their posi-
tion, yet S/Sgt. Harry L. Robinson borrowed a BAR and, 
using an ammunition box fo a firing step, stood head and 
shoulders above ground. level. For a full hour he brought fire 
against the enemy, expending 22 magazines of ammunition. 
His hail of lead failed to stop the tanks, but it did halt the 
infantrr. Sergeant Robinson survived this battle, but he was 
killed in action on the 15th. 
In the fire trench at another pillbox under attack were four 
wounded men of E Company. Pfc. Edward Cavill carried 
tbem out from under the artillery and small arms fire to 
shelter inside the pillbox. When his platoon was forced to 
withdraw from the pillbox, he was ordered back, but told 
them to go to hell. Almost immediately G Company was 
hit hard again. He was captured. 
The Germans, after making a penetration of 800 yards, 
were finally gradually forced back. They were driven from 
the pillboxes they had recaptured one by one. 
Among the last pillboxes reached before evening was one 
63 
held by Pfc. John A. Lasch, Jr., and SISgt. Robert R. 
Allen. At the beginning of the attack they had been sent to 
secure a pillbox which had already been reduced. They had 
had to race a German patrol which was on the same mis-
sicn. Although they were surrounded by Germans and by 
pillboxes held by them, they held the pillbox and refused to 
surrender. 
As E and F Companies had been badly depleted, the work 
of recovering the ground lost fell on Company G and Com-
p4ny K, which had come up on the right flank of Company E. 
. 
The tank commanded by Lt. Walter D . Macht of the 743rd 
Tank Battalion knocked out three of the Mark IV tanks in 
the course of the action. By evening the town of Herbach 
was flanked on the east by the Second Battalion and on the 
west by the Third Battalion of the 120th. This Battalion 
had attacked in the morning but soon ran into heavy small 
arms fire and for a while was occupied in throwing off a. 
counterattack by infantry, after which they had made good 
progress. 
Our First Battalion had attacked in the morning and re-
duced three strongly defended pillboxes blocking their ad-
vance. Early in the afternoon they dug in on the northern 
edge of Merkstein Hofstadt. Our Third Battalion had 
tried to keep abreast of the First, but had been held up. Capt. 
F:cancis J. Del Bene went forward to locate the trouble and 
found that the forward elements were pinned down by ma-
chine gun fire from several pillboxes. He personally led a 
squad of riflemen and two self-propelled tank-destroyers 
against the nearest enemy position. Two pillboxes were 
captured in rapid succession, with a number of prisoners in 
each, and in the late afternoon the Battalion made contact 
with the right of the First near Merkstein Hofstadt. 
As the battle around Mortain in August had made per-
manent the breach in the Atlantic Wall, the 30th Division's 
breach in the Siegfried Line above Aachen made it clear by 
the fifth of October that the invasion of Germany was here 
to stay. The Germans had failed to push us out of the Sieg-
fried Line and though they still talked about it, and even 
about pushing us back to the Channel from Aachen, we knew 
better. Although we see hard fighting ahead, by the sixth 
of October the war seemed clearly a matter of time. 
On the seventh, the 119th Infantry continued its attack 
south, with the Third Battalion of the 120th on the left 
and our First Battalion on the right. Our Second Battalion 
Company G attacks the Siegfried Line while British and 
American Correspondents view' the battle. 
was echeloned to the left rear and our Third to the right 
rear of the Regimental front. The Third Battalion of the 
12(Jth cleaned out Herbach, went through Merkstein Plit-
scha.rd, and was held up a while by fire from the slag pile 
south of the town. It by-passed the sfag pile to the right, 
and the 80 enemy soldiers at the position surrendered to 
C01npany G, which came in on them from the left. Shortly 
after noon the Third Battalion of the 120th had gone· through 
Zu Merkstein and reached the edge of Merkstein, where, 
abreast with our First ' Battalion, they held up for · an air 
:;.ttack on targets between Merkstein and Herzogenrath. Our 
First Battalion had spent the morning advancing against light 
resistance past the road spider north of Merkstein Wildnis to 
Mtrkstein. After the air attack, the advance was resumed 
and reached the edge of Herzogenrath. Our Third Bat-
talion cleaned out Merkstein Worm. There had been very 
little serious resistance during the day. For a short while, a 
platoon of O:>mpany Chad been pinned down 150 yards from 
the northern outskirts of M erkstein by machine gun fire. The 
fi1 e was coming principally from a pillbox concealed in a 
large building with outer entrenchments and supplementary 
machine gun nests in the sheds and barns nearby. 
Pvt. Salvatore Pepe figured that it was a one-man job. 
He crawled over the crest of a small hill and through an 
open field, and when he had come within 25 yards of the 
box, took cover in a shallow ditch. From there he threw four 
grenades into the outer emplacements and forced the enemy 
to abandon them for the cover of the pillbox. With his rifle 
he maintained fire on the embrasures and kept the whole box 
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buttoned up and neutralized for 15 minutes, while his Com-
pany surrounded it. The strongpoint yielded 53 prisoners, 
fc.ur of them wounded by Private Pepe's grenades. A large 
amount of material was captured, including a small ordnance 
dump of small arms and ammunition. 
North of Merkstein Worm the leading platoons of Com-
pany L had by-passed a group of four pillboxes and en-
tr~nchments, and had advanced about 500 yards. A squad 
which had been protecting the right flank of the rear pla-
toons was pinned down by machine gun and rifle fire from 
the strongpoint. S/Sgt. Vyron D. Woodward crawled 
among his squad and organized a withdrawal, leaving a 
BAR team as a covering force while the others took up posi-
tions 200 yards to the rear. He received a heavy machine 
gun from Company M, and with that and the BAR, the 
enemy was held fairly harmless until th_e TDs could move up. 
With the fire of the TDs, the squad advanced and knocked 
out the four pillboxes. 
On the morning of the eighth, the Third Battalion of 
the 120th was relieved from attachment to the 119th. Our 
First Battalion pushed into Herzogenrath, but was held up 
The "Rimburg Bridge," the smallest and mo;t important 
bridge in our history. 
One of the 200 positions knocked out by the 119th Infantry 
by a great number of mines in the streets of the town. Sgt. 
George L. Potts and others of the A & P Platoon worked 
three hours clearing a path through the town for the Bat-
talion. Some mines were under the cobblestones of the 
strtets and under the sidewalks, others were booby-trapped, 
and those in the street usually had primer cord attached so 
that the detonation of one mine would detonate a second. 
W c sustained 11 casualties from these mines, but we would 
have had considerably more if the Germans had not with-
drawn in such a hurry that they left some of their mine-
fields with loose cobblestones and many mines lying unplaced 
by the sides of the road. 
The Third Battalion accomplished its mission of mopping 
up the Regimental flank along the railroad into Herzogenrath 
and joined the First Battalion to remove mines in the town. 
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Before noon, however, elements of the First Battalion had 
passed through Kanerhof and were fighting in the woods 
northeast ~f Nieder Bardenberg. In the early afternoon the 
Third Battalion was ordered to swing around the right of 
the First and take Pley. They met resistance that persisted 
and stiffened, and got no further than a point northwest of 
Nieder Bardenberg. 
The First Battalion also was meeting greater resistance 
and had been stopped just north of Nieder Bardenberg. The 
enemy resistance at this town, which we called North Bar-
denLurg, and the violent battles of the next week, were a 
struggle for the main highway running northeast out of 
Aachen. The Germans were completely confused when our 
attack from Rimburg did not continue east as they expected, 
but turned south. 
As usual, the unusual confused them, and by. now they 
caught the idea and defended their last escape and supply 
route bitterly. The First and Third Battalions dug in, and 
the Second Battalion, which had remained near Zu Merk-
stein, revertecl to Division Reserve southeast of Herzogen-
ratiJ. 
Ou the morning of the ninth, the Third Battalion swung 
wide to the north and west and then drove south toward 
Pley. They surprised scattered strongpoints and in th1ce 
hours occupied Pley. The First Battalion occupied North 
Bardenburg, and at 1100 both battalions were ready to cross 
the road running between W efelen and Kohlscheid, to at-
tack Bardenberg. 
An air strike before the attack softened things up and the 
attal:k was launched. The Third Battalion reached the 
southern edge of Bardenberg early in the afternoon and 
spent the last hours of the day cleaning out that section of 
town. The First Battalion was held up shortly near Huhn-
erne&t, but reached the southern edge of Bardenberg at about 
the same thing as the Third Battalion. Meeting slight re-
sistance, the attack continued south about 1,000 yards, into 
North W urselen. Company A in reserve, was hurriedly 
sent east of Bardenberg to maintain roadblocks, while Com-
pany I was left in the town to cover the rear and right 
flank. 
The balance of the Third Battalion continued the at-
tack into North Wurselen. Company K, leading, began 
to rtceive tank fire shortly after reaching the edge of town. 
Lieutenant Hansen of the 743rd Tank Battalion had already 
lost two of his five tanks from enemy fire. Consequently he 
went forward on foot under mortar and small arms fire to 
locate the enemy tank. He finally located it, a Mark V, and 
reconnoitered a covered route for engaging it. His · own 
tanks were some distance behind, and as speed was essential, 
he commandeered an M-10 Tank Destroyer attached to 
Company K. He mounted the turret and rode along a 
route hidden from the enemy tank into a firing position. 
The Mark V was destroyed befdre it could fire a shot. 
Company K then consolidated its objective without 
difficulty. 
At 1900 the forward elements of the First Battalion 
were hit by a counterattack from the southeast, which they 
threw off without much difficulty. Within a few minutes 
Company A was struck from the east by a swift and vicious 
attack by five tanks and 22 half-tracks, carrying several 
hundred infantry. Company A was dug in around the 
cemetery at the main crossroads east of Bardenberg. The 
enemy armored deployed at this point and broke through 
Company A, proceeding 300 yards into the town. The 
tanks and half-tracks cut the main north-south street of Bar-
denberg completely by their fire, while the enemy infantry 
spread out through the town. At the cemetery Company A 
fought a hand-to-hand battle until almost surrounded. With-
drawal under these circumstances was extremely difficult. 
A platoon of Company G had been sent to reinforce Com-
pany A, but was unable t? get near Bardenberg because of 
the heavy mortar and artillery barrages. Eventually a pla-
toon of Company A broke contact and managed to withdraw 
to the north. Other elements turned up little by little during 
the days and nights that followed. They attached them-
selves to the first troops they met and fou·ght on. 
The withdrawal of the platoon was mainly the accom-
plishment of Lt. Raymond B. Scheuring, who organized a 
tdclaying force while the remainder of the Company with-
dlew. He remained in the line with his men, bitterly con-
testing every foot of ground he had to abandon to superior 
force. The Second Battalion came up at midnight and was 
committed to pinch off the enemy penetration. Little prog-
ress was made against the severe barrages, tank and small 
arms fire. Thus the forward companies of the First and 
Third Battalions were cut off. No communication with 
them was possible, as the wires were soon cut. The situa-
tion of the enemy force in Bardenberg was not much more 
. promising, since we had infantry and tanks on both the north 
and south flanks, and our artillery threatened to cut them 
off by fire east and west. Both forces attempted simul-
taneously to relieve their isolated elements and prevent relief 
from reaching the isolated elements of the other side. When 
Company B realized that they were cut off, they took up 
defensive position and waited. 
Shortly after dark '90 Germans came marching out of 
Wurselen in column of twos toward Company B's positions. 
They were obviously on their way to augment the German 
uuit in Bardenberg, since they did not seem to expect contact. 
A member of our outpost, seeing the column approaching, 
came back to the lead platoon of Company B and reported 
to S/Sgt. William ]. Widener, who rushed from his position 
Anti-tank ditch in the Siegfried Line-Dragon's teeth 
in the distance. 
to find the enemy precariously close. As there was a machine 
gun section attached to his squad covering the road on which 
the Germans were advancing, he assumed the section was 
holding its fire in order to surp•rise and destroy the column 
at close range. The machine guns did not fire and the Ger-
rr ,ans were coming closer. Suddenly a shot was heard and a 
fight with small arms began. Sergeant Widener ran down 
the open street and found a machine gun without personnel. 
It had been set up in the street with no cover available. The 
Germans by this time were about ten yards away. 
Sergeant Widener pulled back the bolt and began firing. 
He blazed 500 rounds into the group of Germans and settled 
the argument. In the morning eight German dead were 
found lying near the machine gun and farther down the 
street an aid station had been set up to care for 35 wounded. 
Five Germans were cap•tured in a house nearby, too fright-
ened to fight or try to escape with the others. 
During the night a First Battalion party of five men went 
,into Bardenberg to repair the wire to the companies in 
North Wurselen. The party was subjected to violent fire 
from the enemy half-tracks and was pinned down behind 
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a wrecked TD for 15 minutes by continuous 20MM fire. 
Against great odds they finally repaired the brea.ks and tem-
porarily restored communications before they were driven 
back. The two Battalions were isolated with no known sup-
ply or escape route. 
At 0300 of the lOth, the Second Battalion, with Companies 
A and C of the 743rd Tank Battalion, made a second at~ 
tempt to break through. This time they forced entry into 
the town before they were stopped by heavy small arms and 
direct cannon fire. Company E, leading the attack, became 
disorganized and was split into two groups. T/Sgt. Neal 
M. Bertelsen and a small group of men became separated 
front the rest. He organized his men for defense and security 
and notified the Battalion Commander of developments by 
radio. The group held a position very close to the enemy 
cannon and were in constant danger of being encircled in 
the dark. Nevertheless they remained at this position far 
intu the morning, reporting all enemy movements to head-
quarters. In the late morning a counterattack was launched 
by the enemy tanks and infantry with the apparent object 
of breaking out of Bardenberg to the west. Companies E 
and F repulsed the attack with heavy losses on both sides. 
At the same time, Company K in Wurselen was occupied 
figbting off four tanks which were leading a strong counter-
attack. Our tanks were called up. The lead tank was mis-
taken for an enemy tank by friendly fighter-bombers, which 
suddenly appeared, accurately bombed and set it afire. Only 
one member of the crew was seen to leave the tank. When 
everyone, including the tanker who escaped, ran for cover, 
Pfc. Kenneth C. Thayer, a rifleman, ran toward the tank in 
an attempt to rescue the men inside it. In full view of the 
friendly planes and the enemy tanks he climbed to the turret, 
though machine gun and 75MM ammunition had begun to 
explvde inside. He reached down through the smoke and 
flames and grasped a man who was wounded and badly 
bunted, lifted him out, and carried him to a nearby cellar. 
Returning rapidly to the tank to rescue the others, he found 
the tank fully ablaze. Company K had moved to meet this 
counterattack, leaving its sector of 400 yards to be defended 
by the first machine gun platoon of Company M. This pla-
toon was under strength in both men and guns. It had 
just reached its positions when a patrol of six enemy soldiers 
was seen leaving the extreme right front of the sector. Pres-
ently a group of 30 of the enemy entered the sector from the 
same direction. S/ Sgt. Robert B. Stiles decided not to dis-
close the positions of his guns, since the enemy clearly had 
other units in position to maneuver in superior force. He 
took eight of his men and laid a trap. The eight men were 
not discovered until they were coming in on all sides. Con-
sequently the surprised group· of 30 surrendered. 
As they were being disarmed, an attack was being formed 
and launched by a reenforced Battalion of enemy infantry 
against the small platoon's sector. This attack was pre-
ceded by an artillery and mortar barrage and accompanied by 
tanks. Sergeant Stiles lost no time in sending the prisoners 
to the rear. On the double, he led his men back to the ma-
chine gun positions under the preliminary barrages. At first 
he directed the fire of his section against the advancing en-
emy. Lt. Eugene Cook decided they could hold out longer 
from a more advanced position, so the two of them moved 
forward on reconnaissance. They found a good position 200 
yards ahead and ordered a gun crew forward. They opened 
fire at first from a window on the ground floor of a house, 
but as the enemy closed in and wounded the gunner, the 
gun was taken to an upstairs window. The sill was too 
higl1 to allow the use of a tripod, so Pfc. Benjamin E. Tagg 
stood fully exposed in the window, cradling the heavy gun 
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in his arms and bringing fire down on the enemy. The en-
emy fire struck the sill around him, but he continued firing 
until the order was given to withdraw if possible and to de-
stroy the gun. The enemy was now only 25 yards away and 
threatening to envelop the position. The crew destroyed 
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the gun and succeeded in getting back 200 yards to the 
~econd position. Sergeant Stiles organized the crew around 
the second gun in a perimeter defense and manned the gun 
himself. The position was soon smothered and the crew 
wounded or captured. Sergeant Stiles refused to surrender 
and kept firing until he was killed. The enemy then manned 
the gun and turned its fire on the platoon's third gun posi-
tion. Suddenly the third gun developed a malfunction and 
would only fire one round at a time. Pfc. Harold G. Jones 
dismantled and repaired it, while Lieutenant Cook and his 
men held the enemy back with rifle fire. 
Shortly after the machine gun returned to action it was 
discovered that the supply of ammunition was dangerously 
low. Pfc. Jones and Pfc. Tagg started back toward the 
ammunition dump. On the way they turned a corner, to 
be fired on by a group of three Germans who had infiltrated 
through the buildings to the rear of the platoon. Pfc. Jones 
fired and wounded one of the enemy, and the other two with-
drew. Machine gun ammunition and 350 rounds of rifle 
amrr.unition were brought up, and the fight continued. Lieu-
tenant Cook had heard friendly tanks moving in the rear and 
had sent a runner to bring them up. With their help, and 
the help of mortars, the body of the enemy attack was broken. 
This small group of men had taken 30 prisoners and in-
flicted at least 85 casualties on the enemy. The platoon's 
losses had been 70 per cent. 
Other groups of the enemy had worked their way into 
the 1 ear of the platoon from the right flank. After helping 
to ca.pture the 30 p·risoners, Pfc. Lewis A. Hunnewell was 
walking down the street on his way to the Company CP 
when he was fired on from the rear by an enemy machine 
gun. He took cover in the nearest house and while attempt-
ing tv escape, saw, from a back window, a group of 25 Ger-
mans. Ten of them entered the house next to his through 
the back. They "tried to leave by the front door and found it 
locked. While they were breaking it down, Private First 
Clasu Hunnewell, carrying a machine pistol he had removed 
from one of the 30 P'risoners, left his house, and started 
towards the locked door. He had just reached the street 
when the door was kicked loose and the 10 Germans came 
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pili11g out into the street. Private First Class Hunnewell 
fired into the group, killing three outright and wounding 
two others. The rest fled and were taken care of later in 
the mop-up. 
On the lOth the enemy launched five powerful attacks 
agair,st the Third Battalion, sending in first a small wave of 
apv.roximately 30 men and then a second wave of a bat-
talion, which covered the advance of the first with its fire. 
In general, the Third Battalion stopped the first wave with 
machine guns and small arms, and the mortars broke up the 
second wave before it could develop. 
Artillery was not available, but our mortars were ex-
tremely effective. Lt. Donald J. Conway had pushed an 
observation post forward to one of the high towers of a coal 
mine 450 yards from the enemy. From this position he 
could usually see the enemy attacks as they formed. The 
OF was maintained through four direct hits by enemy ar-
tillery, but the fifth made it untenable. Prisoners taken dur-
ing the action admitted that casualties from our mortar fire 
were very high. Air support came to the rescue and worked 
over the enemy troop concentrations to the south. 
Meanwhile, the Second Battalion, with tanks attached, 
made another attempt to break through Bardenberg, entering 
this time from the direction of Pley. Fighting bitterly, they 
recahed the center of Bardenburg. The lead tank, com-
manded by Lt. Lambert V. Wieser, tried to cross an inter-
section and was fired on by an assault gun set up in the 
street to its left. Lieutenant Wieser turned his tank into 
the face of the fire and traded shot for shot with the assault 
gun as he bore down up<Jn it. Although his fire had no 
effect on the assault gun, he continued firing until he was 
50 yards away, even though his tank was burning. He evac-
uated his crew, took command of another tank and went 
after the gun again. The second tank was destroyed by a 
German bazooka, and Lieutennt Wieser sustained burns 
which caused his death. 
This attempt to break through Bardenberg finally failed, 
and the situation in North Wurselen was becoming more and 
more critical. No supplies could get through except for a 
small quantity brought in jeeps that had the audacity to run 
the seriously wounded back from W urselen through the fire 
at tl1e intersection at Bardenberg. 
Lt. Milton J. Parks established an aid station in the mine 
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with the help of two medics and their aid kits. On the 
moming of the 1Oth he already had a large number of 
serious cases who had to be evacuated, among them Lt. Da-
vid S Drake. Lt. Drake was placed on an improvised litter 
in a trailer with three men holding him in place. The ve-
hicle, driven by T 15 Sidney Bosofsky, left ~he mine area at 
0800 in a convoy with three other jeeps carrying wounded. 
The three other jeeps took cover from the fire on the inter-
section, but T l5 Bosofsky dashed through the 20MM, ma-
chine gun, and sniper fire to bring his vehicle to cover 400 
yards beyond the intersection. Lieutenant Drake told him, 
"I owe you my life." 
At 1'900 the Second Battalion was withdrawn to the north-
ern edge of Bardenberg while our medium and heavy artillery 
shelled the town throughout the night. That night we in-
tercepted a German radio message sent to their force in 
Ba1 denberg exhorting them to hold their ground as help 
was on the way. On the morning of the 11th, the com-
paratively fresh Third Battalion of the 120th was attached 
to us. Maj. Howard W. Greer,with Companies I and L 
of that Battalion, plus a company of tanks, was given the 
m1s~10n of breaking through Bardenberg and relieving the 
First and Third Battalion. After a 15-minute artillery 
preparation, this t ask force passed through our Second Bat-
titlion and began a methodical cleaning up of the town, 
house by house. 
By the middie of the aftenoon they had cleared the inter-
sectiun and were held up by the fire from the enemy tanks 
and half-tracks. 1\!Iajor Greer borrowed a bazooka and made 
.his way forward to a position from which he could fire at the 
foremost enemy tank. Just as he fired the first rocket, the 
Friendly and enemy artillery destroyed this landmark of 
Bradenburg, Germany. 
tank spotted him and fired. His rocket destroyed the tank, 
and the shell from the tank struck the corner of the building 
ht was using for concealment. Fragments of the building 
cut his face and hands, knocked him down, and knocked his 
helmet off. He got up and started after the second tank, 
which he also put out of action. 
This turned the tide, for after that the Task Force de-
struyed six tanks, 16 half-tracks, and took 96 prisoners in 
shoJt order. At the same time, Company I made contact 
with the other companies of the Third Battalion in Wurselen 
after a strong drive south down the right flank. They had 
destroyed 10 half-tracks and captured 40 German soldiers 
and three officers. Soon afterward the Task Force made 
contact with the companies of our First Battalion in Wur-
selen, and then withdrew to a defensive position north of 
Ba1 den berg. 
Our Second Battalion occupied the town and the Regiment 
was regrouped. Although the enemy had been seriously 
weakened in that sector, the battle was by no means over. 
On the 12th, the 116th Infantry passed through our lines 
to contact the left flank of the First Division and thus com-
70 
plete the encirclement of Aachen. Unfortunately they were 
held up by the enemy's strong defense of Wurselen and made 
little progress. Meanwhile, the 119th Infantry was holding 
the west flank of the 30th Division from Herzogenrath to 
North W urselen against an enemy counterattack through 
Kohlscheid. Since the lOth, this flank, as far as Bardenberg, 
had been held by the 30th Division Reconnaissance Troop 
and the Regimental I & R Platoon, which had met a number 
of wemy patrols in the wooded valley before Kohlscheid. 
On the 12th, a group of 100 enemy infantry was spotted 
grouping for an attack across the bridge near Kohlscheid. 
Our artillery broke it up. From Bardenberg south toward 
North \iV urselen the flank was held for a period by ele-
ments of Company D and by the kitchen train of the First 
Battalion. The German counterattacks did not strike this 
lightly-held flank of the Division, but hit Wurselen in de-
fense of the highway running through it out of Aachen. 
Between the 12th and the 15th there were five serious coun-
terattacks. On the 12th a counterattack by tanks and infan-
try had been repulsed in the First Battalion sector (on the 
Regimental left), and on the 13th there were still tanks 
wandering around. 
Comprany B was prevented from clearing the area ahead 
by some five tanks to their left and three to their right front. 
Capt. Edward E. McBride, Jr., went forward to a building 
7 S yards from the first enemy tank and directed artillery on 
it. When it was knocked out, he directed two additional 
hits on a second tank. Despite our attempts, we were not 
making satisfactory progress in Wurselen. We threw in 
heavy concentrations of artillery, but the enemy was stub-
born. At dusk on the 14th, a company of enemy infantry 
hit Company K, on the left of the First Battalion. The en-
emy approached along a hedgerow beside the railroad tracks, 
oppo3ite the positions of the Second Platoon of Company K. 
The machine gun fire supporting their attack was heavy 
enough to temporarily neutralize our fire. When the enemy 
company closed in, they began throwing a large number of 
!hand grenades into our positions. To stop their advance Lt. 
Donald A. Ward filled his pockets and hands with fragmen-
tation grenades and began crawling toward the hedgerow. 
The enemy attempted unsuccessfully to stop him with gre-
nades. When it became dark he crawled up close to the 
hedge and let loo~e. After the rapid explosions, the enemy 
filled the air with screams of pain. At daylight five enemy 
dead were found behind the hedgerow. They had carried 
their wounded with them. Our platoon had suffered no 
casualties. 
Late on the 15th, the Second Battalion relieved the First 
B.-tttalion in North W urselen in preparation for the series of 
attacks which was to take Kohlscheid. The First Battalion 
wag to reduce northern Kohlscheid while the Third Battalion 
was to take the southern part and continue south about 1,000 
ya~ds to an objective near Sors. The Second Battalion was 
to make a hard push head into Wurselen. Shortly after mid-
night the Third Battalion sent a squad into the southern 
outskirts of Kohlscheid to feel out the enemy before the at-
tack. The patrol had just entered the defem:e perimeter when 
it received a mortar barrage, which wounded three men. 
Pfc. Paul L. Howard, a medic with the patrol, helped the 
three men to the shelter of a house 30 yards away, while 
the barrage was still falling. 
After reconnoitering the enemy territory, the patrol started 
back, but was intercepted by a strong enemy patrol and took 
up defense in a house. A fierce close encounter with rifles 
and grenades followed and the patrol was captured. On their 
way to the enemy rear under guard, our artillery barrage 
preparation for the attack of the Third Battalion fell on the 
group and two Americans were wounded. Private First Class 
Howard refused to take cover, gave the wounded first aid in 
the open, and then helped carry them to an enmy bunker 
nearby. He remained with the wounded until the Third 
Bat tali on came through. 
When Company I came down the road into the outskirts 
of Kohlscheid, they received machine gun fire from a dug-in 
position about 100 yards ahead. There were several casual-
ties, and the column scattered to the sides of the road for 
covtr. 
Lt. Vincent S. Scurria was ordered to swing his platoon 
500 yards left, thus bringing it into enemy territory to cover 
the route of the tanks which were coming up. After the 
platoon had advanced 300 yards it was pinned down by 
cro.>sfire from two dug-in machine guns 500 yards away. 
M 'ortar fire was called for but had no effect. 
Lieutenant Scurria stood up in the machine gun fire and 
mar,euvered his platoon into positions from which they were 
at l~st able to kock out the machine gun nests. The tanks 
then coordinated . their attack with that of the infantry, and 
rapidly cleaned out the southern end of Kohlscheid. The 
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Thiid Battalion reached its objective near Sors early in the 
afternoon. 
The First Battalion had, long before dawn, bridged the 
Wurm River in front of Kohlscheid and proceeded to the 
north edge of the town, meeting scattered but stubborn oppo-
sition. The Wurm River ran generally south to north. It 
was small and could be termed a good-sized creek. How-
ever, in the "Line" battle, the Regiment had to bridge it 
three times-once moving east at Rimburg, once moving 
west at Kohlscheid, and once moving east, south of Kohl-
scheid. 
Tlte leading platoon of COmpany A was pinned down by 
machine gun fire until T/Sgt. John Overman, a mortar ob-
server, charged the machine gun position with his sub-ma-
chine gun and killed three of the enemy crew. After 
that, progress was fairly rapid. First Battalion had the 
downtown area cleared before noon and was on its way 
south west in the direction of U rsfeld and Richterich. Second 
Battalion jumped off at daylight, and though it soon ran into 
resistance from tank, machine gun, and artillery fire, it was 
able to knock out one tank and two pillboxes. Secure foot-
holdg were established finally on the northern and western 
edges of Wurselen. 
Our plan was not to push directly through Wurselen to 
cut the highway, but to come down the western side of the 
city and cut the highway at a point southwest of it, making 
contact with the First Division at the same time. In the after-
noon the Second Battalion held positions reaching down the 
slope to within 500 yards of the highway, and a company of 
the 99th Infantry Battalion, an American Norwegian Bat-
talion attached to us, had men dug in just short of the high-
way. The enemy held a considerable force of tanks and in-
fantry on the high hill directly south of Wursele!'l overlook-
ing the highway. This force brou·ght such heavy fire to bear 
on the men of the 99th that they were unable to leave their 
foxholes by daylight. 
The enemy also had pushed tanks along the road and sent 
six of them, accomp·anied by 40 infantrymen, against Com-
pany E holding the extreme right of the Second Battalion 
west of the highway. One of the tanks, a Mark VI, was 
able to advance to within 175 yards of our lines. A bazooka 
team was sent out, but, finding that the bazoob bad no 
effect on the heavy armor of the monster tank, the team 
came back. In a second attempt Pvt. Blair L. Mutimer took 
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"Sweatin' it out" 
the bazooka and went forward 50 yards and fired. One 
rocktt hit the tank, glanced off without doing any damage, 
and two others, though they missed, accounted for 15 of the 
accompanying infantry. The attack was finally driven off 
by artillery and small arms fire. 
At nightfall, a patrol was sent from Company F to contact 
the 18th Infantry of the First Division. The patrol slipped 
forward in the darkness and rain, coming within 20() yards 
of the First Division front lines before they were fired on 
by an enemy outpost. S/Sgt. Frank A. Karwel, who was in 
charge of the patrol, vanished. Fortunately he had given 
orders to avoid a fire fight and get on to the First Division. 
Two lead scouts, Pvt. Edward Krauss and Pvt. Evan F. 
WLitis, succeeded in crawling out from under the concen-
trated small arms and mortar fire, and in reaching the First 
Di\ ision lines. The seven other men of the patrol managed 
to work back to our lines in the dark. Private Krauss and 
Printe First Class Whitis guided a patrol from the First 
Division back to our lines later that night, but found no trace 
of Sergeant Karwel. It was not known whether he was 
kil.led or captured. 
Another patrol was sent from the Third Battalion sector 
neal' Sors to contact the First Division. It was led by Lt. 
Robert L. Kelly of L Company. The enemy discovered 
them when the lead scouts were within 20 yards, and in 
order to avoid capture or sudden death, all the members of the 
patrul trusted to the darkness, turned, and slipped back along 
the route they had come. Although Lieutenant Kelly stum-
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bled, fell, and lost his weapon, the others continued on to a 
covered position 150 yards away. Lieutenant Kelly, alone 
and unarmed, crawled more than lOO yards to a small clump 
of woods to await developments . 
The enemy came out from their positions to investigate 
and at times passed within a few yards of Lieutenant Kelly. 
The balance of the p•atrol, with the exception of S/Sgt. 
Simone, believed he was captured. S/Sgt. Simone was not 
satisfied and decided to look for his lieutenant. He walked 
and crawled forward calling in a very low voice. He found 
the Lieutenant and led him back to join his patrol. 
Thus on the night of the 16th, the circle around Aachen 
was complete, though not ·yet strong. We were to spend the 
next weeks consolidating the encirclement and cleaning out 
pockets, fighting off counterattacks and keeping the Germans 
from breaking out or in. On the morning of the 17th the 
First Battalion held its positions southwest of Kohlscheid and 
pushed forward reconnaissance in force. Company A with a 
platoon of tanks reached Richterich and took 24 prisoners. 
Company B and a platoon of tanks cleaned out the pillboxes 
around Forsterheide and then moved south to join Company 
A north of Richterich. The Second Battalion defended its 
sector in the western part of Wurselen, and with the help 
of TDs, covered the highway at a point due east of Wolfs-
furth. An enemy tank was destroyed there in the afternoon. 
The Battalion also cleaned out pillboxes in its sector and 
took 25 prisoners. 
In the evening, the Third Battalion sent two patrols to 
secure the bridge east of Eulersweg, where the highway 
crosses the Wurm River. Both patrols received fire, but suc-
ceeded in by-passing it and reaching the bridge, where they 
made contact with the First Division. During the night the 
toad-block in the Second Battalion sector was reenforced. 
Two mine fields were placed on the road by members of the 
AT Mine Platoon led by Lt. Warren Behrens. They laid 
one of the mine fields within 10 ya-rds of an enemy tank, 
trusting to the darkness and the sound of the motors of other 
enemy tanks to conceal their activity. Earlier in the day 
Lt. John Boots, then in command of the platoon, had been 
killed by tank fire while reconnoitering the terrain for these 
mine fields. 
The enemy had excellent observation on the area from 
their pillboxes and other defenses on the hill to the east, 
known as "Crucifix Hill." At night they shot frequent 
fl:o.res illuminating the opposite slope occupied by our troops. 
Because of the flares and the muddiness of the ground, Sgt. 
William H. Crabtree was unable to take an AT gun directly 
detwn the slope against the column of enemy tanks in the 
valley. After a difficult reconnaissance, during which he 
moved in and out of enemy territory, he found a less . ex-
posed route. Even so, the gun was spotted as it was dragged 
by hand down the slope. Enemy artillery and small arms 
were augmented by tank fire from the hill and valley. The 
crew fired the gun from the slope on the enemy tanks and, 
alternately dragging and firing, fought their way into a posi-
tion at the base of the sjope covering a stretch of the high-
way. 
At 0900 of the 18th, the Third Panzer Division launched 
an attack against the roadblocks held by Company A of the 
99th Battalion, inflicting heavy casualties. The attack was 
thrown back within 30 minutes with a loss of three Mark 
VI tanks. Two of them were knocked out by our TDs and 
the third by a bazooka from Company F. Company A of 
the 99th had been driven 100 yards back from the road-
blocks. 
Later that afternoon the enemy launched another attack 
through the left flank of G Company. This attack, pre-
ceded by artillery and mortar barrages, was made by 10 
tanks and 1 0() infantry. The onslaught quickly overran a 
light machine gun P'latoon suporting Company G on that 
flank and bore down on an intersection near the G Company 
CP. Twenty men of the Company were lost and the ma-
jority withdrew 100 yards. Lt. Winslow H. MacDonald 
grabbed a bazooka and a bag of rockets and took up a position 
at the intersection. As the first tank came rumbling down 
the street he fired two rockets at less than 100 yards. Al-
though both rockets glanced, the tank was somewhat intim-
idated and withdrew a short distance to cover. Lieutenant 
MacDonald then ran across the open street to move in on the 
tanls. Almost immediately they started forward again, pro-
te(:ting each other with fire. Lieutenant MacDonald stood 
fast, fired four more rockets, and brought the attack to a 
staudstill in that sector. 
Hitler had publicly announced that Aachen would not fall, 
and it was obvious that he had committed his full strength to 
its aid. Elements of four Nazi divisions were identified in 
our sector, and they were on the offensive. 
A prong of the enemy attack again threatened the positions 
of Company E. Mark VIs chewed up our outposts only to be 
finally stopped by our tanks at ranges of 100 yards. Other 
prongs continued to hit up and down the line. 
Sergeant Crabtree was observing his- sector from the sec-
ond story of a house near his 57MM AT gun when he saw 
tl1ree Mark "IVs moving directly toward his position. Tank 
fire had already driven all but one of his crew into the cellar 
uf the house. Sergeant Crabtree, aided by Robert J. Kochan-
owicz, manned the gun and brought fire on the enemy tank 
700 yards away. The enemy spotted them and returned their 
fire, blowing off a wheel of the gun and wounding Sergeant 
Crabtree. Even with the wheel gone, he fired three more 
rounds, disabling the lead tank and forcing the two others 
to halt 300 yards short of his position. 
In breaking through the flank of Company G, the enemy 
isolated Lt. Louis A. Daugherty, Jr., mortar observer in 
supjJort of the Company, and eleven men of various units. 
They took cover with Lieutenant Daugherty in the cellar 
d the house from which he was observing. Active enemy 
infantry broke into the ground floor of their building and 
tried to dislodge them with grenades. The group answered 
with grenades and even made a number of forays from the 
cellar. Lieutenant Daugherty killed two and wounded three 
others, while Pfc. Edmondo D. Richeidie took two prison-
ers. Four of the men in the cellar were seriously wounded 
and not evacuated until shortly after nightfall, when the 
enemy force at last reluctantly gave up the attack and with-
drew. 
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In the early morning the First Battalion and two platoons 
of tanks jumped off with the mission of taking the high 
ground 1,000 yards south of Richterich and establishing 
road-blocks on the complex highways running northwest out 
of Aaachen near Laurensberg. The Battalion accomplished 
its mission in half an hour, taking 115 prisoners. It was 
quickly relieved by the 11 04th Engineer Group and drove 
southeast to an objective west of Sors. Sors had been taken 
earlier in the day by the Third Battalion, who had established 
road-blocks at Scheuer, below Heumesser, and across the 
main highway near Grosstuck. This last road-block, estab-
lished by Company 'I, finally made a solid junction with the 
First Division, and the ring around Aachen was physically 
complete. 
The breaching of the Siegfried Line and the encirclement 
of Aachen had takn us 16 days of continuous fighting, during 
which the Regiment suffered 661 casualties. Of these, 45 
were killed, 482 were wounded, and 134 were missing in ac-
tion. We had reduced 131 pillboxes, 73 fortified positions, 
and had taken 1243 enlisted prisoners and 26 officers. 
·Without the drive of the 30th Division from the north, 
the First Division could never have taken Aachen, as the 
Cummanding General of the First Division observed. The 
119th Infantry had met the heaviest fighting of the Division 
in this action. \V e had every reason to be proud of our-
sdves. Even the Germans, with their customary ineptitude, 
flattered us by calling us the Roosevelt SS. Later they called 
us the Red Devils, from the color of the Division patch. 
Our reputation with the W ehrmacht was so great that in 
December certain German commanders were influenced by 
the assurance that the 30th Division was too heavily engaged 
in the north to interfere. Such praise as that was rather more 
convincing than the various utterances of German officers 
aLout the brilliance of our tactics or that it was a pleasure to 
surrender to us because we were an honorable enemy. 
Meanwhile the other American armies in the European 
Theater had seriously outrun their supplies. After the cap-
ture of Aachen the entire front was reduced to minor activ-
ity. In our sector we did little more than consolidate our 
gains and push little by little toward the next natural bar-
ritr, the Roer River. 
Holland border at Kerkrade 
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On the 19th the enemy still held Wurselen to the east of 
the highway and the highway itself along most of the Second 
Battalion front. That morning the Third Battalion attacked 
northeast up the highway, and knocked out a pillbox oppo-
site Wolfsfurth. In the afternoon the enemy launched a 
counterattack north of this area against the Second Battalion 
with six tanks and a company of infantry. This time the 
enemy had less success, for they could not penetrate our line 
and in less than an hour were forced to withdraw with a loss 
of two tanks. On the 20th, the First Battalion relieved the 
Second, which withdrew to Kohlscheid. The next day the 
First Battalion drove toward the "Triangle" formed by three 
crossroads, two of them on the main highway about 200 yards 
north of the railroad. The Battalion, supported by a com-
pany of tanks and a platoon of TDs, made little progress 
against the enemy mortar, tank, and machine ·gun fire. When 
C Company reached the highway it was obliged to withdraw 
a short distance to permit the use of fire to its front. Just be-
fore nightfall, the Company was hit by a counterattack which 
forced it to withdraw 200 yards. Lt. Vector Ortega, the 
leader of the Third Platoon, had suffered a compound frac-
ture of the upper leg and was unable to move without as-
sistance. He stayed behind and directed the withdrawal of his 
Enemy defenses at Kohlsche:d 
The First Battalion counts prisoners at Richterich 
men until the enemy was actually intermingled with them in 
hand-to-hand fighting. After all but a handful of his men 
had withdrawn from their positions, he allowed himself to be 
helped to the rear. 
The Second Platoon was cut off by the enemy on both 
flanks, until Lt. Frank A. Sparke, at the head of his platoon, 
forced his way across 100 yards of open ground to contact the 
29th Division to his left. The enemy had also driven a 
"edge between C Company and A Company on the right. 
The next morning, Sgt. James B. Case, Pvt. Sherman C. 
Shelton, and Pvt. Max E. McGowan of C Company volun-
teered to regain contact. At the start they had to cross 75 
yards of open ground under machine gun and small arms fire 
bdore reaching the first house, which was held by at least 
seven Germans. The patrol drove the enemy through the 
cellar to the cellar of the next house (most of the houses in 
this sector were connected by underground passages) . The 
Germans w:ere driven through the cellars of four. houses until 
cornered. Seven prisoners were taken. The patrol then 
pushed on to contact A Company and to coordinate the fire 
over a gap• of some 400 yards. 
The ground which C Company had lost the day before 
wa~ recovered with difficulty after a counterattack had been 
em!J'hatically repulsed and the Battalion had taken 103 pris-
oners. The fighting during the counterattack was at close 
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quarters, in cellars and houses. Grenades, bayonets, knives, 
and fists finally made our position secure. 
The enemy held their positions along the highway with 
artillery, tanks, and small arms, and though the First Bat-
talion reached the highway again, it was unable to establish 
road-blocks at the two crossroads. At the end of the day the 
Battalion retired to about the same positions it had held the 
night before. This sector stagnated, and for the remainder 
of the month of October there was plenty of fire but very 
little movement. Both forces built defensive positions and 
did not attempt vigorous attacks in force. The Wurselen 
sector was held by the battalions more or less in rotation, and 
wl1en not at Wurselen they were at either Kohlscheid or a 
monastery rest center in Holland, nine miles away. 
Kohlscheid offered us our first thorough acquaintance with 
the German people. The situation at first seemed rather 
alarming politically, because we got along too well with the 
Germans. We were in an industrial section and it was 
American enough to make us feel a little at home. We had 
in common a northern, half-Catholic and half-Protestant 
tradition, and we shared certain sentimental feelings about 
Christmas, and Mother, and Cleanliness being next to Godli-
ness. The maniacal scrubbing and dusting the Germans en-
gaged in morning, noon, and night failed to impress us as it 
had in Holland. Maybe we were prejudiced. The German 
Our supporting tanks prepare for the attack on Wurselen, 
Germany. 
ideas of beautiful furniture, clothes, and accessones cor-
responded quite recognizably to the ideas of the American 
middle class. 
But naturally, the principal attraction Germany had to 
offer-and did-was its women. They were usually clumsy 
and had little style, yet they did have a great deal of enthu-
siasm about certain things. In spite of threats, lectures, 
orders and fines of 65 dollars, fraternizing was believed 
to flourish. It was simply biolo-gical pressure and was taken 
too seriously. After a few days' rest we had the detachment 
to realize that the Germans had a gross energy and no real 
liveliness. They had a fatal lack of humor; even their dirty 
jokes were somehow not funny. They were stupid to a 
degree that even their enemies in Europe did not exaggerate. 
Tltey struck an American as essentially c<;>rny, and in a month 
or two we knew that even the good Germans, if such ex-
isted, were uncivilized to a degree unknown to us. Their 
minds, habits, and life were so regimented and systematized 
that the slightest interruption disorganized their entire life. 
When curfew hours were established, they assumed a ~ewil­
dered look of despair. One woman, for instance, complained, 
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in tears, and requested that she be allowed to go to her baker's 
at 11 :·00, as she had for 46 years, rather than at 1000. Well-
dressed men and women stooped, without hesitation, to "shoot 
a '-nipe" in the gutters. Many of our soldiers took to throw-
ing recently-lit cigarettes at their feet, just to see their arro-
gance humbled as they leaned down and mumbled a subdued 
"Bitte." 
During the month, the Regiment captured 2,080 PW s, in-
cluding 33 defiant Nazi officers, and knocked out 21 tanks, 
18 half-tracks, four self-propelled guns, and six AT guns. On 
our side, there were 7'9 killed, 730 wounded, 35 captured, 
and 250 missing, bringing the casualty total to 1,094. 
NOVEMBER 
W urselen-W eiden-F reidaldenhoven-Merzenhausen-
Pattern 
For the first two weeks of November no serious action de-
"eloped. We were still west of the highway in W urselen, 
receiving regular harassing barrages and replying in kind. 
Once in a while an enemy tank would drive up and fire a 
few rounds into our lines and then withdraw. There was 
some patrolling activity. The weather was dismal and the 
ground a mire. 
The Third Battalion spent a few days in the complicated 
monastery outside Kerkrade, Holland, which had been con-
verted into a rest camp. The Second Battalion was attached 
tu the Second Armored and pursued training in the coordina-
tion of infantry and armor near Neerbedk, southwest of Sit-
tard, Holland, and then in the woods west of Gretenrath, 
Germany. In short we had passed from a Blitzkrieg to a Sitz-
krieg of a peculiarly depressing type. No one doubted that 
we would eventually win the war in Europe, but it again 
looked as if it would now go on and on. The longer the 
front remained stagnant, the more firmly the Germans would 
convince themselves that they had stabilized their western 
front and could either push us back or receive, in the words 
Qf Frederick the Great, "a decent peace." They could not 
understand that, from the Allied point of view, any peace 
short of unconditional surrender would be indecent. So, it 
appeared that Germany might fight the war to its military 
conclusion and we would have to pay for the fairly bloodless 
Sitzkrieg which now existed. Daily the stocks of ammunition 
and supplies grew. Kohlscheid was converted into an am-
munition dump; the streets and roads were lined with stack 
after stack. 
On the 15th of the month the Germans made an attack 
un the First Battalion sector in Wurselen. ':£'hey threw in 
an artillery and mortar preparation, and when it lifted, three · 
tanks and the infantry 20 yards in front of our lines, opened 
up. Sgt. Steve T. Puhalla of Company C climbed to a roof-
top and, using a grenade launcher, fired 60-mm. mortar shells 
at the enemy tanks. The enemy infantry directed a good 
deal of small arms fire at him but he ·fired eight shells from 
the grenade launcher, scoring two hits and six near misses. 
At the same time T/Sgt. Raymond K. Rhodes was firing 
at them with a bazooka from the middle of the road, where 
he was exposed to heavy small arms fire. Each time he fired 
the bazooka he had to withdraw, having drawn attention to 
his position, but he returned four times, to score two direct 
!tits on the lead tank. The tanks became irresolute, fired two 
perfunctory rounds, and then withdrew. After that the en-
emy infantry returned to a quiscent state, and the artillery 
duels continued in a leisurely manner. 
The jump came soon. On the afternoon of the 16th the 
Third Battalion attacked east to finish Wurselen. Small 
arms fire was met from the first, but in about half an hour ~ 
Companies I and L had advanced 500 yards. Company L 
crossed the highway and advanced until it was pinned down 
by machine gun fire east of the stadium. Companies I and K 
had difficulty in reaching enemy-held Wurselen because they 
were forced to cross 400 yards of open terrain before reach-
G.I.'s walk down the main street of Alsdorf, Germany-
you can look, but mustn't touch. 
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illg the first buildings. A platoon of Company I got across, 
though subjected to crossfire from enemy machine guns. The 
platoon took cover in a building in which one wing was still 
held by tbe enemy. A friendly tank attached to the Com-
pany observed machine gun fire coming from the building 
aud began firing at it, unaware that the platoon of Company I 
was also there. They tried to signal the tank but had no 
success. 
Pfc. Sam W. Larsen, a platoon runner, had become sep-
arated from the platoon early in the action, and while mov-
ing up to rejoin them, saw the situation. He attempted 
tu reach the Company Commander by radio, to relay the sit-
uation to the tank, but he could not get through. Finally 
he decided that he would have to crawl up to the tank himself 
in spite of the eQ.emy fire. It was some 7 5 yards, and as he 
nawled, the enemy laid in an artillery and mortar barrage. 
He made it and the platoon was saved. 
Lead scouts of the Second Platoon of K Company were 
pinned down 100 yards from the first houses by machine gun 
fire. The platoon, in the open field, was subjected tq severe 
artillery and mortar fire, and suffered a good many casual-
ties. Pfc. Freeman V. Horner rose up in the face of the 
fire and dashed across 100 yards of the field. A machine gun 
from the second story of one of the houses opened up, barely 
missing him. He fired his tommy gun, and his first burst 
killed both men at the machine gun. He rushed two more 
ent.my machine gun positions SO yards from him, dodging and 
firing. 
USO performers pause for an affectionate greeting with 
soldiers in Germany. Frank McHugh, center, unit 
member, surrounded with armament, takes a rest afte~ 
tramping through debris. 
Wurselen 
'Ibe enemy, unable to hit him, abandoned the two guns 
as Private First Class Horner broke into the house. As he 
came into the kitchen he saw one of them disappearing into 
the cellar and followed him with one grenade and then an-
other, calling to the enemy to surrender. Four of them 
came out of the cellar with their hands on their heads. When 
he had made certain that the three enemy guns were out of 
action, he signalled the phtoon to come up. Squad A and 
pari of the Headquarters group reached the house, but en-
emy artillery and mortar fire prevented further reinforce-
meJJt of the foothold . The squad and the Headquarters group 
held out all night. Three runners were killed before Sgt. 
Benjamin T. Blanten, by taking two hours to crawl the 400 
yards across the field, reached the forward group. His pack 
and field jacket were riddled by machine gun bullets. 
Company K lost its fighting commander again that day. 
The morning of the attack, Captain Hopcraft was heard to 
remark, after he had gone over the attack plan, "It looks like 
'Harry's Night Riders' are going to catch hell again today. 
If the Germans don't stop this damned foolishness, most of 
us will get a rest cure in the hospital." A few hours after 
tht attack had been launched, Captain Harry ran into a: 
batch of artillery. He was evacuated to a hospital in Heer-
len. Several days later when some of his men went back to 
see him, a nurse remarked, "Who is this guy, anyway? Seems 
like every General and Colonel in the Army has been here to 
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sec him." It was just "Captain Harry," an able fighting in-
fantryman. 
Captain Stewart assumed command of K Company, later 
to become Third Battalion Commander. 
The next mornin·g Companies I and the balance of K led 
the attack through Wurselen, passing to the right of the foot-
hold gained by K Company. The enemy had withdrawn; 
nevertheless 16 casualties were sustained from mines and 
boobytraps which they had left behind in great numbers. At 
the end of the day very little of Wurselen remained to be 
cleaned up. The outskirts were attended to the next morning 
by Companies I and K. Wurselen was destroyed almost be-
yond rebuilding. Our artillery and air force had pounded 
this city for nearly a month. Here some soldier with a sense 
of humor had quoted on a signboard a sentence from one of 
Hitler's infamous speeches, "Follow me and in ten years you 
won't know Germany." 
The captured prisoners were amazed at our ability to get 
into the approaches of the town. They had laid a remarkably 
complicated pattern of mine fields, the most intricate we had 
ever met. What they did not know, however, was that one 
of our patrols had taken prisoners before the attack. Clever 
interrogation by' our own PW team divul·ged not only the 
ext(;llt of the fields, but their exact location and the gaps 
used by their patrols. We moved through the hidden gaps 
and let the fields sleep peacefully. 
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Aachen 
With the fall of Wurselen, the last main defenses of the 
Siegfried Line were destroyed. The Regiment alone had 
reduced over 200 pillboxs, and had badly mauled portions of 
five divisions. 
On the morning of the 18th the First Battalion attacked 
towards W eiden. In the late morning Companies A and C 
were held up near the railroad tracks before the town by very 
heavy machine gun fire from two pillboxes and other positions 
5n the town, as well as artillery and mortar fire. A tank with 
Company A had been knocked out by a mine, and the Com-
pany Commander was wounded. Lt. Ferdinand Eons took 
command of the Company and, seeing that the greatest ob-
stacle to the advance was the machine gun fire, called up the 
thrte remaining tanks against the enemy positions. He 
mounted the lead tank himself and from there directed the 
fire and maneuver of the others until the enemy positions 
were neutralized. By evening the Battalion had taken the 
greater part of W eiden and in the morning completed the 
occupaiton, setting up road-blocks on the highways beyond it. 
In the afternoon of the 19th the 335th Infantry relieved our 
First and Third Battalions. The First Battalion retired to 
the monastery at Kerkrade and the Third Battalion went to 
"Camp to Kohlscheid." The Second Battalion, with the 
Second Armored, had moved from Grottenrath to Ubach to 
Setterich, in preparation for an attack on the approaches to 
the Roer River. 
On the 20th the Second Battalion and the Second Ar-
mOied attacked the town of Freialdenhoven, with Company 
G leading. By evening half the town had been taken, and 
Con1pany F was about 700" yards northeast of it. 
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Wurselen 
They had loose contact with the un · t to their left, across a 
500-yard gap. The enemy ~ent a patrol of ten men into the 
gap during the night, but they were stopped by an outpost 
consisting of S/Sgt. Jack C. W eeren and two other men. Sgt . 
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Weeren fired on the patrol with his M-1, killing four, 
wounding two, and taking three prisoner. The last of 
Freialdenhoven fell the next day and the Battalion, though 
delayed by the AT and AP mines in the town, had pushed 
mure than a mile east of it by nightfall. 
On the 22nd, elements of the Second Battalion advanced 
tu take Merzenhausen. The town offered the Germans one 
of their favorite situations for defense, being on a stream with 
high ground behind it. They had used it at Mortain, on the 
Seine, at Valkenburg, in Siegfried Line and again here. The 
platoon of Company G was held up by fire from entrench-
. ments in front of the town, about 300 yards away. A pla-
toon of Company E was committed and pinned down. The 
balance of Company G was committed with a platoon of 
tanks. Enemy entrenchments in front of the town were 
finally cleared almost entirely by 81-mm. mortar fire. The 
mortar observer attached to Company E took the assign-
ment. A tank shell hit so close to him that it destroyed 
his radio and he had to crawl under heavy fire to obtain an-
ot!Jer from Company E. His fire was effective enough to 
cause numerous casualties among the enemy and to disor-
ganize the others in the entrenchments. Only then were 
Companies G and E able to enter the town. 
As Company G moved down the man 'treet, a camouflaged 
enemy tank opened up with machine gun and 75-mm. fire, 
"ounding four men. At the same time, the town was sub-
119th Troops plod forward on the march to Wurselen 
jecced to a heavy artillery and mortar baruge observed from 
the hill behind the town. Pfc. Roy Scott, an aid man, left 
CO\ er and carried the four wounded men to safety just be-
fore artillery shells landed in the street exactly where they 
had been lying. In spite of this fire and infantry defense, the 
Battalion had cleared about a third of the town before it dug 
in for the night, still in close contact with the enemy. Mine 
fields were laid as a defense measure against the enemy armor 
in the northern part of town, some of it being only a few 
hundred yards from Company G. 
One mine field was to be placed in an open field 50 yards 
to the right front of Company G. Three members of the 
A & P Platoon carrying the mines were about to leave the 
front line when they heard the voi<Oe of a German soldier 
calling to them from the field. One of them went back to 
the Battalion CP and brought up Pfc. Frank Bartenek, an 
:interpreter. Private First Class Bartenek crawled out from 
our line, but because of the noise of the battle he could not 
hear what the German was saying. He crawled ahead to 
within 15 yards of the enemy outpost. Private First Class 
Bartenek and the German tried to persuade each other to 
surrender, until Bartenek settled the argument by throwing 
two grenades. The mine field was laid. Shortly afterwards 
the enemy struck with two Mark VI tanks and about a com-
pany of infantry. 
Our defenses had already been weakened by the loss of 
eight tanks and a large number of wounded. The enemy 
overran the forward platoon of Company G and disorgani~ed 
;it5 support, which was digging in in an orchard on the left 
of the town. A heavy machine gun section acting partially 
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Medical party about to pick up German ciYilian who just stepped 
on a German box mine. 
as riflemen was sent to hold the left flank from further col-
lapse, until reinforcements could be found. The instrument 
corporal, Henry C. Klander, who had been in the town with 
forward elements of Company G earlier in the night, led a 
three-man patrol into the section of town retaken by the en-
emy, to contact isolated riflemen. The patrol found 20 
riflemen and tankers and brought them back to strengthen the 
left flank. Though Company G lost considerable ground, 
it was able to hold a quarter of the town until it could re-
sume the attack again in the morning. On the 23rd they 
regained control of about two-thirds of the town. The en-
emy resistance and counterattacks on the Corps front, includ-
ing the 29th Division on the right, became so serious that 
the 1·emainder of the Regiment was alerted. 
The balance of the Regiment moved by motor to areas 
near Hongen, Schleiden, and Aldenhoven. That afternoon 
the Third Battalion, with Companies K and L leading, 
advanced towards Pattern. Supporting tanks from the 743rd 
Tank Battalion knecked out three Panther tanks while our 
companies took 62 prisoners. Resistance was relatively light, 
and Pattern was taken by the middle of the afternoon. Dur-
ing the night, contact was made with the 120th to our right. 
Patrols made contact with the enemy on the 24th in the 
wuods east of Pattern, and on the 25th our Third Battalion 
w.ts attached to the 120th Infantry to continue the attack 
from Pattern to Altdorf. Our First Battalion was attached 
to the Second Armored, and what little was left returned to 
Kohlscheid. 
The battle in Merzenhausen bounced back and forth in-
deciJively. Early on the 26th, when E and F Companies at-
tacked, we had barely a foothold in the southwestern end of 
town. With their artillery and mortar barrages, which in-
flicted heavy casualties, the enemy was desperately defending 
the town house by house, with snipers and machine guns in 
tbe houses and from foxholes in the gardens. Early in the 
attack when the leading Equad of Company F scattered for 
cover from the sniper and machine gun fire, S/Sgt. William 
]. Peterson went ahead, throwing grenades into the windows 
ar.d foxholes. After four buildings had been cleared, the sec-
ond platoon was again held up by machine gun and bazooka 
fil"e coming from a house lOO yards farther up the street. 
Sgt. Rene W. Beaulieu crawled up the street on his hands 
ar.d knees, armed with an M-1, hand grenades, and AT gre-
n:.:.des. When he came within 15 yards of the enemy machine 
gun position, he fired three AT grenades into the window 
and then rushed the front door. Three hand grenades killed 
four Germans and wounded two others. Sgt. Guy C. 
Bates, who had taken cover in the kitchen of a house nearby, 
found that he could see an enemy bazooka team from a bed-
room window. With AT grenades and a BAR he destroyed 
the team. The advance of Company F drove a group into 
the courtyard of another house. Covered by the men of his 
squad, Sgt. Bates called to the Germans who were in the 
house to surrender. They found a captain, in command of a 
Battalion, and a staff of three officers. Eighty enlisted Ger-
mans in the barn and sheds around the courtyard followed 
the excellent example of their staff. 
Shortly after Company E jum~ed off, the platoon leader, 
the platoon sergeant, and the runner of the First Platoon 
were seriously wounded by a single mortar shell . The enemy 
had 36 mortars covering the area and they were hard to 
avoid . Pvt. Wally Beswerth, a medic, made two trips across 
a 50-yard space under the barrage to bring the three wounded 
rr.en to the protection of a ruined house. There were 22 
wvunds on the platoon leader, 20 on the platoon sergeant, 
and a bad leg wound on the runner. He tended them for 
three hours until they could be evacuated over the almost 
impassable road to Freieldenhoven. Only a few jeeps were 
able to make the trip, for five of them had been destroyed. by 
enemy fire. 
The Third Platoon of Company E was given the mission 
of clearing the gardens and orchards behind the houses on 
the south side of the town. The terrain was made difficult 
by the number of hedges dividing the lots and running across 
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the line of advance, as well as by the long hedge closing the 
orchards off from the open fields to the right. At the be-
ginning of the advance, one squad attempted to flank the 
orchards from the right, was pinned down by small arms 
fire, and the squad leader became a casualty. 
SISgt. Norbert V. Osterland went forward to take com-
mand of the squad, leaving his own squad with his second in 
command. He persuaded a TD to drive across the front of 
the squad and cover their shift left, to the concealment of 
the hedges. Sergeant Osterland had intended to use the TD 
to break the hedges in a move down the orchards; however, 
after a short advance, it was destroyed by a bazooka. Ser-
geant Osterland was obliged to continue the advance along 
the houses, clearing each lot in turn. When his squad occu-
pied a bunker in one of the lots, he spotted an enemy machine 
gun squad of six men moving across the next lot. By simul-
taneous fire, on his signal, Sergeant Osterland's squad killed 
two of the enemy and wounded .the other four. Soon after-
wards, he saw an enemy rifleman run from one of the houses 
and d ~op into a foxhole in the same lot. Sergeant Oster land 
crawled forward along the houses and into a barn about 20 
yards from the sniper's hole. He crawled into the loft and 
knocked out a tile from the roof. When he stuck his head 
out to observe, the sniper Ehot his helmet off. Sergeant 
Osterland hastily pulled in his head and crawled down to the 
ground floor. Four grenades and a liberal application of a 
fl::~me thrower squared accounts. Inside the TD two men 
had been injwed and one killed, but the TD itself was still 
opnative and badly needed. 
The difficulty was that the surviving members of the crew 
were too shaken · to remove the dead man from the turret. 
Although the enemy barrages and short range small arms 
fire made it a dangerous undertaking, Pfcs. Ervin L. Liv-
in~ston, Reginald L. Hazen, Elmer G. Sheeder, and Pvt. 
Earl F. Humiston left cover, climbed up to the turret, and 
tried to remove the body by hand. . After two attempts they 
decided it could not be done. They all removed their belts 
and, with a supplementary tent-rope, rigged up a system of 
harnesses on the body and succeeded at last in hoisting it out. 
A new commander and .crew took over and the TD went into 
?.ction again. 
Company E was pinned down once more and remained so 
for about an hour, until Pfc. William A. Ashworth and 
Pfc. Thomas P. Belka decided that they had all the fool-
i~hness they could stand. · Leaving their cover they crawled 
straight toward the enemy 45 yards away, opened fire, and 
began tossing grenades. They killed four of the enemy, 
wounded three, and captured three others. The Company 
was then able to push on, and by evening the town was en-
tirely cleared. 
A patrol sent from Company F after dark was attacked on 
the slop·e beyond the town by an enemy patrol of 20 men. 
The Germans lost four men killed and five wounded in the 
encounter, and another enemy patrol was stopped with sim-
i! ar losses at the b_ idge by Company E. 
At midnight the enemy pierced the eastern end of town in 
force, with two Tiger tanks, four lighter tanks, and a 
C'lmpany of infantry riding and walking. Pfc. Arion L. 
Adams and Pvt. Russell R. Teague, of Company F, a 
bazooka team halted the drive and held until help arrived. 
They had some success again.st the enemy infantry with gre-
'nades. When the tanks came within 35 yards, two direct 
hits by the bazooka stopped and turned them back. How-
ever, their bazooka flashs had given their position away and 
the enemy infantry, with grenades and small arms, forced 
them to abandon their foxholes and take cover in a creek. 
They remained in the frigid water for 40 minutes, bring-
ing fire on the enemy infantry. Artillery had been called for 
2nd, falling heavily on the enemy tanks and infantry, made 
them give up the attack, though reluctantly, and withdraw. 
As the Company recovered its ground, help was brought to 
Pvt. Mason H. ArmsLong, who had been cut off by the en-
emy attack. With his M-1 he had killed at least one of the 
infantry riding the lead tank and had fired AT grenades at 
the second. When the attack passed by and cut him off, he 
rdused to surrender and survived. 
Shortly after their withdrawal, the Germans sent back a 
p2trol to the Company F lines. It was discovered, driven 
b~ck, and one prisoner, full of information, was taken. It 
was learned that the bulk of enemy armor and infantry had 
withdrawn to Barmen, leaving the high ground immediately 
northeast of Merzenhausen unoccupied. He also informed 
us that a force was being organized to rescue the German 
captain and the others who had been taken prisoner with 
Qim. The force was located on the information and when 
it refused to surrender, was dispersed with artillery. Com-
pany F took the high ground northeast of Merzenhausen 
before daylight. 
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"All right! All right! So you gonna get married when 
you get back home." 
On the morning of the 27th, the First Battalion, which 
had come up from Hangen, attacked north and northeast of 
Freialdenhoven to take the bare tabletop hill called Hill 
1003. Company B advanced astride the railroad track with 
Company C on its left. The progress of both companies was 
very slow against heavy fire of all kinds. At the jump-off, 
the leading platoon of Company B suffered four casualties 
before it had gone 25 yards. Lt. Gerald E. Posner reorgan-
ized his platoon and crawled forward to the two lead men, 
whom he found dead. While there, he received word over 
his radio to return to the line of departure. Lieutenant Pos-
ner withdrew his platoon to cover, under fierce machine gun 
fire, and was the last to leave. Artillery smothered the en-
emy positions and the Company attacked again, advancing 
4 0 yards only to be pinned down again. 
The Third Platoon of Colllpany C was also pinned down 
by an enemy gun 35 yards away. Pfc. Joseph A. Micerri 
crawled to within 15 yards of the position and, with his M-1, 
held the gunner down and stopped his fire. Suddenly he 
saw a German with a burp gun ready to fire down the flank 
of his squad. Private First Class Micerri was unable to hit 
the German from his position, so he got up on his knees and 
pointed the German "out to th; BAR man. The German 
fired a burst which hit Private First Class Micerri in the 
~tomach. Micerri pulled a grenade from his pocket and, 
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holding his stomach with one hand, pushed himself up again, 
threw his g renade at the German and then slumped back as 
the German shot him again, killing him instantly. The 
BAR man could hardly miss his target and killed the Ger-
man. Company C moved ahead. The enemy resisted bit-
terly with mortar, machine gun, artillery, and tank fire. 
Whe~ the two companies were 200 yards short of their ob-
jective, the fire became so fierce that they could go no 
farther w ithout tank support. 
When the tanks fin ally came up along the railroad tracks, 
Lt. Francis ]. Brookman, a f~rward observer from the 65th 
FA Battalion , climbed down from the haystack he had been 
nsing as an observation post and made his way to the nearest 
tank. From its turret he directed such fire that the two 
companies advanced to within 100 yards of the objective be- . 
fore they we re pinned down again. A final de:;perate spurt 
by B Compa!Jy cleared the hill at the end of the day. 
. 
Throughout the day enemy air activity had caused numerous 
casualties. The' First Battalion Headquarters had a novel 
CP . They occupied the cellar of a building which had just 
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been destroyed by fire. The concrete floor, walls and ceiling 
were still hot. The weather was cold and wet, so the heat 
was certainly acceptable. 
. 
On the 28th, the Second Battalion returned to Kohlscheid, 
and on the 29th, the Third Battalion returned from its at-
tachment to the 120th Infantry. On the 27th, the Third 
Battalion launched an attack from Pattern against Altdorf. 
After advancing over 1,000 yards of open ground they were 
pinned down by heavy flanking grazing fire from enemy en-
trenchments and by tank fire from the town. There were 
heavy casualties in this action, among them the commander, 
Captain Eskelin. Lt. Robert ]. Kane took command of the 
Company and reorganized it for a slight withdrawal. The 
First Battalion of the 120th took Altdorf from the flank 
the next day. 
Our Company A had the mission of clearing the woods be-
tween Barmen and Flossdorf, consequently the First Bat-
talion did not return to Kohlscheid from its attachment to 
the Second Armored until the third of December. 
During the end of November the Regiment and attach-
ments had suffered 52 men killed, 210 wounded, and 66 
mi~sing in action. We had taken 426 prisoners. On the 
29th, there were changes of command. Lt. Col. Roy G. 
Fitzgerald assumed command of the Third Battalion, re-
lieving Lt. Col. Courtney P. Brown, who became Regimental 
Executive officer. Maj. Hal D. McCown assumed com-
mand of the Second Battalion, relieving Lt. Col. William 
C. Cox, who was transferred to Regimental Headquarters. 
DECEMBER 
The Bulge-Werbomont-Stoumont-Rouat La-Gleize-
L'ambleve River 
On the first of December the general outlook of the war 
was good. The Allied for~es had driven from the beachhead 
across France, Belgium, Holland, Luxembourg, and well into 
the industrial Rhineland. The end of the war still loomed 
in the future but not as promisingly as it had at the begin-
ning of October, when the assault on the Siegfried Line 
seemed to the ordinary soldier the end of Germany. Th~ 
Germans were masters at shifting forces and reserves from a 
quiet sector to one of action. Later, in the battle for the 
Rhine, this fact alone contributed greatly to their defeat. 
The loosely formed Battalions and Regiments had little co-
ordination or communication. Individual commanders used 
tactics detrimental to the units on their flanks. As a whole, 
it could be now said that a general overall breakdown of 
German Army command and control was ~eveloping. The 
battles in the "Line" were exhausting; the First, Ninth, 
Third, and Seventh Armies had so depleted enemy units that 
companies were reformed on squads and groups of companies 
from different units into battalions. Other companies were 
kept alive, although their strength might be only 15 to 20 
men. Later, it was not uncommon to find troops of five or 
six different German companies in one company's sector. 
The picture in our own sector looked bad. We had cleared 
the west bank of the Roer. The enemy still held the dams 
controlling the headwaters of the river to the south. They 
1:ould at any time destroy the dams and flood the entire re-
gJOn. If the attack were resumed, Allied Troops on the east 
hank would be cut off and could be destroyed at the enemy's 
leisure. The_29th Division, on our right, was badly depleted, 
and the Second Armored Division, on our left, had lost a 
large portion of its tanks and armored vehicles, some of 
which had been lost in the "Line" and not yet replaced. 
85 
Our weapons and vehicles were in extremely bad condition. 
We needed an almost complete re-equipping and a long rest 
cfter the many days of continuous combat. While the First 
Army was given the mission of capturing the dams, the 
Ninth Army stabilized its front and we began to pull back. 
On the first of December, the Regiment, minus the First 
;J.nd Second Battalions and Cannon Company, pulled back to 
Kohlscheid. The First Battalion was attached to the Second 
Armored Divisiol) in the vicinity of Frieldenhoven, and the 
Second Battalion moved into the Division rest center at Herk-
rade, Holland. Our Cannon Company was needed to sta-
bilize the front and was attached to the 197th Field Artil-
, 
lery Battalion near Setterich. 
In the days that followed, the First Battalion and Cannon 
Company returned to Kohlscheid. We now began to receive 
reenforcements in a number never before known. In a short 
time all companies were back to strength, some even a little 
overstrength. Training programs and inspections followed 
with such rapidity that it seemed as though we were back 
in basic training. 
The quality of the reenforcements was excellent; they 
learned rapidly and were smoothly absorbed into the unit. 
Many of these men were soon promoted to the vacancies left 
by our heavy non-commissioned casualties. The battalions 
and separate companies were rotated at the rest center. 
Beards and long hair disappeared and pants once again wore 
creases. Smiles and laughter came out of hiding and liquor 
d a very dubious quality became plentiful. Some mathe-
matician with nothing else "to do computed and announced 
the fact that if all the foxholes we had dug were joined end 
to end, a ditch two-and-one-half feet deep, three feet wide, 
ilnd 754 miles long could be used to bring "pin ups" and 
b00ze from the beachhead to his personal door step. 
Life was simple and quiet, and hot food was shoved down 
mtr throats three times a day. Crap and poker games flour-
5shed, even with the complications involved in the use of 
cu1'rency from four countries. Chrismas packages arrived in 
their usual battered condition and the Christmas spirit pre-
Vililed. Men started to make Christmas presents for each 
other. Hand-carved pistol grips and a type of suspender used 
to hold up a cartridge belt were most popular. Men gave 
a< presents their cigarette lighters, knives, and captured pis-
tnls to their buddies, who had admired these articles at some 
time in the past. One man gave to his foxhole buddy a. 
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lucky rabbit's foot which he sincerely believed had carried 
him safely from the beachhead. As trivial as this may seem, 
it really was a noble gift, for soldiers in battle become a 
snperstitious lot. Without his rabbit's foot, the man was 
killed, 5 days later. 
The sudden news of the German counterattack into Bel-
gium brought us back to reality. The Second Battalion 
was alerted and at 1000 was trucked to the vicinity of 
Erberich, Germany. Almost upon arrival, in the rapid oc-
C'Irence of events, the Second Battalion was ordered back to 
Kohl~cheid, and the entire Regiment was alerted for an 
instant move upon order, destination unknown. Our attach-
ments rapidly arrived and the Combat team now consisted 
of the 197 th Field Artillery Battalion; Company A, 823rd 
Tank Destroyer Battalion; Company B, 1 05th Engineer 
Battalion; and Company A, 1 05th Medical Battalion. In 
a matter of minutes the town awoke. Equipment, guns, sup-
plies, a!1d ammunition were quickly loaded and prepared for 
the move. No stage could have presented a more beautiful 
scene to a Commanding Officer than that of a well-trained 
Regiment in motion, each man at his individual task, no 
confusion-only quiet, smooth efficiency. 
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It was only then that we began to realize that for the last 
months the German High Command had been desperately 
hoarding its last major air, armored, and infantry forces for 
2 final blow at the growing Allied strength. Suddenly on 
December 16, Field Marshall von Runstedt had launched 
his abortive winter offensive. Masses of armor broke through 
the American front and fanned out into the snow-covered 
hills of the Ardennes. By the 17th the true magnitude of the 
offensive was realized. Supply and administrative installa-
ti.ons were being overrun on a large scale, and the security of 
the Allied front was threatened. Movement orders and the 
Quartermaster trucks arrived quickly, and by 1800 on De-
C(:mber 17, the Regiment was motorized and moving south 
toward the fluid zone of the German breakthrough. 
The Regiment moved quickly, yet cautiously, with air 
~::over. Enemy information was lacking, and the move contin-
l1ed until after dark when the Regiment occupied an assem-
My area near Eupen, Belgium. Enemy aircraft were active on 
? scale unknown for months. During the night all anti-
aircraft weapons were used to fight off consistent bombing 
and strafing attacks. Service troops stationed in the area pro-
vided conflicting reports of location of nearest enemy troops 
2nd direction of their movement. Retreating troops contin-
ued to pass through our column to the rear. Their move-
ment and fresh rumors added confusion to the already scanty 
t>nemy information known. 
No enemy contact was made that night. The following 
day, December 18, orders were received assigning the Regi-
rnnt a wide zone of advance running south and southeast 
from Spa, Belgium, with instructions to move on all main 
roads, find the spearheads of the German Panzer columns, 
and stabilize the front as rapidly as possible. Again the Regi-
ment mounted its trucks and moved swiftly to the south-
west. 
The Second Battalion was assigned the mission of cover-
ing the right, or westernmost, of the two main roads in the 
Regimental zone of advance. It moved quickly to the key 
road junction of Werbmont, Belgium, detrucked, and con-
tinued on foot with one platoon of self-propelled tank destroy-
ers from Company A, 823rd Battalion, following closely be-
hind the infantry point. Three miles from W erbomont they 
Tan headlong into a German armored column of six half-
tracks loaded with infantry, and six Mark VI (Tiger) tanks 
,~peeding west toward W erbomont. The platoon on the point 
deployed quickly and took the enemy under fire with ba-
zookas and TD's. Four half-tracks were destroyed, 15 of 
the enemy killed, and one prisoner taken. The six German 
tanks with the two remaining half-tracks turned around hur-
riedly and withdrew to the first defilade, from which they 
sent 88-mm. shells screaming in the general direction' from 
which the surprise American attack had come. The remain-
der of the Second Battalion moved up behind its point and 
established road blocks and security for the night. They 
were ordered to hold this position till late the next day, De-
rember 19th, when they were relieved by the 82nd Airborne 
Division and instructed to rejoin the Regiment. 
In the meanwhile, on the 18th, the Regiment, less the 
Second Battalion, had continued moving by trucks on the 
main highway running through the western half of the Regi-
mental zone. As darkness approached, the First Battalion 
detrucked and went into a temporary defensive position north 
e>f Lorce-Chevron. The Third Battalion detrucked at Stou-
mont, established road blocks and security, and sent out a 
~trong patrol farther down the road. 
At 2130 the first definite enemy information was obtained. 
The Third Battalion patrol discovered approximately 40 
heavy German tanks coiled in an assembly area only 500 yards 
from Stoumont. Numerous infantry lounging around half-
tracks were observed. These troops later proved to be the 
striking force of the First SS "Adolf Hitler" Division, the 
elite of the German armored divisions, chosen by the German 
High Command to drive up the Malmedy-Stoumont highway 
;~nd seize the supply and communication center of Liege, 
thus threatening encirclement of the entire First and Ninth 
American armies. Spa, Belgium, was only a few miles north 
d this powerful German force and was First Army Head-
qu'lrters. It contained many important administrative m-
!'tallations and large stores of vital war supplies. 
Upon receipt of this information, the Regiment Im-
mediately regrouped its available resources with a v1ew 
of stoppin·g the German advance up this vital valley. The 
Third Battalion established a defensive position on the 
~Duthern end eastern edges of Stoumont, blocking all roads 
with mines and AT guns, and pushed out strong outposts. 
Company A, 823rd TD Battalion (less one platoon), the 
400th Armored FA Battalion (which did not get into firing 
position until 1700, December 19), plus four 90-mm. guns 
nf the ]10th and the 143rd AA Battalions, were attached to 
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the Third Battalion to augment its defense. The 90-mm. 
guns were deployed in depth along the main highway as 
anti-tank secondary defense. The remaining 40-mm. and 
.50 cal. AA weapons were attached to the First Battalion in 
Regimental reserve and on road blocks in the Lorce-Chevron 
area. No tank support was available on the spot, although 
it had been promised and was reported on the way. One 
lone regiment, less one of its battalions, stood between one of 
the crack divisions of the German army and Runstedt's main 
intermediate objective in the west, Liege. 
At o6 I 5 on the I gth, Company I reported that a large 
enemy tank and infantry column was forming just east of 
Stoumont. By 0645 the full force of the attack struck the 
Third Battalion. Massed armor and infantry charged the 
I 
Battalion outposts. Mark V and VI tanks, moving abreast 
parallel to the highway, were closely followed by shouting 
infantry. The enemy, by sheer force of numbers, poured 
through the advance positions. Third Battalion riflemen ig-
rored the charging tanks and poured concentrated small arms 
fire on the fanatical foot-troops dodging behind the armor. 
Regardless of the casualties they were suffering they con-
tinued to attack. 
Waves of fresh German infantry moved forward behind 
the steady advance of the tanks. Four towed tank destroyers 
fired repeatedly, to see their shots boun~e ha~mlessly off the 
front plates of the oncoming heavy armor. All four TD's 
were finally overrun. One 90-mm. gun in this sector was 
destroyed completely by an 88-mm. tank shell, but not until 
one of its rounds had gone completely through the turret of 
? Mark V and set it afire. 
With anti-tank support gone, the Third Battalion- fought 
a hopeless action to hold the town of Stoumont. Four me-
dium tanks from Company C, 743rd Tank Battalion, arrived. 
and were rm:hed up• to form a fall back line for the overrun 
troops of the Battalion. Although the bulk of the German 
armor was through the forward positions of the Battalion, 
men continued to fight savagely with the German infantry. 
Casualties fell in increasing numbers on both sides. Aid men 
crmtinued to evacuate the wounded and render aid in the 
oren fields until they were captured. Single men and isolated 
1'{[uads remained behind to cover the withdrawal, when they 
saw it was impossible to hold against such overwhelming su-
periority. One rifleman, calmly selecting his targets, de-
~troyed two half-tracks with rifle grenades ;ts they rolled past 
How the hell did he eYer get 85 points?-What do ,ou 
think he did the three ,ears he was married? 
bis foxhol e. Two more Mark V tanks and one half-track 
were destroyed by bazooka fire at close range as the armor 
entered the built-up area of Stoumont. The American me-
riium tank platoon, waiting on the western edge of Stoumont 
to cover the withdrawal, opened up and accounted for one 
Mark IV and one Mark V making the total casualties in-
flicted on the enemy thus far: four Mark V tacks, one Mark 
IV, three half-tracks, and an unknown but large amount of 
infantry. 
The Third Battalion withdrew through the First Bat-
t~lion ·and began reo :-ganization. It had suffered 2~7 casual-
ties, 152 of which had remained behind to cover the with-
drawal and were for the most part captured. 
The fanatical attack swept on through Stoumont, 1,000 
yards on to Targnon, and 2,000 yards beyond to a point just 
past Stoumont Station, where it came to an abrupt halt when 
it ran against the fresh and waiting First Battalion. By 
this time the delaying action of the Third Battalion had 
forced the main body of the enemy to deploy and to commit 
rart of·their reserve on the right flank. The Third Battalion 
had absorbed most of the shock of the spearhead and had 
definitely blunted its penetrating power. 
Meanwhile the Regiment was exerting strenuous efforts 
to · improve its P' ecarious position in the face of the over-
whelming strength of the enemy. Headquarters were stripped 
to furnish riflemen to man road-blocks on the dangerous open 
flanks. Service Company furnished an assorted but deter-
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mined group of 60 men, recruited from the cooks and clerks, 
to form the Regiment's last available mobile reserve. AT 
Company moved most of its guns from the exposed flanks 
down the road into the First Battalion's position to strengthen 
the forward defense. Then Fortune smiled a little and the 
Regiment received its first stroke of luck since joining the 
action. The 740th Tank Battalion was attached to the Regi-
ment and arrived just prior to the final withdrawal of the 
Third Battalion. This tank battalion had never seen action 
in combat before and was using hastily secured tanks from a 
nearby Ordnance Depot; yet these, though inexperienced, 
were far better than none at all. It was with a feeling of relief 
that the Regiment watched them rumble into the forward 
positions of the First Battalion to await the oncoming en-
emy. 
This second stage of the action opened with the enemy's 
sending three Mark V tanks with infantry down the road 
from Stoumont Station, apparently to see if there were any 
organized American defense left to their front . When the 
lead tank reached a point 600 yards from the Regimental 
CP, the First Battalion struck, and the 740th Tanks opened 
np. One tank was knocked out . by bazooka fire, two de-
stroyed by tank fire, and all of the accompanying infantry 
killed or captured. One more Mark V moved up from 
Stoumont Station to cover the possible evacuation of the 
knocked out tank crews and it, too, was added to the score by 
one of the 740th Tanks. 
From this point on, the trend of the battle changed. Heart-
ened by the addition of the fresh and willing tank unit, the 
Regiment had alw received the information that its Second 
Battalion would return to it during the coming night. The 
Regiment still smarted from the drubbing it had taken that 
morning. Every man in every echelon knew that the Regi-
ment's mission was not merely to halt this panzer column, 
but to destroy it or be destroyed, and that it would take 
every available resource to do so. 
During the remainder of the afternoon of the 19th of 
December, Service Company borrowed and salvaged deserted 
equipment and raided abandoned supply and ordnance dumps 
to replace the lost equipment of the Third Battalion. Men 
0f this Company traveled throughout the day and night over 
uncleared roads and without maps to _locate and replace AT 
guns, small arms, mortars, ammunition, radios an~ vehicles. 
By daylight the next morning the badly mauled Third Bat-
talion had regained much of its equipment and was once 
more ready to close with the enemy. 
On the morning of the 20th, the Regiment opened its new 
offensive phase wi.th an attack of the· First Battalion, with 
one company of the 740th Tank Battalion and one platoon 
of Company A, 823rd TD Battalion, attached. At 0'830 they 
jnmped of£ from their original defensive positions and ran 
into an organized defense of infantry supported by direct 
tank fire. Direct approach down the road was impossible, 
so the action developed into a slow, ~trenuous business of 
flanking each position by hazardot~s routes up the hills north 
of the road. The SS men resisted, with unusual ferocity, 
any attempt to drive them back and had to be killed or com-
pletely encircled. By nightfall these tactics had regained 
the Regiment a large portion of the lost ground, and the 
First Battalion now occupied a position 500 yards west of 
Stoumont. The final prize of the day was a large chateau on 
r.ommanding ground above the road. 
The Third Battalion had been moved on the 20th around 
through Menthouat down to a position 1,200 yards north of 
Stoutmont to partially encircle that position. The Second 
Battalion was moved up to Targnon, where it established a 
second strong defensive line behind that of the First Bat-
talion's farther east. 
At 2200 on the night of the 20th, the enemy struck back 
viciously in a strong tank and infantry attack. The First 
Battalion had moved its attached tanks well forward from 
their usual night positions for just such an attack. They im-
mediately opened up, and a fierce tank fight raged in the 
darkness, each force firing at the other's flashes. Three 
American tanks were hit and burning. Finally one of the 
enemy tanks exploded as one of the First Battalion's tank 
found its mark. The darkness permitted the German infan-
try to work in close before they were discovered; then they 
charged with their characteristic shouting. 
Their favorite cry seemed to be "God damn Roosevelt!" 
The German radio had been calling us, for some time, 
"Roosevelt's SS. Troops." This cry was evidently sup-
p0sed to be a grave insult, but what they failed to understand 
was that we also had a few Republicans in the Regiment. 
The old chateau quickly became the focal point of the 
fighting. One platoon, defending in and around it, found 
itself attacked by an enemy company. The fighting was 
close and in some cases hand-to-hand. Grenades were tossed 
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in windows and from room to room as both groups fought 
for possession of the building. The remainder of the First 
Battalion's line repulsed the attack in the other sectors. One 
unit, Company F, from the Second Battalion was alerted and 
moved up into the First Battalion's positions as safeguard 
~gainst a possible breakthrough in the ch~teau area. The 
fighting here raged all night and into the next day (the 21st). 
When daylight came, the First Battalion's positions were· 
8till practically intact. One small band still held out in one -
room of the chateau and directed artillery fire to help stop 
each new lunge of the German attackers. Fresh tanks from 
the 740th were pushed up to replace those knocked out the 
right before. They added their fire~power to the fight by 
!'hooting straight down the valley into the trees lining the 
sides of the highway, where the bulk of enemy was concen-
trated to form each attacking wave. In the face of this in-
creased show of strength, the German effort lost power and 
finally stopped altogether, both sides holding their ground 
for a much needed breathing spell. 
During the 20th the Combat Team ·artille y, the 197th 
FA Battalion, had arrived in the area and had started inten-
sive harassing fire on the enemy, much to the relief of the 
Regiment. In the German counterattacks thrown after its 
arrival it inflicted heavy casualties. 
After the final German thrust was stopped on the 21st, the 
rest of the day was spent in desperate preparations for a 
concent;ated effort by the whole Regiment. Ammunition for 
tanks, .50 cal. guns, and artillery, all , of which had run 
dangerously low, was hunted out in the far sepa-ated am-
munition dumps of this sector. Briefings of the plan were 
held. The Regiment was going to reduce the enemy garrison 
at Stoumont by complete encirclement. The fresh Second 
Battalion was to swing around in a wide move to the north 
~nd chop the Stoumont-LaGleize Road. The Third Bat-
t-alion would attack from the north and the First from the 
west. 
Early on the morning of the 22nd the Second Battalion 
Ploved out on its cross-country operation. Under full com-
bat equipment men worked their way up the steep snow~ 
<:overed slopes. In spite of the bitter cold, every man wa~ 
sr:>on drenched with sweat from the strenuous exertion. 
Through thick underbrush along the crest of the high ridge, 
the Battalion swung due east, moved on past Menthouat 
deep into the thick evergreens halfway to LaGleize. Then 
it cut straight south, right at the vulnerable rear of t!1e 
Stoumont position. 
At this time the First and Third Battalions jumped off to 
a;·sault Stoumont frontally. The enemy immediately moved 
up his heavy armor and blasted straight up the main highway 
?nd the Menthouat road, denying their use by friendly ar-
mor. An intensive barrage of small arms opened up as the 
Regiment attempted to push into the open fields just north 
and west of the town. The 197th and 400'th FA Battalions 
laid continuous heavy concentrations on the town and adja-
r.ent high ground to neutralize this deadly fire and assist the 
infantry through the flat open fields. Both battalions worked 
doser toward the town, but the amount of casualties being 
suffered in the frontal assault became excessive, and the Regi-
ment was ordered to hold up· the~e two battalions. 
In the meantime, the Second Battalion had chopped the 
main road between Stoumont and LaGleize at a point ap-
rroximately halfway between thece two towns. Trees were 
being felled and mines laid straight across the highway cov-
ered by bazooka fire (no tanks or AT guns were able to move 
on the tortuous cross-country route). The Battalion Com-
mander was moving at the right rear of his right company 
in an effort to rersonally contact the Third Battalion when 
he was captured with two of his men by a strong German 
outpost. In view of this, and also because of the unsuccessful 
assault on Stoumont, the Battalion was ordered to abandon 
its road block and withdraw to the north to the high ground, 
moving out of its present precarious position. 
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At that time a German staff car and motorcycle raced up 
to the roadblock and were destroyed by bazooka fire. A cap-
tured jeep further down the road saw this action, turned and 
raced back to Stoumont with the news of this American 
force on the German rear. One platoon of Company G was 
left in position at the roadblock as a covering force, and the 
remainder of the Battalion began making its way back up 
the steep brush-covered slop·e. In less than half an hour, a 
company of armored infantry, supported by three self-pro-
pelled guns and five Mark V tanks, moved rapidly out of 
Stoumont to engage this new American threat. They stood 
c ff beyond bazooka range and shelled the area for 30 minutes 
with tank and 20-mm. fire. Meanwhile, the bulk of the 
Battalion had succeesfully withdrawn to the high ridge 1,200 
yards to the north. The enemy suddenly lifted its fire and 
charged the small covering force. The platoon leader imme-
diately gave the order to break contact a~ his mission was now 
complete. Qne 60-mm. mortar squad and the platoon leader 
himself remained alone in the face of the attack until his last 
casualty was carried back up the slope. Then they, too, 
made a successful withdrawal. 
Meanwhile, by 1200 the Third Battalion had managed 
to seize Rouat in bitter hand-to-hand fighting, further com-
rressing the ring closing around Stoumont. The concentrated 
fires of the 107th and 400th FA Battalions, 823rd TD Bat-
talion, 140th Tank Battalion, one 155 SP gun, and ·all the 
AT guns, mortars, and MGs of the First and Third Bat-
talions were being poured into Stoumont to swamp the heavy 
resistance found there earlier in the day. At 1418 the First 
Battalion jumped off again and drove into Stoumont. Sur- · 
r risingly enough, little resistance was encountered, and the 
town was rapidly cleaned up. The sudden appearance of the 
Second Battalion on the rear of the town had apparently 
caused the German commander to abandon his position, but 
not before the American preliminary bombardment had ex-
acted a heavy toll, as the dead and wounded left lying in the 
streets gave grim testimony. The First Battalion pushed on 
."00 yards past Stoumont and established road-blocks. 
The Regiment was then concentrated in Stoumont and 
girded itself for the final blow. The main enemy for~e was 
now compressed into the town of LaGleize and the sur-
rounding high ground. A friendly unit had moved up the 
main highway from the east of LaGleize, blocking escape 
in that direction. 
On December 23rd the First Battalion pushed off toward 
LaGleize. Progrt:>ss was rapid at first. When the advance 
elements reached a point 1,000 yards west of the town, 
they hit a mine field covered by two MG nests and an AT 
gun. In the resulting action the lead 740th tank was 
knocked out, and the German gun was destroyed by a well-
placed shot by the second American tank. One other friendly 
t<'~nk was lost in the mine field before engineers of Company 
B, 1 05th Engineer Battalion, working under fire, could clear 
a path. Infantrymen moved in and eliminated the machine 
guns, and the Battalion drove forward another 300 yards, 
only to encounter another well-placed road-block. 
Simultaneously the Third Battalion drove along the north 
side of the highway. The enemy had planned his defenses 
well and they, too, ran into cleverly-placed road-blocks. The 
Battalion hit its first resistance on a small wooded trail which 
lr:d into the objective. A medium tank was lost before the 
infantry could reduce the position. The attack was then 
pushed rapidly until the Battalion reached a point 500 yards 
from LaGleize. Here the enemy showed some of his main 
strength. The area was smothered by 20-mm., tank, small 
arms, and mortar fire. The Battalion deployed and the bat-
tle developed into another slugging match. 
LaGleize was now almost completely encircled. Elements 
of the 117th Infantry, with holding orders, were in position 
rn the eastern side. The Third Battalion of the Regiment 
was on the north of the town and the First Battalion on the 
west. The Ambleve River on the south blocked any vehicle 
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movement, yet still afforded a means of escape for foot 
troops. Although the enemy's aggressive spirit had not de-
creased, he seemed well aware of his precarious position and 
fought tenaciously to hold all approaches of the position 
he now held. 
The stage was now set for the knockout blow. The Regi-
men's chance for complete revenge had come. Orders were 
is>ued which involved every element of the Regiment and its 
attachments and called for the complete annihilation of the 
enemy garrison in LaGleize. 
Throughout the night of the 23rd and 24th, eight-inch 
howitzers of the 187th FA Battalion poured high explosives 
into the town, slowly turning the built-up area to rubble. 
Toward morning, this fire was supplemented by the light 
battalions and direct fire by the 823rd TD. Battalion and 
the 155-mm. SP gun. Forward observers, with their ra-
dios, climbed steep hills overlooking the town to adjust ac-
curately fire on every part of the enemy position. · 
Early on the morning of the 24th, the time for the jump-off 
came. The comparatively fresh Second Battalion, less Com-
p!!ny F, had been selected to make the opening move. The 
two companies slipped silently through the morning fog 
through the left portion of the Third Battalion's line and 
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launched the attack from a point 300 yards due north of 
the town. The First Battalion was to jump 15 minutes 
later, and the plan called for the Second Battalion to be 
close into the main defenses by that time. They ran into sur-
prised outposts, but quickly smothered them and pushed on 
toward the buildings. They followed a large draw and 
came upon six half-tracks surrounded by armored infantry. 
A bitter, close-in small arms fight followed, with the Ger-
mans breaking and falling back into the town, abandoning 
the vehicles. A German patrol of 30 men hit the flank of 
the Battalion and was taken under fire and eliminated by 
the second wave without slowing the momentum of the at-
tack. 
At 1745 the First Battalion jumped off and encountered 
tcugher resistance due to the alert given the German garri-
son by the earlier attack. · One troublesome Mark VI tank · 
was knocked out by the supporting fire of the 155 SP gun. 
The Battalion closed closer into the buildings and bitter fight-
ing ensued. Then the combined pressure of the two-fold at-
tack began to tell. Both assaulting battalions began press-
ing farther and farther into the town, and the German 
pP-rimeter defense cracked and broke. Disorganization was 
evident as trapped German tanks were abandoned by their 
crews when they saw the approaching Americans. Others 
blew up their vehicles with demolitions. Half-tracks loaded 
92 
with German infantrymen raced up and down the streets of 
the town to be blasted by guns of the 740'th tanks. Individ-
uals and group5 of Germans still fought from most of the 
piles of rubble that served as houses. 
The Third Battalion was ordered into the town from the 
northwest to assist in mopping up the houses and rounding up 
prisoners. They moved forwa:·d, to run into isolated groups 
of SS men who put up bitter resistance for the most part. 
Some, however, surrendered as their situation became appar-
ent. The attack of the Third Battalion overran the large 
cellar which housed a group of 152 American prisoners who 
had been captured from the Regiment earler in the Ar-
dennes action. The Second Battalion Commander was not 
among them. He had been taken along by the German 
commander, with a selected group of his original force, in 
an effort to escape the LaGleize trap. They had crossed the 
Ambleve River on foot in an effort to find their way back to 
German lines. The Second Battalion Commander escaped 
from his captors later and made his way back to the Regiment 
on Christmas Day. 
Meanwhile the attack raged on through the town. The 
houses were cleared and the search for the demoralized 
enemy carried on into the woods south and east of the town. 
By 1000 the entire LaGleize pocket had been wiped out and 
the Regiment was fully avenged. 
The six.-day struggle had been costly for the Regiment, 
but its mission ctood accomplished. It was the list of German 
losses which gave the Regiment grim satisfaction, however. 
It read: 2 W known killed, 189 prisoners, 39 tanks knocked 
out, 148 half-tracks and flak-wagons de: troyed, 12 AT 
gnns and 12 120MM mortars captured. Alw in the Regi-
rrent's mind was the fact that this was the best fighting force 
Germany could offer. The bulk of the striking power of 
Hitler's pe~sonal divi :ion composed of picked SS men had 
been destroyed. This unit was so thoroughly mauled that 
it was never agai~ reconstructed as a full division. 
During this action officers and men of the Regiment won 
the following awards : 
4 Distinguished Service Crosses. 
52 Silver Stars. 
2 Silver Star Clusters. 
135 Bronze Stars. 
2.1 Bronze Star Clusters. 
T~n non-commissioned officers received battlefield commis-
sions as a direct result of their respective parts in the six-
day battle. 
The Regiment had moved into the sector without tactical 
maps, without knowledge o{ the enemy location, and defi-
nitely without knowledge of the power of the German thrust. 
J t hunted, located, and absorbed the full fury of a crack 
German armored force. The Regiment rallied under this 
heavy blow, beat it back, and finally delivered the knockout 
I 
bJow itself, fighting under the most severe weather and ter-
rain conditions. 
Chaplain Ansbro holds Christmas Mass in 
La Gleize, Belgium. 
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Lt. Col. Hal D. McCown 
It was apparent from the beginning that this particular 
p~.nzer spearhead could have caused the greatest damage to 
the entire Allied plan by capturing Liege and splitting the 
12th Army Group in half. With the German defeat at 
LeGleize, von Rundstedt lost his chance to accomplish this 
objective, and from that point on, there w as no major offen-
five action by the Germans in the northern shoulder of the 
Bulge. 
At the end of the action, mail and hot food were brought 
5n while the bridges from T argnon to Grand Coo were pre-
pared for demolition. Fate and the fortunes of war had 
given us a fine present-victory on Christmas Day. 
The following day w as spent outposting the L'Ambleve 
River from Arret De Coo to Halt De Loree Chevron with 
the First and Third Battalions. Contact was established 
dming the day with the 505th Parachute Infantry, and the 
sector became very quiet. At noon the Second Battalion was 
relieved from attachment to the I 17th Infantry near Trois 
Ponts and moved to Ster, in Division reserve. Reports were 
received that the Germans were beginning to withdraw from 
the west · and were building up just south of Malmedy to 
protect or hold their northern flank. Minor shifts in disposi-
tion were made the next day with the Third Battalion pull-
ing back to Stoumont for a complete reorganization. 
... 
We attack south from Macmedy 
On the 28th the First Battalion continued to improve its 
positions and began actively patrolling its front. Meanwhile 
the Third Battalion traded places with the Second Battalion 
in Division reserve at Ster. The Second Battalion imme-
diately occupied positions on the left front of the Regiment 
and sent patrols to the W arche River. With contact almost 
lost in our sector, enemy information became again a para-
mount factor. The Second Battalion supported by fire a 
surprise raid of the 120th on Otaimont. An I & R night pa-
trol moved deep into enemy territory, sustained casualties, 
and was forced to return. Enemy aircraft were active 
throughout the day and night, bombing and strafing at leisure. 
The remaining three days of the month were concluded with-
out serious action. Heavy patrolling was maintained and 
Mtillery duels raged 24 hours a day. 
JANUARY 
M almed y-H edomon t-Bellevaux-Reel umont-Thioux-
Reaumont-Kappelle-Krombach-Hinderhause-Belgium. 
The failure of the German winter offensive (operation 
"Grief") in December has been termed by many military 
authorities as the immediate factor contributing to their de-
frat. Although the enemy held a deep penetration into the 
Allied front, it was soon realized that he had lost freedom of 
ar.tion and his ability to continue in strength or exploit his 
gains. The securing of an additional 20 miles and the cap-
ture of Liege, which would have fallen with little difficulty, 
would have changed the entire conduct and character of the 
war. 
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Liege, Belgium, a major river-croscing site on the mam 
snpply route and dump for two armies, would have been a 
s~:rious loss. Here was concentrated the major portion of 
their supplies, indispensable to their ability to wage war. Its 
less would have undoubtedly called for a general withdrawal 
from Germany back into Holland and Belgium, or possibly 
eYen farther. The Germans, with the realization of another 
l()st war, had "shot their wad." As in the last war, they 
h:1d concentrated their fo:-ces and last reserves for an all-out 
attack on a grand scale, to either win the war or to suffer 
certain defeat in one final gamble. In World War I the · 
famous taxicab army of Pa: is had stopped them; in this, a few 
gallant regiments of infantry such as those who stood fa?t 
at St. Vith, Bastogne, Stavelot, and Stoumont. 
The German Sixth SS Panzer Army finally withdrew its 
two battered divisions from our Division's sec.tor and re-. 
placed them with infantry. As time passed, our air and 
g'·ound forces, combined, began to aggravate their supply 
problems, and they turned the attack to the west again. 
Meanwhile the Allied garrison in Bastogne still held out. 
The enemy had not given enough serious thought to this im-
r ortant communications center. In spite of the subsequent 
diversion of reinforcements, the enemy found himself grad-
ually forced back as aid arrived. 
The Russian advance in the east was going well, with 
Budapest encircled. The enemy began hurriedly to with-
draw troops from Norway, Yugoslavia, and Denmark. At 
the height of the "Bulge" action, 80 German divisions had 
been identified on the western front-more than 20 of them 
in the Bulge area alone-with an almost corresponding· num-
ber absorbed in the support, either directly or indirectly, of 
the offensive. It was estimated that the enemy had com-
mitted 1,300 artillery pieces of 105MM, which, in itself, 
composed apporximately one-third of all his available artillery 
on the entire western front. So it became even more evident 
that this offensive had been an all-out show. 
The American losses in this battle were great, but the 
enemy losses were ~ven greater. His loss in men and equip-
ment alone was so great (estimated at 40 per cent) that 
many divisions were never again reconstituted. Even Herr 
Hitler's personal division, the First "Adolph Hitler" SS 
Panzer, which we defeated, lived in name only. With the 
point of the German thrust now stopped, the Allied armies 
concentrated on the north and south flanks of the "Bulge" to 
chop it up and destroy it piece-meal. Von Rundstedt realized 
this and consolidated his forces in an iron circle with his re-
maining mobile reserves, capable of being committed on any 
flank, or to the west as he hoped. Meanwhile, St. Vith and 
Bastogne, thorns in his side which he was never able to pull, 
held fast, with aid driving in. All in all, the picture seemed 
to brighten somewhat. Patton's Third Army reported gains 
in the south, and our air force was again active. The 119th 
Infantry began the new year holding an active defensive line 
along the L'Ambleve River. The sector was quiet during 
the first four days of January, with the exception of seven 
n1en of I Company lost as prisoners while on a patrol in 
Lodomez. Reenforcements arrived and the men became 
somewhat rested and began to regain their strength. 
On the 5th the First Battalion was attached to the 120th 
Infantry and relieved the 99th Infantry Battalion ( Sep-
arate) that night. The 526th Armored Infantry Battalion 
was attached to the Regiment in the afternoon, and com-
pleted relieving the Second Battalion before daylight the next 
morning. The Secor,d Battalion pulled back for a rest in 
Bt.rnister, Meiz, and Burnenville, Belgium. On the sixth 
the 99th Battalion was attached to replace our Third Bat-
talion. They pulled back to Xhoffraix, and the Regiment, 
~ ith the exception of Headquarters, First Battalion, and 
Special Units, rested. Night patrols on the seventh, eighth, 
and ninth continued to bring in a small but steady stream of 
prisoners for interrogation. 
On the 1Oth our awaited counte;·attack began to develop. 
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The Third Battalion was moved south to Malmedy in 
preparation for an attack south and east into the heart of the 
Bulge. On the morning of the 12th, the 99th and 526th In-
fantry Battalions were relieved from attachment and con-
tinued to hold their defensive positions. The Second Bat-
talion moved into Malmedy to join the Th~rd Battalion. 
Before dawn on the morning of the 13th the Second Bat-
talon jumped off in the deep snow. 
Slow but steady progress was made until Company E ran 
int(J a st rong enemy strongpoint 2,000 yards south of Mal-
medy. The enemy had organized a defensive position along a 
wooded ridge which was the last natural barrier before a 
large open valley running to the southeast. Numerous well-
placed machine guns, supported by heavy mortar and rocket 
fire, held up the advance for over an hour. During this 
barrage the leading troops were pinned down in the snow, 
unable to withdraw or advance, and were suffering heavy 
casualties. 
Although movement had been stopped, Pfc. Gilbert 
Wagner, an aid man, crawled 200 yards through the fire to 
give aid to nine of the wounded. Tanks and tank destroyers 
moved up to give supporting fire. One tank and one TD 
were lost, and the only road in the immediate area was 
blocked. Company G was pinned down within 200 yards 
of the enemy, with its position even more precarious than 
that of O:lmpany E. Lieutenant Oakes and two radio oper-
ators-Corporal Vaughn, and Private First Class Carlock of 
Cannon Company-crawled forward to the leading pinned 
do~n friendly elements. They moved on, searching for an 
observation point from which they could effectively direct 
fire to reduce the positions. Their forward movement, de-
tected by the enemy, caused almost continuous mortar bar-
rages to be directed at them. They continued forward 
through this heavy fire to a position 75 yards ahead and only 
50 yards from the enemy. 
Lieutenant Oakes then directed his radio operators to 
open their radio and transmit fire orders to his guns. To 
achieve the maximum observation it was necessary for Lieu-
tenant Oakes to stand fully exposed while adjusting the fire, 
which resulted in an increased volume of fire being directed 
at l1im. In an ensuing barrage, Leutenant Oakes and his two 
opera tors were wounded. Lieutenant Oakes lost conscious-
ness, and died of his wounds two days later. 
Company F became involved in the fight when Sgt. Hobdy 
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Hayles and his platoon were stopped and suffering casualties 
as they lay in the middle of a road. After directing his men, 
individually, to cover or concealment, he moved forward to 
reconnoiter. He was able to gain the woods without being 
stopped. Moving carefully through the woods, he located 
two heavy machine guns dug in and protected by thick logs 
and cement fortifications. 
The guns were so well camouflaged that they were invis-
ible from his platoon location 200 yards away. He also dis-
covered that a company of enemy infantry was proceeding to 
encircle his platoon, and also to cut off another platoon which 
the} had allowed to pass on. By running and crawling he 
was able to cover the 200 yards back to his platoon through 
exceptionally heavy machine gun and rifle fire. Three 
bullets penetrated the front of his field jacket without injur-
ing him. 
Upon rejoining his men, he led them through a gap in the 
enemy's fire lanes and contacted the forward platoon. While 
this platoon used the information gained by Sergeant Hayles 
to clean up the infantry, he organized a special squad carrying 
bazookas, rifle grenades, and one light machine gun. He 
led the assault of this squad on both fortified positions and 
succeeded in knocking them out. This squad alone took 30 
prisoners and killed 24 of the enemy force. With the help of 
the other companies the entire position was reduced. The 
tanks had been lost from the action when the road be-
came blocked by a knocked out tank. They took an alter-
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nate route and rejoined the Battalion that afternoon. The 
Battalion continued to push the attack, and by the middle of 
the afternoon had reached a position on the high ground 
north of Bellevaux. Patrols were sent down into Planche 
Thioux. 
Simultaneously, the Third Battalion had jumped off and 
had reached the outskirts of Hedomont by 0745. Intense 
small arms and automatic fire pinned down the leading 
company and the advance halted. Company I w<:s brought 
up and committed around to the left flank. Lt. Vir<;il Sow-
ers, a mortar observer, was accompanying the leading ele-
ments as they approached the edge of town. They were 
able to make a little progress against the artillery and mortar 
fire, but when enemy tanks, machine guns, and rifles opened 
up, they were stopped cold. Despite the enemy fire directed 
at him, Lieutenant Sowers remained fully exposed and suc-
ceeded in effectively blanketing the enemy positions with mor-
tm fire. Under cover of this fire one platoon was able to 
work its way into the first houses. 
Pfc. Frank Stenger, a member of this platoon, spotted an 
enemy machine gun firing from a window of a house. By 
crawling through a slight ditch he was able to reach an ad-
joining house which was about 50 yards ahead of his platoon. 
He inched his way along a hedge until he reached a position 
just below the window from which the gun was firing. Pri-
vate First Class Stenger reached up, grasped the barrel of the 
gun, and tore the weapon from the enemy gunner's hands. 
Before he could take cover, the enemy threw a grenade out 
the window which exploded almost at his feet. Although 
he was not wounded, it was necessary to evacuate him be-
cause of concussion injuries. 
As soon as the mortar fire stopped, the enemy again gained 
fire superiority, and the platoon was unable to advance or 
withdraw. Lieutenant Sowers again moved forward through 
the enemy fire, this time laying a smoke screen which enabled 
the platoon to withdraw slightly and consolidate their posi-
tion. 
During the remainder of the day the battle continued at 
clo~e quarters. Officer and non-commissioned rangs contin-
ued to expose themselves to aid in the evacuation of the nu-
meJ ous casualties and to establish gun p{)sitions. That after-
noon tanks attempted to maneuver to aid the attack, but 
the area was so heavily mined that they served little purpose. 
Three officers were lost in rapid succession-Lieutenants 
Hager, Kane, and Petchulat-to further hinder our posi-
tiou. At darkness the battle still raged with little change in 
disposition from that of the early morning. Lieutenant 
Colonel Fitzgerald was relieved as Battalion Commander 
and Captain Stewart assumed command. Under his com-
mand, an all-out surprise attack was launched at midnight; 
the enemy was routed in the process of withdrawal and the 
town fell with only one casualty to our forces. Meanwhile, 
the First Battalion had reverted to Regimental control, and 
Company C began to move into positions vacated by the 
12.0th. As Company C moved up at daylight, they found 
that the enemy had already occupied some of the positions. 
Several men and two machine guns were lost before they were 
driven out. The remainder of the Battalion moved up be-
hind the Third Battalion and prepared to pass through and 
continue the attack when Hedomont was reduced. Late in 
the afternoon the Battalion moved east towards Hedomont. 
Due to the pnor trail, thick woods, snow, and enemy resist-
ance, the Battalion failed to reach the town, and at dark-
ness withdrew to a defensive position behind the Second and 
Third Battalions. 
] ust before daylight on the 14th, the First Battalion 
pas~ed through the Third Battalion and continued the at-
tack south. The intermediate objective was rapidly taken 
without enemy opposition. The enemy had withdrawn dur-
ing the night to their next prepared position. As the Bat-
talon pushed the attack towards Reculemont, they began to 
receive heavy observed mortar and artillery fire. It was evi-
dent that this town had been heavily fortified and that the 
enemy intended to hold it. The enemy occupied buildings 
in tire town and dug-in positions in the surrounding terrain. 
As Company B advanced over the crest of the last hill be-
fore the town, they were hit by an exceptionally heavy con-
centration of small arms, machine guns, and mortar fire. The 
heavy fire forced them to dig in along the crest and the re-
vel se slope of the hill at distances varying from 7 5 to 300 
yards from the enemy. Their positions had previously been 
zeroed in by the enemy and were constantly subjcted to ma-
chiue gun fire and mortar barrages. In an attempt to neu-
tralize some of the enemy fire, a light machine gun was 
worked into position 100 yards from the town. Immediately 
upun Oj:ening fire, the enemy directed such a heavy volume of 
machine gun fire at them, that one man was wounded and 
the machine gun was abandoned. Sergeant Forbuss, a 60MM 
mo1 tar observer, saw the crew abandon the machine gun and 
return to safety. 
He carefully observed the direction of the enemy fire and 
located the machine guns in the houses on the outskirts of 
the town. As the machine guns were in houses, mortar fire 
would be useless, so he decided on another course of action. 
Leaving his foxhole, he started crawling to the abandoned 
gun. When he left the security of his foxhole, his movements 
were discovered by the enemy gunners, and they immediately 
started firing at him. Paying little heed to the fire as it 
pursued him across the 200 yards of open field, he crawled 
for 30 minutes to reach the position. When he slid into the 
foxhole behind the gun, the enemy redoubled their efforts to 
knock him out. Ignoring the storm of fire hitting around 
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"Objective taken!" 
him, Sergeant Forbuss put the gun into action and fired 
burst after burst into the enemy gun positions. His accurate 
fire neutralized the guns and the advance was resumed. 
He continued firing until the gun was out of ammunition. 
Then he picked up his rifle, and as two of the enemy dashed 
out of a house trying to escape, he killed them both. Al-
thc-ugh the town was rapidly reduced, only 51 prisoners 
were taken. The Battalion dug in and outposted the north 
ba11k of the L'Ambleve for the night. 
The Second Battalion held i.ts positions until 0'940, with 
the exception of Company E, which moved up with the 
Tl1ird Battalion to protect its flank. In a short time Com-
pany G was in Thioux, fighting a close-range small arms 
battle. Company F was in Bellevaux and was receiving a 
moderate amount of small arms fire from the left front. 
By 1100 both towns were com"pletely in our possession and 
the river was reconnoitered for a crossing site. While the 
Battalion was moving up to swim and wade the river, a 
flight of friendly medium bombers were sighted. They paid 
their usual visit with 500-pound calling cards. Fortunately 
no casualties were sustained. 
The attack was pushed towards Beaumont. The village 
of Beaumont, Belgium, is located on a knoll which dom-
inates the surrounding terrain. The ground 20{) yards to the 
direct front of the village is completely bare and drops off in a 
slight slope. From the high ground in the village the enemy 
had perfect observation and fields of fire covering every ap-
p-roach. Late in the afternoon Sergeant Wease, acting pla-
toon leader of G Company's leading platoon, and his men, 
began crossing the barren stretch of ground just outside the 
village. _The enemy, located in the outskirts of the village, 
suddenly covered the area with machine gun and small arms 
fire. 
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The inexperienced men of the platoon, some in combat for 
the first time, were paralyzed by the sudden burst of fire and 
immediately dropped to the ground. Although Sergeant 
Wease repeatedly urged his men to continue their advance, 
they were reluctant to move in the face of such demoralizing 
fire. 
The Sergeant realized that continued exposure meant cer-
tain destruction to the members of his platoon. After verbal 
encouragement had failed, he rose to his feet in the face of 
the fire and began running through his platoon, shouting en-
couragement to the men, calling for them to follow him. 
By the time he reached the head of his men the platoon 
were on their feet, following slowly. Sergeant Wease con-
tinued charging forward, firing a BAR from the hip. Al-
though he was now the main target, he continued to run 
up the fire-torn road until he was '90 yards from the village. 
Stopping and turning to his men, he shouted encouragement 
as they ran to catch up so that the final assault could be 
made. A burst of machine gun fire struck his stationary 
figure and he dropped to his knees. Even though he was 
mortally wounded, Sergeant Wease called and waved his 
men on, emptying his BAR as he sank to the ground, dead. 
When the men saw Sergeant Wease drop, all caution was dis-
carded and they charged on the double into the enemy posi-
tions, overrunning them, killing five, and taking 15 prisoners. 
The small platoon, further weakened by five casualties lost 
outside the town, immediately attacked the enemy exposed 
flank and drove them back, allowing the other platoons to 
enter the town. The house-to-house fighting continued un-
til midnight, when the town was finally reduced. Mean-
while, Company E had branched off to take Villers, and con-
tacted the 517th Parachute Infantry. 
Company F pushed on through after the town had fallen 
and organized the high ground 500 yards to the south. 
At daylight, Company G passed through them to continue 
the attack toward Francheville. By 1000 they had reached 
the outskirts of Francheville and were engaged in a fire-
fight. After several hours fighting, Sergeant Miller, a squad 
leader, was able to get his depleted squad of four men into 
the first houses. A squad pushing in from his right rear be-
came pinned down, and he requested that the support platoon 
be moved up to aid its advance. By the time the platoon 
arrived, the enemy had also moved in support, and they, too, 
became pinned down and were suffering casualties. 
Sergeant Miller realized that he must advance and engage 
the enemy at close quarters to relieve a portion of the fire 
from the pinned-down troops. As he led his small squad 
from house to house, the enemy snipers succeeded in wound-
ing two of his men. Nevertheless he continued with Murphy 
and Lyles into enemy territory. He stationed his two men 
in advantageous firing position and brought fire on the su-
perior enemy force located 7 5 yards away. He directed the 
fire of his BAR and destroyed a machine gun nest and its 
support of six riflemen. In retaliation the enemy began to 
direct a large portion of his fire into the positions held by 
these three men. Then under cover of extremely heavy mor-
tar fire, the enemy attempted to dislodge them. With this 
group destroyed, the enemy could chew up the exposed 
troops lying in the open. Although Sergeant Moller was 
wounded by the flying shrapnel, he refused to withdraw and 
drove the superior enemy force back with rifle fire. After 
two hours of fierce fighting, the exposed platoon was able to 
free itself and move into the first houses. The town was 
swiftly mopped up, and the 33 Germans remaining alive 
were taken prisoner. 
Meanwhile, the First Battalion had driven south to the 
bridge at Ligneuville and then west toward Pont. With 
three hours of fighting, the town and 28 prisoners were taken. 
The Third Battalion had remained stationary during the 
day and late that afternoon was attached to the 117th Infan-
try, which was having considerable difficulty in its sector. 
With the fall of Beaumont, Francheville, and Pont, the 
main enemy defenses in our route of advance had been elim-
inated. The remaining enemy forces, with the exception of 
a strong rear guard, withdrew to the south and east to pro-
tect the main east-west escape highway back into Germany. 
In our advance south from Malmedy, our patrols had dis-
covered the field which contained the bodies of several hun-
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dred American prisoners, who had been ruthlessly slaugh-
tered by the enemy. Although the feeling of hatred ran ex-
ceptionally high among our troops, the enemy received all 
privileges under the Geneva Conference regulations. Those 
who refused to surrender, however, were eliminated with 
dispatch and considerable enjoyment. 
The 16th was consummated with a short gain to the 
south, but with one of considerable import. The Second 
Battalion moved south, hit moderate resistance, and held up, 
waiting for the units on the flanks to come abreast. The 
Third Battalion moved through Ligneuville and continued 
on to the high ground which dominated the enemy escape 
route to the east. While Company K was moving into posi-
tion, Sergeant Lotshaw left his platoon to report to the Com-
pany Commander. As he moved along a trail to the rear 
he spotted an enemy patrol of one officer and six men, all 
armed with machine pistols. Despite the fact that he was 
armed only with a carbine, greatly outnumbered and out-
gunned, he jumped back off the trail and prepared for a 
fight. When the first of the enemy soldiers was only 10 yards 
away, Sergeant Lotshaw jumped into the trail and com-
manded them to surrender. The enemy group, completely 
surprised by the audacity and suddenness of this attack, 
dropped their weapons and surrendered. 
The First Battalion held its position and protected the 
Engineers while they cleared the main supply route of mines 
and snow. The 17th was quiet, with the Second Battalion 
remaining in position and establishing road-blocks in the 
"Hey!!- Look what I just liberated" 
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American Infantrymen bring in a wounded comrade on a sled, in the St. Vith sector, 
Belgium. Members of H Company, Second Battalion, 119th Regiment, they improvised a 
litter from a door, on which they placed straw. 
enemy escape route. The First Battalion assembled in Pont 
late in the day; the Third Battalion was reliev~d by the 
120th. 
The 18th and 19th saw little action. Contact was main-
tained with the 117th and 517th Infantry, and the First 
Battalion relieved the Second Battalion of the 120th. On 
the 20th, the First Battalion was relieved by the 30th Di-
vision Reconnaissance Troop, and the Second Battalion ad-
vanced to the south. 
Privates First Class Keith, Mousin, and Holt, piOneers, 
were leading and clearing the Battalion's advance through 
mme fields. The enemy spotted the three men, who were 
well ahead of their advance units, clearing a path through a 
mine field. An enemy patrol, of squad size, came out of their 
positions to capture them. The three men refused to with-
draw, although outnumbered four-to-one. They remained 
to fight off the patrol and in two hours had cleared the way 
for the tanks to move up. The Third Battalion, following 
on the heels of the Second Battalion, moved in and mopped 
up. The First and Third Battalions straightened the lines 
and made contact with the 117th and 290th Infantry Regi-
ments on the 21st. 
The action on the 22nd was considerably heavier. The 
Second Battalion ran into stiff resistance near Kappelle. The 
enemy had organized the high ground south of and over-
looking the town. 
Enemy forces in the town allowed the leading platoon of 
Company F to advance within 150' yards before they opened 
up. The terrain was comparatively level and was covered 
with short grass, affording no cover for the advancing 
troops. Paralyzing graz\ng fire brought the Company's ad-
vance to an abrupt halt, and the men lay almost helpless 
on the ground. 
As in almost every crucial period, God gives some the 
courage to defy even death. Anthony Pistilli, a private, 
'jumped to his feet and advanced on the enemy with his rifle 
blazing. By running and crawling he pushed through the 
fire for 50 yards. The only usable firing position he could 
find was an exposed spot on a forward slope 7 5 yards from 
the enemy. The movement of Private Pistilli as he crawled 
over the gentle slope into a firing position, was detected, and 
machine gun fire tore up the ground around · him. From 
this exposed position, he opened fire on the enemy gun, kill-
ing its crew of three. Quickly switching his fire to the auto-
matic P'istol on his left, he wounded two inore. The remain-
der of the enemy began to withdraw. Private Pistilli contin-
ued to fire at the fleeing enemy, ignoring the burst of fire 
coming from another automatic pistol located in a concealed 
position 50 yards to his right flank. He kept firing at the 
enemy until a burst from the automatic pistol killed him in-
stantly. 
After four hours of battle and the expenditure of generous 
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amounts of artillery, the town fell and the Battalion occu-
pied the positions on the high ground. Eighty-three Ger-
mans accepted our liberal hospitality and were conducted 
to the PW cages, while the troops dug in. The Third Bat-
talion fought all morning and into the early afternoon to re-
duce Hinderhausen. The town fell after Pfc. Alvin King, 
an M Company machine gunner, fought off, single-handed, 
an enemy counterattack of 60 infantry, supported by at least 
one tank. 
On the following morning the First Battalion attacked 
South. Moderate resistance was met in Krombach, which 
fell with several hours' fighting. The Battalion took 23 
demoralized prisoners and dug in for the night. 
The Second Battalion jumped off at 1000 and met no re-
sistance until they reached W eisten. The town was assaulted 
and taken·, together with 27 prisoners, in less than one hour. 
The momentum of the attack continued until the middle of 
the afternoon. Enemy infantry supported by a dug-in tank 
slowed down the advance. 
Our tank destroyers and tanks moved up and gave the en-
emy positions the "once-over lightly for effect." The cannon 
fire proved persuasive, for they withdrew and the advance 
continued. Contact was made with the 289th Infantry be-
fore the day was over. Darkness found the Regiment dug-in 
and resting peacefully. 
The next four days were spent digging deeper, licking 
our wounds, and p•reparing to fight again. We were to re-
ceive a surprise, for on the 28th we were ordered to a rest 
area in the vicinity of Vielsalm, Neuville, Ville-Du-Bors, and 
Renchux, Belgum. 
Almost upon arrival reenforcements began to pour in. 
The next four days were spent in training, reorganizing, 
and re-equipping for all units. The local theater, which 
had been P'artially destroyed, was cleaned up, and two movies 
a day were shown. 'But, the best news of all was when 
someone found a good bootlegger with a new variety of 
"Buzz Bomb Fluid." 
FEBRUARY 
Roer Crossing- Selgersdorf- Daubenrath - Bambach -
Hamachforreht - Dufferlich !Hollen - Rodigne - Konigs-
hoven-Erft Canal 
The successful attacks during the last weeks of January 
had driven the main enemy force into his borders again. 
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For the first time in over 40 days the First and Ninth 
Armies had regained almost complete freedom of action. 
Forces were still mopping up in the east end of the Bulge 
while others were being assembled in or near their original 
sectors preparing to force a crossing of the Roer River. The 
German radio had again returned to its old wheeze, "Ger-
many was forced into the war; it does not want to fight; 
we fight only to win an honorable peace." They continued 
the same old story with a new tune. Daily they bragged 
of the strength of the Volkstrum, the people's army; of 
how the German people were united, as never before, to re-
pel the invading gangsters. Hitler was once reported to have 
said, "Make the lie big enough and tell it often enough and 
they'll believe it," but now it seemed as though they were 
hopefully using the theory on themslves with little effect. 
Two months later even the German people were laughing 
openly at the Volksturm's pathetic efforts. This was not true 
in all cases, however. Some units were well trained and ably 
led. This type of soldier, fighting to defend his village or 
city, could and did fight courageously in some cases. 
Intelligence reports indicated that the enemy was building 
up forces behind the upper Rhine. There was no indication 
of the size of the force nor of its identification, but the con-
tinuous reports of high-ranking members of the General 
Staff being seen in the area seemed to verify the contention. 
Attack in strength in the north and south would have sep-
arated and spread our reserves sufficiently to give the major 
portion of their army a breathing spell. The German 
mechanized forces were now consuming nearly 50 per cent 
more gasoline than was being P'roduced. A stabilized front 
and rigid rationing was necessary so that the mobilty of 
their Panzer Armies could be maintained in case of a break-
through. For them a loss of moblity for their reserves meant 
disaster. They considered the gasoline shortage so senous 
that one division was moved from Denmark to the Rhine-
land by bicycle. 
When we received a warning movement order on the 
first of February, excitement ran high. Rumors had us 
moving to all points of the compass. One even had us on 
our way home. Orders were issued on the second to remove 
all shoulder patches and identification from equipment and 
vehicles. The secrecy of the move only aided the start of a 
new flurry of rumors. The Regimental quartering party 
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left that afternoon, destination unknown, but as the miles 
were traveled north and east, they soon realized that they 
were on their way back to the Ninth Army sector. 
The Regiment began movement just after midnight to an 
assembly area in Kohlscheid, Germany, which the quarter-
.ing party. had selected. It must have been a very clever 
and devious security measure, because it had us baffled our-
selves. In any case we were glad to be back, for every squad 
lhad its old billet and many of them beds with clean sheets. 
In our absence, an element of the Belgium Army had occu-
p;ied the town. The Germans were actually glad to see us 
come back, for they had been given a hard way to go in our 
absence. They found occupation, under troops who gov-
erned with a deep-rooted hatred , a slave's existence. Some 
of the people, however, accepted their fate philosophically, 
with a bowed head and "Das ist kreig. " As a whole, the 
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Germans began to realize that they were now to reap the 
bitter fruit of the weeds they had sown. 
During the next four days re-equipping and training con-
tinued. Movies were shown, and football games were in 
progress. Lectures were given on security, camouflage, and, 
of all things, sex hygiene. Fraternization poked up its 
ugly head and some men· found that it took sixty-five dollars 
to answer the sixty-four dollar question. The Articles of 
War were read to all units on the sixth. Very, very, very 
interesting. 
After dark on the eighth the Regiment suddenly moved 
east to an assembly area in the general vicinity of Alsdorf. 
The build-up for the crossing of the Roer had begun. The 
First Battalion was selected as the assaulting battalion. So, 
on the ninth day they began river-crossing training on the 
lden River near lden, Germany. 
The enemy had blown the Roer River Dams several days 
before, and the rain widened it to flood stage. Water rose 
so rapidly on the ninth and tenth that the Battalion was 
forced to abandon Schophoven. 
They continued training the next day, and that night 
moved the Battalion on foot to Frenz. We planned to use 
"artificial moonlight" during our forthcoming night attack 
on the Roer, and on the 11th the British moved into our 
sector to give us a demonstration. "Artificial moonlight" 
was a British idea. A large number of powerful search-
lights would b~ moved into the sector behind the line of at-
tack. By carefully selecting their positions they were able 
to reflect the strong light off the clouds down into the faces 
of the enemy. Friendly troops, with the light at their backs 
and the area in front of them illuminated, held a definite 
advantage. 
While the Regiment waited for the flooded Roer to re-
cede, all battalions conducted training in river crossing op-
erations. Crossings were made both during daylight and 
darkness, until the plan of attack became almost automatic. 
The units were rotated and received two days' rest at the 
Division rest center at Kerkrade, Holland. The river be-
gan to drop from flood stage on the 14th, and continued 
dropping slowly as the days passed. Each unit in turn con-
ducted training with the 744th Light Tank Battalion and 
developed close coordination for attacks on . built-up areas. 
The Division had long been famous for its river-crossing 
tactics, and found itself prepared for this one as it had sel-
dom been before. Our experience and training in this spe-
cialized type of operation gave us a feeling of confidence, 
assurance, and success. Each man had been assigned his 
specific duty and position in his assault boat; he knew the 
plan, the time schedule, the routes of advance, and the mine 
fields. The plan was perfect, and he knew it. 
We were prepared; and prayed that it wouldn't rain while 
we waited for the river to recede. The enemy had sensed 
our build-up and began giving our assembly area a going 
over with artillery. All daylight road traffic was restricted, 
with the exception of necessary messenger vehicles. Each 
morning the sector was coverd with a smoke screen to blind 
enemy observers and aircraft which had become active. In 
places the smoke screen was over 15 miles deep. 
On the 22nd, when the final attack was received, the 
Roer still flooded a considerable area on both banks. The 
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current was swift and full of floating snags and debris. Our 
role in the general plan was to force a crossing at Selgers-
dorf, push on through and take Daubenrath, clear the Hom-
back Forest, then swing north and go like hell. Our task 
was extremely difficult, for the crossing site in our sector 
was very unsatisfactory. As the attack progressed we would 
have to protect the now exposed flank of the entire Ninth 
Army. On the other hand, we were well prepared and had 
all the artillery support we could use. One artillery observer 
made the comment that, if necessary, he could control the 
fire of one gun for every yard of our front. Artillery fire 
was so carefully planned and timed that a constant rolling 
screen of fire would precede our advance. 
At 0245 on the 23rd, following a tremendous artillery 
barrage, the First Battalion moved down to the river carry-
ing storm and rubber assault boats. Supporting Engineers 
followed the assault waves to the banks and began building 
a bridge under fire. The enemy occup,ied Selgersdorf and 
were dug in around the outskirts. Approaches to the town 
were flat and partially covered with water. The enemy had a 
dense mine field under the water and covered it with ma-
chine gun and mortar fire. The swift water, mortar fire, 
and floating trees overturned three boats in the first waves, 
but;.. failed to slow down the attack. Lieutenant King of 
Company A led his men rapidly across and deployed them 
for the assault on the town. As he awaited his Company 
Commander's order to begin the assault, the preparatory 
artillery barrage began falling ahead of his platoon. The 
barrage pounded the enemy positions immediately in front 
of him and started to roll on. At this time word came 
•' 
forward that the Company Commander's boat had capsized 
Roer River Offensive 
commg across the river and contact had been lost with the 
remainder of the Company. 
Realizing that the success of the attack depended upon 
keeping up with the artillery as it moved forward, he as-
sumed command of the portions of Company A already 
across and led them on the double through the enemy out-
posts, by-passing and neutralizing them as they advanced. 
Enemy machine guns laid down their final protective lines 
of fire and mortars smothered the area. With his platoon 
temporarily halted, Lieutenant King moved forward alone 
and located the gun positions and a flanking route. In a 
matter of minutes he courageously led his troops through 
the enemy fire into town. Within 40 minutes, his platoon, 
with the aid of "artificial moonlight," had taken the Com-
pany's objective, 80 prisoners, five machine guns, and five 
heavy mortars. 
Company B had moved in on the enemy so rapidly that 
they caught the Germans still crouching in their holes. Bay-
onets dug the bewildered troops out, and left them standing 
unarmed to be picked up by the support elements. The as~ 
sault group refused to stop to even gather prisoners. When 
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machine gun and mortar positions were overrun, the guns 
were hurriedly turned around and used on the fleeing en-
emy. Even B Company's wounded were brought back laugh-
ing. One man explained, "You should see those bastards 
go; I never had so much fun in all my damned life." This 
was indeed the spirit of the entire Regiment. We had the 
enemy on the run and intended to keep him running. 
When Selgersdorf fell, troo]:s of the First Battalion were 
to drive north to take Altenburg. 
In the early days the men had complained bitterly when 
friendly artillery landed dose by. As they became more ex-
perienced they soon found that the closer they remained to 
our falling artillery the better off they were. They wanted to 
move right in with the artillery, sometimes even exposing 
themselves to it. They found that the artillery pinned the 
enemy down in his hole, as his fire did us. A soldier's per-
sonal aim in battle is to keep alive! if the artillery p•assed on, 
the enemy rose up and manned his weapons-the idea was 
to catch him before he could recover. 
Meanwhile the Second Battalion had moved up and 
crossed the river at 1330 to continue the attack. Lieutenant 
Yarrow had moved across with the First Battalion to estab-
lish a forward OP for the Second Battalion. 
Accompanied by two enlisted men, Sergeant Page and 
Private First Class Edelman made their way into the enemy 
portions of the town. After two close-range fire-fights, they 
found that they were the only friendly troops in that part 
of town. Moving from house to house to avoid the heavy 
artillery and mortar fire falling in the streets, they ran into 
an enemy mortar position. The enemy, even more surprised 
than they were to find that they had penetrated so deep 
into enemy territory, ran into the cellar of a nearby house. 
The three men slipped into the house and ran down the 
cellar steps. With persuasion, 16 prisoners were taken. 
When the grounds were searched, they found four mortars 
and 1,500 rounds of ammunition. This position had been 
one of the many which was making the town difficult to 
reduce. 
The First Battalion mopped up the town and the Second 
Battalion passed through them iri their advance on Dauben-
rath. Company F advanced across the open fields to within 
800 yards of Daubenrath. Suddenly the leading platoon was 
hit by machine gun fire, losing two men. The enemy had 
skillfully concealed the gun under a haystack 300 yards away. 
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Sergeant Hayles, the platoon sergeant, began crawling 
through the fire toward the gun. He was able to get within 
150 yards before the intensity of the fire stopped him. With-
out hesitation he fired two rifle grenades into the haystack 
and set it afire. Before the four enemy machine gunners 
could run 100 yards, he killed three of them, and wounded 
and captured the fourth. 
After leading his platoon 200 yards closer to the town, 
they were again pinned down by machine gun and sniper 
fire. When he located the enemy positions, he skillfully 
maneuvered his men through a creek which ran toward the 
town. Sergeant Conley, a mortar observer, picked up a 
BAR dropped by a casualty and moved up with the point. 
Under cover of the smoke from the haystack and Sergeant 
Conley's supporting fire, the platoon stormed the nest, killed 
the gunners, and took the remainder prisoners. With this 
foothold secure, the Second Battalion moved in and took the 
town. 
Fanatical SS troops continued to die during the day in 
foolish small-scale counterattacks. The enemy's conduct re-
minded us of stories we had read of ancient battles. Two 
armies would draw up on the field; one side would send 
out its hero to joust all comers until he was defeated, then 
another champion would come forth to take his place. All 
day the enemy threw single squads at us, only to be destroyed 
and replaced by another. The only thing they could have 
gained was to die for a lost cause which they worshipped, 
unless they intended to kill off our Quartermaster burial de-
tails by overwork. The enemy was evidently well supplied 
with heavy mortar ammunition, for he continued to plaster 
the landscape indiscriminately. Any movement above ground, 
even for personal relief, proved a dangerous pastime. 
During the day Capt. Buford (Patty) Toler, Company C 
Commander, was killed while leading an attack on a ma-
chine gun nest which was holding up his Company. 
At 1900 the Third Battalion crossed the river and pre-
pared to pass through the First and Second Battalions. The 
Battalion left the line of departure at 2300 and advanced 
on hombach. The enemy outposts observed the movement 
and began their prepared artillery and heavy mortar con-
centrations. Private First Class Keaton, a squad leader, 
found himself and his squad smothered with heavy sustained 
fire. Although he himself was wounded, he reorganized his 
men and started them forward out of the fire. He was 
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unable to continue and remained in the shelled area to 
bandage the wounds of four more seriously wounded men. 
Company I pushed rapidly through the darkness and fire, 
trying to get into town before they were torn to pieces. 
Progress was rapid and costly until they came within 200 
yards of the town. Here enemy fire became so devastating 
that all movement was stopped. 
Captain Rehkopf, Company Commander, was also pinned 
down with his leading elements. He realized that speed 
was the only thing that could save his Company from de-
struction. His radio operator had been killed at his side and 
two men in front of him. Captain Rehkopf seized the radio 
from his dead operator and crawled forward to the head of 
his Company. His exertion had reopened an old wound, 
and he was losing blood rapidly. Despite the fact that he 
was silhouetted against the flames of a burning haystack, he 
rose to his feet and moved toward the town. His men, see-
ing him disappear through the darkness and bursting shells, 
jumped to their feet and followed. The first houses were 
cleared and the leading platoon advanced, clearing the street 
house by house. The enemy was firing across a courtyard and 
through the arch at anything that moved. 
Sergeant Sopenski armed himself with hand grenades and 
ran to the side of the arch. Peering cautiously around the 
arch, he spotted the enemy dug-in next to a house. As he 
jumped into the arch-way he was struck by the enemy fire. 
Despite the wound, he hurled two smoke grenades into the 
position, and advanced firing. The enemy, partially blinded, 
sprayed the entire courtyard with rifle fire. The sergeant 
pulled himself forward into the enemy position, killed one 
man and took the remaining four prisoner. Private First Class 
Gatta commandeered six riflemen to reduce a road block on 
the flank. After pinning the enemy down with rifle fire, 
they assaulted the road block and took eight prisoners. 
The Company I penetration had allowed Company L to 
advance into town, to aid in its capture. At one point an 
enemy group held up the advance. Privates First Class Pe-
ters and Blum, machine gunners, were ordered to hold the 
front while the riflemen flanked the position. As they set 
their gun up in the street, they detected the approach of 3t 
large number of men. The group was challengd and they 
replied with bazooka fire and the SS "Cry." The enemy 
group proved to be a platoon. When the enemy discovered 
that only two men were holding up, an assault was launched, 
The adYance on Rombach 
covered by bazooka, grenades, and automatic fire. T~e two 
men held fast and their fire so depleted the enemy ranks that 
they retreated in disorder. The enemy withdrew to the 
cover of the buildings down the street. They reorganized 
and came charging down the street again. Although out-
numbered 20-to-1 the two machine gunners refused to with-
draw, and when the fight was over 25 dead Germans lay in 
the street. 
Before daylight the town was clear and the Battalion had 
organized the surrounding high ground. Daylight on the 
morning of the 24th found the Third Battalion on the high 
ground around Rombach, the Second Battalion in Dauben-
rath and holding ground 2,000 yards to the southeast, and 
the First Battalion in Selgersdorf and Altenburg. A ve-
hicular bridge had been completed during the night, 50 
hours ahead of schedule. Ammunition and supplies, which 
had been hand-carried previously, came over in large quan-
tities, accompaned by our supporting tanks, TD's, and even 
a battalion of artillery. The build-up continued throughout 
the night and morning, while we consolidated our positions 
and received the first sleep in two days. By 1600 sufficient 
tanks had arrived to give us a fighting chance and the at-
tack was resumed. The First Battalion attacked northeast 
through the Rombach Forest to cut the main highway which 
ran from Julich to the Rhine. Simultaneously Company C 
and Company F of the Second pushed north to objectives 
along the main road . That night all three battalions were 
either on, or fighting in, their objectives. The Third Bat-
talion captured 20 of the 120MM mortars which had been 
giving us trouble. Contact was made with the 117th on our 
right and the 29th Division on our left. Our rapid move-
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ment had flanked the enemy's defenses, and as our drive con-
tinued north toward Rodingen, he was forced to retreat 
across his own supply line. 
On the 25th the First Battalion continued to consolidate 
its position near Steinstrass while the Second and Third 
Battalions continued the attack north on Pufferlich, Hollen, 
and Rodingen. Both battalions pushed rapidly over the flat, 
open terrain against strong opposition. Their intermediate 
objectives were taken, along with nearly 200 prisoners. The 
towns of Hollen and Rodingen, the final objectives, sat side 
by side to the north. Both battalions, advancing together, 
continued to push into the steadily mounting resistance until 
they reached a point approximately 500 yards south of the 
towns. The Second Battalion on the right was able to con-
tinue the advance under cover of artillery fire until they 
reached a point 400 yards from the town of Hollen. The 
assault platoons of Company G ran into a strong outpost 
line, assaulted it, and temporarily occupied their positions 
for cover against the hail of machine gun fire which had 
opened up. 
Private Rochadl, a rifleman, crawled forward into a slight 
draw 350 yards from the town. As he moved up the draw, 
an enemy machine gun opened up and he received a wound 
in his face. He bandaged himself and then realized that 
the enemy gunner had waited until he came well down into 
the draw before firing. It was a fire trap which his com-
rades would soon enter. When he saw the men of his pla-
toon advance toward the draw he exposed himself to signal 
them. The men saw his signals and moved around, but the 
enemy gunner had already started firing, and one bullet hit 
Private Rochald in the shoulder, entering from the back. 
The platoon medico, who was 50 yards away, saw him fall 
the second time and started to run toward him, but Rochadl 
waved him away, for he knew that he would only become a 
victim of the trap. He laid there and, as the last squad ap-
proached the draw, again he rose up in face of the enemy fire 
and directed the men away. This time a bullet hit him in the 
left arm. 
Enemy tanks in the town took up the fight and the ad-
vance develoJ:ed into a brutal fire-fight. Company G had 
made several attempts to charge and overrun the town, but 
the fire of tanks and machine guns was so severe that it was 
impossible to take the town without extremely heavy casual-
ties. Enemy tanks continued to move about in the town to 
evade our artillery fire. It was soe>n realized that the only 
way the town could be taken was to destroy the tanks. 
Pvt. Raymond Butts volunteered to take a crack at them 
if his platoon would cover his movement into town with fire. 
Private Butts crawled the 150 yards to the first houses suc-
cessfully and began slipping from building to building. He 
was now moving through enemy territory and troops. As 
he continued, he spotted a building which was tall enough to 
permit observation down into the city streets; he climbed to 
the second floor, knocked out a window, and began his vigil, 
waiting for the enemy tanks to show themselves. Our artil-
lery fire continued to fall on his building and in the street3 
outside. At 1730 he heard two Mark V tanks rolling down 
the street towards him. Evidently the enemy thought that 
we had entered the town in strength. The lead German tank 
crew increased their speed as they came iuto sight and sprayed 
the buildings with machine gun and cannon fire. 
Meanwhile, the Third Battalion, with Companies I and 
K leading, punched their way to within 200 yards of the out-
skirts of Rodingen. The enemy opened up with final pro-
tective fire of such intensity that the companies were suffer-
ing heavily. Sergeant Jerome, a squad leader of Company I, 
saw that his men, some in combat for the first time, were 
freezing to the ground. The attacking elements had been 
stopped. He ran forward, pulling his men from the ground 
and leading them out of the impact area. The enemy machine 
guns took up the fire and a burst caught Sergeant Jerome 
and knocked him to the ground. Determined to bring his 
men safely into town to the cover of the buildings, he rose 
to his feet. Seriously wounded, Sergeant Jerome directed the 
fire and advance of his entire squad. As he pulled himself 
forward another burst of machine fire struck him and he 
died instantly. Private First Class Barker, a BAR man of 
the same platoon, immediately took up a firing position on a; 
slight rise. From this positon he could see both machine 
guns. Fully exposed to the enemy fire, he fired alternate 
bursts into both guns in their fight for fire supremacy. His 
accurate fire successfully neutralized the fire of both guns. 
After firing 15 magazines to cover his platoon's entry into 
the first houses, he ran to catch up. Just as he gained the 
first house he was struck by a burst of fire from one of the 
guns which he had temporarily neutralized and was killed. 
With a foothold established, the balance of Company I 
fought their way into town. Private First Class Weinstein, 
lead scout, advanced into the gap to be caught in the fire of 
the two guns. One round penetrated his helmet, cut through 
his wool knit cap and passed out the other side. In spite of 
the fire he emptied a clip at the nearest gun and fired a 
smoke grenade at the left gun. Under cover of the smoke 
and the joint fire of his platoon, they made their way into 
town. The enemy had committed two of its tanks to break 
up the troops concentrating in the outskirts and to plug up 
the gap. 
Pfc. Frederick Long of Company L spotted one of the 
tanks moving up the street toward him. He immediately 
warned his comrades and took cover in the nearest doorway. 
Although he was armed only with a BAR, he was deter-
mined that the tank would not pass. When the huge vehicle 
A support platoon awaits the signal to move up in the 
battle of the Rhineland. 
was but 15 yards away, Private First Class Long stepped 
into the street and opened fire on the tank commander who 
was riding unbuttoned in the turret. His first burst killed 
the tank commander, who toppled over the side onto the 
street. The tank opened fire and withdrew back up the 
street. Company I with the aid of Company L now began 
the fight to enlarge and secure the foothold. 
It was now 1730. Our artillery broke up a counterattack 
of five tanks and 150 infantry northeast of Rodingen, and 
Private Butts watched the two enemy tanks approach his 
position in Hollen. The first tank advanced to a position 
80 yards from Private Butts and fired a round into his build-
ing. The shell barely missed him, and exploded in the lower 
floor. Even though his position was disclosed, he held his 
fire. The lead tank, encouraged by the inactivity, charged 
forward and came to a halt 30 yards away. Private Butts 
leaned out the window and fired a shot at the lead tank with 
his bazooka. A grazing hit failed to knock out the tank. 
The crew of the second tank spotted Butts when he fired, 
and advanced with its cannon and machine gun blazing. 
Both tank crews now · opened up, sp~aying the room with 
machine gun fire and shrapnel. Private Butts clung to the 
floor and loaded his bazooka the second time. He held his 
fire until the second drew abreast and ahead of the lead tank. 
He stood up in the window, took careful aim, and scored a 
direct hit on the second tank, killing its entire crew. Thor-
oughly demoralized, the crew of the first tank hastily with-
drew before he could fire again. 
With the tank fire eliminated, Sgt. John Nolan placed 
the fire of two of his squads on the enemy machine gun near 
the gully and skillfully led his men into town. Butts' battle 
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with the tanks and the entry of one platoon into the town dis-
OI'ganized the enemy defense. Sergeant Nolan spotted 33 
Germans concentrating near a building 50 yards away. He 
could see that they were disorganized .and evidently were 
preparing to withdraw as soon as they could assemble. With-
out hesitation, he charged up the street calling for his men 
to follow him. The men opened up and the entire enemy 
group surrendered. The house-to-house fighting continued 
througout the night with lessening intensity. Before day-
light the town was in our hands. 
By 2000 the Third Battalion had cleared Rodingen, with 
the exception of the west end. Company K with tanks at-
tached, forced the enemy out, and by 0200 on the 26th, the 
town was ours. Throughout the night the enemy continued 
to send truckloads of troops into the town to reenforce the 
garrison which they thought still existed. At midnight of 
the 25th an incomplete estimate of enemy losses in the three-
day battle stood as follows: Lost-51 heavy mortars, 113 
machine guns and automatic weapons, seven tanks, two 
150-mm. artillery pieces, five light artillery pieces, four anti-
aircraft guns, two AT guns, nine light armored vehicles, 
seven heavy trucks, and dead all over the place. Our casual-
ties for the three-day period were 26 killed, 188 wounded, 
and five missing. 
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Our successful river crossing had been so perfect that it 
undoubtedly will be studied in our Army Staff Schools in the 
future. To compare this attack to the others along the river 
made it even more conspicuous. We were the first to get an 
entire battalion across, first to consolidate our bridgehead, 
first to build a bridge, first to build up armor and, at times, 
were even ordered by higher command to hold up our ad-
vance so that other sectors could develop. 
On the 26th the Regiment organized its objectives, re-
ceived a few hours' rest, and prepared to continue the attack 
on the 27th. At 1130 on the following day the First and 
Second Battalions jumped off on their attack on Konigshoven, 
three miles to the north. Both battalions met heavy resist-
ance from enemy armor, but failed to stop the infantry. Al-
though Companies G and Q were hit the hardest, they con-
tinued to advance. By the end of the day we were in the 
outskirts of the town. 
The enemy had reenforced its garrison that night, and the 
battle raged at close quarters into the next day. It was evi-
dent that the enemy was determined to hold the town and 
prevent our crossing the Erft Canal. Enemy groups, even 
when surrounded, continued to fight until they were killed. 
He had committed more armor and artillery than he had for 
The Regimental service train moves up under fire 
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some time. Suffering heavy casualties, we slowly drove the 
main enemy body into the northern outskirts of town. The 
battle continued during the daylight hours of the 28th with 
increasing intensity. The enemy was finally driven from 
the town itself and the remnants of their force withdrew to 
the high ground 400 yards out of town. 
MARCH 
Rhine Crossing-Lippe Canal and River-Spellen-Fried-
richsfeld-H unxe-Gartrop-Gahlen. 
The action developed rapidly in the following days. The 
units on our flanks came up, and fresh armor and infantry 
poured through to exploit our gains. Our drive to the 
north had cut the enemy defenses of the Rhineland in two, 
and the enemy troops to the west were forced to withdraw. 
Armored task forces fanned out and drove to the Rhine in 
short order. We rested while friendly troops continued to 
sweep past us. By the third we found ourselves occupying 
a rear area where the Regiment was assembled, and prepared 
for a move back into Holland for training and rehabilitation. 
The Regiment moved on the sixth to an assembly near Sus-
teren, Holland. vV e began our training with a certain 
amount of satisfaction. We had just completed an extremely 
successful operation and realized that one more big show 
would end the war whether Germany surrendered or not. 
The Rhine crossing presented a stupendous tactical and 
logistical problem. The Rhine is wide, deep, and swift, al-
though it cannot be compared to our Ohio, Missouri, or 
Mississippi. The preparation for this crossing was not unlike 
that of a beachhead invasion. Naval and amphibious units 
were necessary to transport the troops across the mile-wide 
expanse of water. Assault, build-up, follow-up, and ar-
Paris 
mored task forces were needed, so that once the bridgehead 
was secure, the infantry could break ·a hole and let the armor 
race through. This blow was to be the last: one of gigantic 
scale, with power enough to drive through, overcome all 
opposition, and win the war. 
We were glad to be back in Holland. Now, with war 
past their country, their hospitality was even greater. Offi-
cers and enlisted men were invited to dances held in our 
honor. They shared their small ration of beer with us and 
made us welcome. Trips to Paris and London for both 
officers and men were arranged. Old friendships were re-
The remains of Napoleon's Egyptian campaign 
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newed in England, and hair-raising tales were brought back 
from "Pig Alley." 
The Navy had assembled a number of their LCT's, 
LCVP's, and CDL's on the Maas River. By the 19th, all 
battalions had rotated in the training for the forthcoming 
operation. Daylight and night-time loading had been repeated 
until vehicles 1nd men were able to load and unload in rec-
ord time. Rumors were heard that a unit in another location 
had assumed our identity. If was obvious that our present 
location and training would have notified the enemy of our 
part in the Rhine crossing. His intelligence could plot our 
movements closely and would be able to determine the 
locale of the Ninth Army's attack. Several men even reported 
that they had seen numerous vehicles in the Gladbach area 
carrying our Regiment's number, 30-119-1. 
The Regiment moved up· toward the Rhine on the night 
of the 19th. Driving without lights and with great secrecy, 
we bivouacked in the woods near lssum. All movement was 
stopped and the area was heavily camouflaged. Our present 
location was unknown to the enemy and we intended to keep 
it so. The 21st, 22nd, and 23rd were spent in planning, 
reconnaissance, and briefing of the men for the attack. 
The plan w:ts simple. The Second Battalion would force a 
crossing, seize and hold a bridgehead; the Third Battalion 
would cross to expand it; and the First Battalion .would 
follow and continue the attack. The British on our left 
were to cross a Brigade of Marine Commandos just 
above W esel, three miles north, while our paratroops 
were to be dropped inland to cut enemy communications. 
Companies G and E led the attack in storm and assault boats 
at 0200 on the 24th. Within 40 minutes the entire Battalion 
was across and fighting on the bank. We had achieved a 
1 
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tactical surprise, for our rapidly advancing troops overran 
~· 
artillery observation posts and troops moving into position. 
The enemy had selected key terrain features and had built 
mutually supporting positions which contained from 25 to 30 
men each. Our speed of crossing and aggressive advance 
inland so swamped the enemy that strongpoint after strong-
point fell. Prisoners were disarmed and ordered to march 
back to the river. By 0340 the Second Battalion was on its 
objectives inland. 
The Third Battalion began crossing at 0348 and was 
completely across in 42 minutes. At 0530 they launched 
their attack to take Spellen and enlarge the bridgehead. Sin-
gle men of both Battalions captured large groups of the en-
emy. Frequently one man was seen to march 30 or more 
prisoners to the roads leading to the rear, shove a toe in the 
rear-most extremities and command them to get going. Ar-
tillery pieces and flak guns fired point blank into our ad-
vancing troops, only to be overrun and destroyed. 
The First Battalion crossed just before daylight and 
launched their attack at 0745. With the coming of daylight 
the enemy overcarne his shock, and our forces began to hit 
stubborn defensive positions. Enemy reserves had been com-
mitted, and resistance stiffened. Our air force was very 
active, strafing and bombing just ahead of our troops. One 
of the missions of the First Battalion (with Company E at-
tached) was to secure an underpass of the railroad which 
runs parallel to the river. This underpass was important. 
It was our daily means of getting tanks beyond the railroad 
to support the offensive. Freidrichsfeld, just beyond the 
railroad, was the Battalion's final objective. As long as the 
enemy held the railroad underpass, we were denied the town, 
and our attack would be halted. The enemy fully understood 
its importnce and had based his local defenses on that as-
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sumption. His defensive positions around this pass included 
four 88-mm. dual purrose guns, two AT guns, and one 
150-mm. howitzer. Each gun was supported by infantry 
and numerous machine guns. 
Air strikes and artillery fire failed to reduce the position, 
and at 1500 the bazooka men had eliminated the howitzer 
and taken its positions, but were held up a~ain. To re-
lieve the pressure here, the Third Battalion was committed 
to flank the enemy position and to move into the First Bat-
talion's objective, while they contained the enemy force. The 
He met "Kilroy" 
111 
A U. S. Army alligator, part of an 119th Infantry column crossing· the Rhine, lands on the . 
eastern bank of the river, south of the W esel, Germany. 
maneuver was successful. With the aid of the Third Bat-
talion and tanks, the underpass was cleared. Meanwhile 
the Second Battalion was mopping up its area and sending 
back a stream of prisoners. Company G was sent at 1700 
to clear a large island formed by the Lippe Canal and River. 
They fought throughout the night to clear th~ southern end 
of the island, and by morning were in position to cover the 
crossing of the remainder of the Battalion. 
The First and Third Battalions continued the attack at 
2115 on Gartrop and the high ground 2,000 yards east of 
Friedrichsfeld. At midnight good progress was being made 
and 514- prisoners were tallied for the day. The capture of 
Spellen and Friedrichsfeld had secured a wide bridgehead, 
and troops began to build up behind us on the river. The 
Third Battalion had its objective by 0100. The First Bat-
talion ran into considerable resistance and after fighting 
throughout the night and morning, secured the town. At 
noon the enemy concentrated for a large-scale counterattack 
in the woods just outside of town. 
Lieutenant Helms broke up the attack with artillry fire, 
In the face of direct fire from a 170-mm. gun. At daylight 
the Third Battalion discovered that the I 17th on our right 
had by-passed a battery of 88's in the darkness, which now 
began to shell our area. Company I was sent on a wide 
flanking movement which brought them up behind the en-
emy. They assaulted the position and took 128 prisoners, 
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11 88-mm. dual-purpose guns, two radar sets, three search-
lighth, 11 2'0-mm. guns, and some assorted flak guns of odd 
caliber. 
At 1700 the Third Battalion relieved the Second and 
moved to protect the Division's right flank. The First Bat-
talion advanced and took Hunxe through minefields and 
moderate-to-heavy resistance. By 2130 they had contacted 
the 117th, and it began to look as though our Division had 
made a major breakthrough. The Regiment continued to 
move east with the support of tanks until 0300. Few men 
had had any sleep since the night of the 23rd, and a short 
rest was welcomed. At 0900 on the 26th the attack was 
resumed, with the exception of the Second Battalion, which 
remained to hold contact with the 35th Division on our 
right. At 1800 this Battalion was ordered to move up and 
prepared to pass th~ough the First and Third Battalions 
and continue the attack to the east. 
Before the plan was put into effect, 'the orders were 
changed and t!1ey were assigned the mission of establishing 
a bridgehead across the Lippe River north of Gahlen. The 
First and Third Battalions had overcome resistance near 
Heisterhapf, but were stopped cold at Gahlen. The town 
was held by a large infantry force supported by tanks, artil-
lery, and 88's planted to fire point-blank. Three of our 
tanks were knocked out in rapid succession. The bitter battle 
continued all afternoon and evening with little relief, and 
A. A. positions are overrun by our rapidly advancing troops 
with artillery on both sides taking a heavy toll. By midnight 
the First Battalion had forced its way into the western end 
of the town and the Third Battalion into the southern end. 
At 0300 both b._attalions gained about four blocks of the town 
and were still meeting extremely heavy automatic and direct 
fire from the tanks moving about in the streets. Two pla-
toons of Company L were cut off when several buildings 
were set on fire by the enemy's 20-mm. guns. The fight 
continued through the morning, with both battalions making 
very slow progress in the house-to-house battle. By 1335 the 
Third Battalion had broken through the town and had cut 
the main road leading to the east. The First Battalion con-
tinued the battle in the town and wiped out the last rem-
nants at 1600. 
With the fall of Gahlen, the breakthrough in our sector 
was well established. The Second Battalion attacked east the 
next day and met no opposition. Contact was made with 
the Eighth Armored Division, who was having an easy time 
cruising east. The Regiment remained in an assembly area 
around Gahlen on the 29th, 30th, and 31st, resting and 
re-equipping. During the five-day battle, 1,199 prisoners 
were taken, 82 artillery and flak guns captured, and large 
• numbers of machine guns, mortars, and rifles were destroyed. 
So far in the war, our Regiment had sent over 15,000 "Sons 
of Hitler" to the Prisoner of War cages. Prisoners were 
taken in such quantity after that, that little accurate check 
was possible. However, 4,202 additional prisoners were offi-
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cially credited to us besides several thousand which we pushed 
off on other units, just to get rid of them. Some of us re-
membered a favorite axiom of .one of our old commanders, 
"American infantry, well-trained and well-led, can go any 
place-even to the storming of the gates of hell." 
APRIL 
Pivitscheid - Oerlinghausen - Ubbedissen- W eser River 
Crossing-Hamelen-Hildeshiem-Immendorf-W ofenbut-
tel-Diesdorf-Magdeburg. 
With the Rhine crossed the flat central plains of Germany 
lay open for our taking. Organized resistance along the 
Rhine had been crushed. The drive that followed trapped 
their armies in the we: t, where they were chewed up at our 
leisu ~e. The Ninth Army began to roll. Arinored col-
umns were driving boldly into the heart of Germany, at-
tempting to exploit to the fullest the disorganization caused 
by the initial penetration. The Russians were putting strong 
pressure to bear on Berlin from the east and Hitler found 
his candle burning on both ends. Our air force was hav-
ing a field day tearing up the frantic enemy attempts to as-
semble troops to stop our drive. Hitler's vaunted legions, 
who a short year before had challenged us to cross the chan-
nel and meet them, were fleeing in terror. Germany was 
breathing her dying breaths; final victory was at last within 
our grasp. 
It seemed impossible to believe that an a:my as strong as 
theirs, could disintegrate in such a short time. Then we be-
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gan to recall the months of bitter fighting, the terrible losses 
their army suffered at Mortain, the Siegfried Line, the Bulge, 
and along the Roer. Then we recalled our own, the thou-
sands of men, the equipment, strength, and suffering which 
littered our path from the beachhead. Nations clawing at 
each other's throats draining their life blood because of a 
few men. 
A mustached moron dreamed of Lebensraum; a big-chinned 
monkey spoke of a "Roman Empire," and a little four-eyed 
yellow rat intended to dim the light of our solar sun with 
the "Rising Sun." In dying Germany we saw, in reality, 
that which few people can actually visualize: the utter folly 
of a civilization which breeds such men. We fight wars to 
end wars, wars to free enslaved countries, wars for free~om. 
We all understand that rot must be cut from the world as 
it is from an apple. Such wars are just and necessary. 
Men spoke freely of their desire to eliminate the German 
race for all time. Others spoke more sanely of a world gov-
ernment, with teeth enough to back up the peace. Our bull 
sessions offered many plans but they were all agreed on one 
thing, that if it were within their power, this was the last-
the final war of our lifetime. 
· Movement orders on the first cut the bull sessions · short, 
and by 1300 we had moved to an assembly area in the vicin-
ity of Drensteinfurt. The drive to the east was progressing 
satisfactorily, but the assaulting troops were slowing down 
because of fatigue. We were to be united with the Second 
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Armored Division, pass through friendly forward elements, 
and go like hell. Rumors set our final objective as the north-
western part of Berlin. We had fought often with the Sec- . 
ond Armored; they liked us, and we had the same .respect 
for them. They called us "the best damn infantry on 
leather" _and we r~ciprocated by calling them "the best 
damn tankers on treads." 
At midnight the Regiment was broken into battalions and 
attached to different armored task forces. By daylight we 
had closed into the Second Armored assembly area near 
N euenkirchen. 
N euenkirchen is a historic town 'dating back 2,000 years. 
Near this city the Roman Legions, under Varus, were almost 
destroyed by a concentration of German tribes. Rome had 
stretched her empire to the Elbe, and, in her waning years, 
rebellion and defeats like this ended in the fall of the Em-
pire. The Hermanns Denkmal (monument) is there and, 
considering the German and Nazi obsession of making and 
repeating history, som<: sort of defense was to be expected 
where they had made their most heroic defense against the 
incursions of civilzation. 
The Third Battalion was attached to Combat Command 
R, the Second to Task Force B of Combat Command A, and 
the remainder of the Regiment, including the First Bat-
talion and the Second Battalion of the 66th Armored Regi-
ment, formed Task Force R of Combat Command B. Be-
cause of this. division, and the importance of their separate 
actions which took place in widely separated areas, the ac-
tions of each task force will be related separately. 
When orders were received for the attack late on the 
second we were disappointed to learn that our objective 
was not Berlin, but the Elbe River. One soldier complained 
bitterly, "We do all the blocking and someone else gets to 
carry the ball." The press had made a similar comment after 
our drive across France into Belgium. They stated that 
"We were always the bridesmaid, but never the bride." 
We had been the work-horse of two armies, and were 
doomed to end the war in the same role. We were ready 
and willing, however, for we were in position to deal a knock-
out blow. The only geographical barriers between us and 
the Elbe were several minor rivers and the high ridge-line of 
the Teutonberger W ald. This north-south ridge with its 
steep wooded foothills, made a formidable natural obstacle. 
The ridge was covered with a heavy growth of pine and its 
sides indented with deep gullies and ravines. The road net-
work of the plains on either side of the W ald was funneled 
through narrow, twisting passes. The major passes in our 
area we:·e between the towns of Augustdorf and Pivitscheid, 
through the town of Orlinghausen, and another farther 
north near Ubbedessin. 
These passes had been selected as the route of advance for 
the Ninth Army. The rapid seizure of these passes was vital 
to the success of the entire operation. The Second Battalion 
was given the mission of securing the pass at Augustdorf, the 
First Battalion, the pass at Orlinghausen, and the Third at 
Ubbedessin. Infantry troops of another division had at-
tempted to take the passes, but had encountered heavy resist-
ance and had hiled. The Second Battalion and Company A 
of the 66th Armored, which formed part of Task Force B 
of Combat Command A, relieved the troops at Augustdorf 
and prepared to launch their attack. 
The Battalion had been riding trucks for two days and 
nights and wa> badly in need of sleep. However, at 2345, 
April 2, in a cold, driving rain, the Battalion jumped off 
from Augustdorf with two companies abreast, E on the 
right and F on the left. Company G remained in August-
dod to protect the armor, and as Battalion reserve. The 
light tank company part of their Task Force also remained 
in Augustdorf, but was alerted for immediate commitment 
when the pass fell. The nature of the terrain prohibited 
their use in the early stages of the attack. 
Exceeding pre-engagement estimates, the German forces 
were later found to be the equivalent of two infantry bat-
talions, commanded by SS officers, and containing a large 
number of SS men among the enlisted ranks. Two com-
panies were dug in directly astride the pass, and on the re-
verse slope of the ridge, one company was dug in 1,500 yards 
north of the pass and two companies 2,000 yards south of 
the pass. An outpost line of automatic weapons on the west 
side of the ridge covered the entire position. No artillery 
support was available to the enemy, although they were 
equipped with light and heavy mortars and panzerfausts. In 
Pivitscheid, just east of the pass, was held an infantry re-
serve and two Mark IV tanks. 
The element of surprise was lost as the Battalion pushed 
into the outpost line. Two enemy machine gun nests were 
wiped out and the remainder pushed back into the main line 
of resistance at the crest of the ridge. As the assaulting 
forces moved slowly up the steep slope, control became a 
superhuman task. The thick growth of pines and steady 
rain created almost total darkness, necessitating combat 
groups to hold hands to maintain contact. 
Both companies reached the crest of the ridge at approx-
imately 0300, April 3, and vigorously assaulted the main 
positions defending the pass. The enemy proved to be young 
and fanatical troops, well mpplied with automatic weapons. 
They were in cleverly camouflaged two and three-man em-
placements. Few prisoners were taken, and the individual 
positions had to be reduced with short-range fire or grenades. 
The Battalion fought its way over the crest and into the 
reverse slope defenses. Flanking fire began coming in from 
both flanks as the widespread defenses north and south of the 
pass fired into the flanks of the attack. Both attacking com-
panies echeloned their support platoons toward their open 
flanks to prevent infiltration, and pushed on. At 0530 the 
enemy struck back in a vigorous counterattack preceded by 
a heavy mortar concentration. Two infantry companies hit 
the Battalion frontally, attempting to drive it from the ridge 
and . out of the pass. Small arms fire was delivered at the 
same time from the enemy positions on the Battalion's flanks. 
The enemy attack was delivered by fresh troops, and the 
weight of them, catching the Battalion in poor defensive 
positions, caused it to pull back to the crest of the ridge. Or-
ders came down to dig in and hold. The Light Tank Com-
pany was ordered into the fight and moved four of its tanks 
straight down the road through the pass into the front lines. 
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The tankers of the Second Armored had never lacked 
courage, and we welcomed their presence in our misery. 
They sprayed the woods beyond the crest of the ridge as 
Infantry and Armor confer 
Snipers harassed, but failed to slow down, our drive 
best they could from these poor positions. The Battalion's 
machine guns were rapidly thrown into action on the flanks 
to neutralize the flanking fire that was threatening to make 
the position untenable. The frontal attack was beaten off 
after two hours of steady pressure of the fresh troops trying 
to push the Battalion off the crest of the ridge. Because of 
the thick undergrowth, the fighting was at extremely close 
range. Three tank commanders were shot by snipers who 
had crept close up to the road from which they were firing. 
At 1100 the enemy again counterattacked. A frontal as-
sault was mounted initially. Then a company was swung 
around Company E's right flank, driving into the Battalion's 
rear from the south. One platoon of Company E took the 
brunt of this attack. They held, although greatly outnum-
bered. The action developed into hand-to-hand fighting. 
Part of the enemy force fought its way into the rear of the 
platoon and was stopped only after the platoon leader had 
been killed, and the platoon sergeant and ten others were 
casualties. When the assault was finally stopped, the lines . 
were only a few yards apart. It was now clear that the Bat-
talon had stopped fighting to clear the pass, but was strug-
gling for its very existence. The assauJt companies' strength 
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was sapped by the drawn-out struggle on the rugged terrain 
and the chilling rain which fell incessantly. The enemy pos-
sessed nearly double numerical superiority, was comparatively 
fresh, and still held close-in positions on both flanks of the 
Battalion. 
The Battalion reserve, Company G, was ordered forward 
to tie in closely with the right rear of Company E to pre-
vent further infiltration on the open right flank. All com-
panies were ordered to reorganize and prepare to repel fur-
ther counterattacks. The Battalion Commander went for-
ward to a vantage point on the crest in Company E's line 
to study the enemy's positions and to plan how to extricate 
his unit from its dangerous position. He decided to adopt 
the bold plan of action of passing the comparatively fresh 
Company G through Company E in a narrow frontal assault 
to take a key road junction and house group in the rear of 
the enemy's reverse slope defense; to hold open the corridor 
thus created with elements of the two companies then on line; 
and to push the light tanks rapidly through this gap to the 
plain beyond where they could bring fire on the enemy posi-
tions north and south of the pass. At 1630 on the third all 
was in readiness, and the Battalion resumed the attack. 
Company G drove vigorously forward. and overwhelmed the 
resistance in a narrow sector in Company E's front. They 
swarmed through the woods on the reverse slope and moved 
out into the open toward Pivitscheid and the strategic road 
junction employing walking fire, for which we were more 
or less noted. 
Two Mark IV tanks and one 75MM AT gun opened 
up, temporarily slowing the assault, but the speed and feroc-
ity of the attack was such that 15 Germans were killed or 
wounded at the AT gun position and the gun was captured. 
Support squads flanked both tanks and knocked them out 
with bazooka fire. Two counterattacks formed immediately. 
One group, of platoon size, moved down the slope from the 
south and attacked Company G's vulnerable rear. The 
Company Weapons Platoon engaged this group with car-
bines and pistols and managed to pin it to the ground before 
it hit the platoon's rear. The other threat was coming from 
the town itself. The infantry reserve held by the Germans 
was being committed in an effort to stop this new threat. 
Company G had seized the road junction and the first houses 
of the town and had joined in a fierce small arms fight with 
these fresh troops. 
In the meanwhile, the Light Tank Company had been 
ordered forward to Company G's aid. They pushed rapidly 
down the road around two heavy road blocks, which had 
been covered by the now knocked out tanks, and into the 
edge of town where Company G was fighting. 
They deployed rapidly and, together with the infantry, 
pushed farther into the town. Prisoners began pouring back 
toward the Pass as the German rear installations and mortar 
positions were overrun. Comp~nies E and F had been keep-
ing steady pressure on the flank positions in the pass and 
now went over to the attack. The Germans,-with their line 
of communications cut, and harassed by fire coming from the 
Light Tank Company, fell back from the Pass, trying to 
keep under cover of the thick trees on the ridgeline. From 
this point on, the enemy position began disintegrating and 
the entire Battalion surged forward . With the enemy 
virtually surrounded, the fighting developed into small i"o-
lated actions, as the Germans split up in an effort to escape 
annihilation. These groups were rapidly picked up as the 
two co~panies advanced down the reverse slope. 
Long columns of German infantry could be seen north 
and south of the Pass, moving down from the ridge, abandon-
~ng their positions. These troops could no the affected by the 
Battalion other than by long-range fire, and the majority 
made good their escape. The mopping up in the woods and 
in the town of Pivitschid was completed by 1830. This ac-
tion cost the enemy 239 prisoners, 79 known dead, two tanks, 
one half-track, one 75MM AT gun, and numerous light 
and heavy mortars and automatic weapons abandoned or 
destroyed._ 
The reminder of the .. Armored Task Force waiting m 
Augustdorf was uncoiled, passed through the Pass, and de-
ployed on the plains around Pivitscheid. The following morn-
ing the infantry once more mounted tanks, and the full mo-
mentum of the American drive to the Elbe resumed. At 
O.SOO ~n the fourth, the Second Battalion, mounted on tanks, 
TDs, scout cars and jeeps, moved east. 
Simultaneously on the second, the First Battalion and Task 
Force R had relieved the 377th Infantry near Orlinghausen. 
The town itself lay right in the pass; one narrow road 
which passed through the Wald was its principal street. 
The buildings and houses wete built on the slope on either 
side with only small alleys, useless for vehicles, running up 
the steep slopes. The enemy occupying the slopes could look 
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Aboard tanks, Infantrymen of the 119th Regiment bypass 
resistance and continue the attack. 
down into the main road, which was the Battalion's only 
possible route of advance. They were heavily supplied with 
panzerfaust which, in the absence of artillery, they fired 
into the streets and houses. The backbone of the enemy troops 
were fanatical Nazi Officer Candidates, who were the cream 
of the now · staggering German Anpy. By 1900 Company 
B had gained a few houses in the town, and the enemy imme-
diately launched a counterattack from both flanks and the 
front. Our thin column was outnumbered and in position 
to be wiped out. The enemy, under cover of the trees and 
houses, were able to get to within 15 yards of our troops. 
Machine guns which fired between the houses denied a route 
of withdrawal or one of support. The small band held out 
for two hours until the cover of darkness allowed relief to 
push up to free them. The enemy, on the slopes 100 yards 
behind the houses, continued to throw panzerfausts down on 
the Battalion as it attempted to build strength enough to 
push the advance. Company A made a little progress until 
their flanks and rear were hit by an attack of approximately 
two-company strength. 
The cellar-to-<:ellar and house-to-house fighting had spread 
I 
II 
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out their leading platoons. The enemy, moving in behind 
them in strength, retook some of the houses and threatened 
to cut off two platoons. The Commander of Company A 
fought his way up to the two platoons and directed their 
battle for survival. The enemy forced his way into the 
cellars and, under cover of the p-anzerfaust which he fired up 
the stairs and down the halls, closed in on our troops. Ma-
chine guns, set up on either end of the halls, fought each 
other. Any movement brought grenades and fire, sometimes 
with both enemy and friendly troops firing into their own 
ranks. Fists, bayonets, and knives were used freely, as the 
troops silently slipped from room to room through the dark-
ness. Men colliding in the darkness fired first and asked 
questions later. With the first glow of dawn the enemy was 
forced back and our position was regained. By this time the 
entire Battalion had been committed, including Headquar-
ters Company. The enemy force, which had originally been 
estimated to be a reenforced Battalion, continued to receive 
reenforcement and was estimated to be nearly a Regiment 
when the town was finally taken. 
. 
At 0600, April 3, Company C began a flanking attack 
from the outskirts of the town in an attempt to capture the 
enemy positions on the slopes. By 10()0 Company C was 
making very slow, but steady, progress. Tanks were sent up 
the main road into town to force the action. The enemy, 
'however, slipped down from the slopes or, firing from the 
slop·es, knocked out the tanks as fast as they appeared. The 
enemy continl!ed to drive into the Battalion's flanks and 
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neutralized our forward movement. In an attempt to break 
the enemy's flank positions, the anti-tank gunners and am-
munition bearers who were unable to use their guns effect-
jvely, armed themselves and formed a rifle platoon. At 1500 
the platoon began its attack on the right flank slope. Alter-
nately firing and advancing their squads, they moved through 
the enemy fire. They continued closing in on the enemy 
until they had built up a line of fire 25 yards from their posi. 
tions. Gaining temporary fire superiority they jumped to 
their feet and charged the position. Their vicious charge 
overran two machine guns and took the 28 enemy survivors 
prisoners. This success and the advance of Company C per-
mitted A and B Companies to push vigorously through the 
Pacs. The Pass and town were completely in our hands at 
1700. In the battle for the Pass, 351 prisoners had been 
taken. The Armor pou-ed through and prepared to resume 
the attack on the fourth. 
Meanwhile, on the Second of April, the Third Battalion, 
as part of Combat Command R, swung north to sever and 
secure the mountain pass which controlled the Autobahn, 
just south of the key communications center of Beilefeld. 
The attack met the same type of troops and defense which 
had stopped ·the First and Second Battalions farther south. 
A large portion of the troops in the entire area came from 
Detmold, 18 kilometers southeast. Detmold was one of the 
largest m]itary schools in the country; it was an installation 
similar to our Fort Benning but not on so large a scale. The 
enemy troops that opposed us were the Officer Candidates, 
ordnance, school, and tank troops who had been stationed 
there. They were exceptionally well-trained and equipped, 
with the exception of artillery. The enemy's attempt to stop 
Lieutenant Colonel McCown examines prisoners captured during the Weser Ri'Ver Crossing 
the advance by harassing our flanks failed in this case. Under 
cover of darkness, Captain Mann led one of the assaulting 
companies in a wide flanking movement, which came in be-
hind on the reverse slope of the enemy road blocks and posi-
tions. Forces converging from both sides soon reduced the 
enemy force and the attack pushed down into Ubbedissen. 
By 2150 the tcwn was ours and the armor moved through. 
On the fourth the Second Battalion moved south of Pivit-
scheid mopping up , and the First Battalion also swung south 
toward the Second Battalion to clear that area. A morning 
was spent cleaning out this area to secure our supply lines. 
The three battalions took Mackenbrush and was relieved 
by the 117th, while the Second and First Battalions turned 
east and drove toward the Weser River. By midnight the 
head of the column had reached the Weser at the town 
of Ohr, just south of Hamlin (of Pied Piper fame). 
Plans were made for Task Force B to cross the W eser, 
making use of any available boats and equipment. These 
plans were changed, but, before the Second Battalion could 
be notified, they had already crossed Company F and seized 
the town of Tundern. The remainder of the Battalion 
crossed, followed by the First Battalion, while a bridge was 
being built. The bridgehead was extended under fire to the 
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high ground south and east of Hamelin. Meanwhile, the 
remainder of TFB swung north and seized a highway and 
a railway bridge intact on the southern edge of Hamelin. 
The Third Battalion had moved down from Lemgo and 
had assembled at Hummarbruch. 
On the morning of the sixth the Second Battalion was 
ordered to attack and secure a line on the outskirts of Harne-
lin. The Second Platoon of Company F had advanced to a 
point 55 yards from a factory at the edge of town, when the 
enemy opened up with intense machine gun and automatic 
fire. The enemy occupied positions to the front and on 
both flanks. Enemy fire, coming from three directions, was 
so devastating that the platoon was pinned down in the 
open field. 
Lieutenant Beaudoin, platoon leader, saw that his pla-
toon was in grave danger of being annihilated and that the 
entire Company was in danger of being flanked and sur-
wunded. He ordered four of his men to take up a position 
to the front of the platoon and fire on the enemy located in 
the factory. He then ordered three men on the platoon's 
left and right flanks to sustain fire at their respective flanks. 
He then crawled among his men, pointing out the best 
German ci'l'ilians display Hitler's secret weapon 
places to dig in and collecting ammunition in order to sup-
ply the men who were firing. By rotating his men in the 
firing line they were all able to dig in. Lieutenant Beaudoin 
dug in at the platoon's most advanced point. During the 
fire fight that followed, he killed six of the enemy. The 
battle continued to rage, and by 0900 the enemy had suf-
fered a loss of 43 dead and 73 wounded. 
Despite the deadly, well-aimed fire of this small force, 
their position was rapidly becoming precarious. The e;1emy 
had brought up strong reenforcements to the platoon's direct 
front and were preparing to counterattack. This attack 
would have constituted a serious threat to all of Company F. 
Furthermore, the platoon was now running low on ammuni-
tion. Only a well-directed and continuous stream of fire 
could stop the nume : ically sup•erior enemy from engulfing 
them. Three times men were sent back to obtain ammuni-
tion and to notify the Company Commander of the impend-
ing attack. All three were killed by snipers from the enemy 
position 90 yards away. The platoon also lost five men who 
rose up in their holes to cover the messengers' escape, by fire. 
The position of the platoon seemed hopeless. 
Lieutenant Beaudoin decided to make a last attempt to 
save his platoon. He called his second-in-command and left 
instructions with him in case he himself should not return. 
He directed another man to crawl towards the First Platoon 
700 yards away while he drew the enemy fire. Then with 
utter disregard for his life and with the almost certain knowl-
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edge that he would not return alive, he proceeded to .crawl 
and creep toward the enemy, 90 yards to the right flank. 
The enemy was distracted by this threat and the messenger 
escaped. Eight rounds of bazooka were fired at him and two 
exploded within 10 feet, bouncing him upon the ground. 
The enemy infantry sprayed the area with rapid fire as he 
continued to move forward. Two of their oullets pierced 
his left sleeve, yet he went boldly on. He fired his carbine 
to keep them from d ~awing an accurate bead on his crawling 
figure. Finally, after reaching a point 10 yards from the 
enemy, he threw caution to the winds and charged. 
Three of the enemy rose from their holes to shoot him 
down. He shot and killed two at a range of four yards and 
killed, with the butt of his carbine, the third who was now 
rushing him with his bayonet. As Lieutenant Beaudoin 
leaped through the air into the enemy's dug-out he was 
brought down by enemy machine gun fire from the factory. 
Due to his sacrifice, the messenger got through and brought 
back a platoon of tanks which blasted the enemy from their 
positions. 
The Congressional Medal of Honor was awarded post-
humously for this action. 
Later that day the attack again turned east. The Third 
Battalion had crossed the Weser and took Elze at 1600. 
With the W eser crossed, all three Battalions drove east. All 
coordinated resistance seemed broken. In the days that fol-
lowed, it was dismount and fight, and get on and ride some 
more. Some towns resisted bitterly while others fell with 
hardly a shot. The usual procedure was to advance into a 
town, and if any shots were fired, the tanks in the column 
behind quickly pulled out into the level fields and encircled 
the town. If resistance continued, the tanks and infantry 
moved in from all sides. The "V olk~turm" in most cases 
fired at the lead vehicle but, when the fire was returned, ran 
home to change into civilian clothes. 
In one case the Third Battalion moved into the tO"\Yn so 
rapidly that the "Volksturm" were caught with their pants 
on. As they were gathered up for a spanking before we 
turned them loose, a crusty old man emerged from his house. 
He was dressed in a faded, moth-eaten uniform of some by-
gone war. On his belt was strapped a huge sword that almost 
pulled him over. While the local "heroes" were bejng 
marched by, he straightened to a position of attention and 
spat at the ground in front of them. He was heard to ex-
claim, "It took men in my day to be a soldier-my belly is 
sick with your strutting a:·ound, telling the women how 
brave you are-how you will throw back the invading fools-
you see the muzzle of a cannon and you run like children-
watch me, women, and see how a soldier can die." The old 
man then pulled his sword with great difficulty and tottered 
toward the nearest guard. One of our German-speaking 
soldiers gently pulled the sword from his hand and led him, 
crying, back into his house. When the soldier turned to go, 
the old man wiped his eyes and said, "An old man am l. 
If youth I had, I would wish to fi·ght you, Honorable En-
~mv." 
Town after town fell before our advancing columns. 
Afferde, Gr. Forste, Hildesheim, Harsum, Reppner, Oster-
!inde, Immensdorf, Levenstedt, and Wolfenbuttel were taken 
one after the other. The First Battalion ran into serious op-
position in Lesse. The enemy had concentrated heavy flak 
batteries around the factories, for protection against aircraft. 
Our advance was stopped until artillery was moved into firing 
position and counter-battery fire was able to silence some of 
the guns. These defenses were the first of the defenses which 
covered the Herman Goering Works in Immensdorf. The 
Battalion was forced to deploy and fight their way ahead. 
The stiff fight continued on past Lesse, up the road three 
miles to Reppner. The enemy had bolstered his ground de-
fense around the 88s with young "Hitler Youth," armed 
with panzerfausts. The Goering Works was one of the 
largest factories in Germany. Thousands of Allied slaves, 
including Prisoners of War, were used in its operation. 
On the 11th the assault to take the plant itself began. 
The enemy flak guns put up a good scrap, but failed to stop 
our infantry long. The thousands of freed slaves began to 
riot and mangle the local Nazis with considerable pleasure. 
The factory itself contained huge warehouses of food which 
they attempted to loot. The First Battalion was obliged to 
remain in the town to preserve order, while the Second Bat-
123 
Lieutenant General Vieth, in command of German forces in Braun-
schweig, Germany, shakes hands with Maj. Gen. Leland S. Hobbs, 
CG, 30th Division, U. S. Ninth Army. Surrender terms were 
discussed, but no agreement reached. Each officer returned to 
his camp and the fighting continued. 
talion continued to drive east to capture Wolfenbutte. On 
the 14th they were relieved by the Eighth Armored Division 
which had caught up with them, and they moved east toward 
Schonebeck. On the way, their orders were changed because 
of the enemy troop concentrations near Magdeburg and 
the heavy fighting which the Third Battalion had run into. 
The Third Battalion had run into a "bear's nest" on the 
morning of the 13th when they joined CCB at W esterhusen 
just south of Madgeburg. They were told that they would 
cross the Elbe River and be in reserve at the bridgehead on 
the east bank. The Battalion was very tired, and under 
strength from casualties and the loss of two platoons which 
were protecting the Second Armored Division's CP. At 
6500 the Battalion began its crossing of the river in ducks, 
under vicious artillery concentrations from the enemy, the 
Battalion moved quickly into its assembly area in a small 
patch of woods a short distance from the river. The enemy 
artillery fire continued to rain on the area throughout the 
day. Observed enemy fire was placed repeatedly on the 
bridge site where an engineer unit was attempting to con-
struct a bridge to enable tanks to cross and to reenforce the 
bridgehead. The continuous enemy fire on the bridge forced 
the abandonment of a crossing at that point. 
At 2030, the Third Battalion received orders to move 
south along the east bank of the Elbe, followed by the Third 
The Second Armored Division of the V. S. Ninth Army 
moves through the suburbs to Magdeburg. 
Battalion, 41st Armored Infantry in column, in that order. 
The Battalion was to secure a new crossing site for the 
construction of a bridge, clear all opposition on the route 
of march, seize and hold the town of Elbenau. The armored 
infantry was to fill the gap between our Third Battalion in 
Elbenau and another friendly battalion to the north. In-
sufficient time was available to the Third Battalion for 
proper planning, orientation, issuing of orders, and planning 
artillery fire, but the Battalion moved on schedule at the 
head of the force moving south. Company Commanders 
were given the orders and were able briefly to inform their 
platoon leaders of the mission, and gave more detailed and 
specific instructions from memory of their map study as they 
marched. 
Enemy resistance was hit and a few prisoners were taken. 
The Battalion CO, at the head of the troops, was forced to 
stop several times during the advance, and, under improvised 
shelter, to check the route and to prepare artillery fire for 
the advance. No suitable small-scale maps were available, 
and numerous obstacles such as ponds and several small 
canals had to be skirte.i after a visual reconnaissance. Ap-
proximately 1,500 yards from Elbena,u, the Battalion as-
sumed an attack formation with Companies I nd L abreast. 
Company K followed L to clear the edge of the woods be-
tween Grunewalde and Elbenau and then take a position 
'in support on the south of Elbenau. The heavy weapons of 
Company M were sited near the base of the bridgehead to 
cover the Battalion right and left rear, from a position ap-
proximately 1,500 yards south of Elbenau, and to remain In 
this position until the bridgehead was sufficiently secure 
against enemy counterattacks. Although greatly exhausted 
Friendly tank destroyers support our infantry's 
attack on Magdeburg. 
from their prolonged commitment, the Battalion moved ag-
gressively forward against moderate resistance and began to 
clear the enemy from the town. 
While ·the Battalion was fighting in the town, an enemy 
force estimated to be two battalions of infantry and one bat-
talion of armor, launched a savage three-pronged attack on 
the town. One enemy infantry column of more than 100 
men armed with a large number of automatic weapons at-
tacked the left flank. COmpany I, utilizing every man and 
weapon, succeeded in forcing the enemy back. The enemy 
force then swung farther to the left and came in on Com-
pany I's rear. The defenses of the Company immediately 
shifted to cope with the new threat. Meanwhile, a second 
enemy force of infantry and armor drove against the sector 
between Companies I and L. A despe~ate struggle followed, 
with each man clinging tenaciously to his position; even mor-
tar observers and bazooka men held their forward posi-
tions. 
Mortar fire was placed on the enemy only 100 yards in 
front of the friendly positions, as our men endeavored to pre-
vent encirclement. With no anti-tank weapons with suffi-
cient range to stop the enemy tanks, the sector was finally 
penetrated by the enemy force, and Company I was ordered 
to fall back to the Company K positions. They formed a 
line in the north edge of the woods at the south edge of town. 
One platoon, which was prevented from gaining the Com-
pany K positions by the fire of tanks, fought its way back to 
reenforce the positions of the Company M heavy weapons. 
Another column of enemy armor, in which at least 27 tanks, 
self-propelled guns, and half-tracks towing gun9 were 
counted, enveloped Company L on the right. 
This Company stubbornly engaged the enemy, but the 
armored vehicles had stopped just out of bazooka range and 
poured in a hail of cannon and machine gun fire. Mean-
while, one machine gun platoon of Company M, which had 
been deployed to cover a large open area in the vicinity of 
Grunewalde, was driven back toward the river by the over-
whelming onslaught in that sector. Unable to obtain sup-
port and hopelessly cut off, the gallant platoon continued to 
engage the enemy in the hopeless struggle for their posi-
tions. They did, however, succeed in drawing off from the 
main attack a sufficient number of enemy troops to enable 
the remainder of Company M to prepare a defense. The 
overwhelming numbers of the enemy assaulted the platoon, 
and the personnel were taken prisoners. 
The Battalion CO realized that, without anti-tank wea-
pons, a serious loss would be incurred if the situation con-
tinued as it was. He therefore ordered Company K to estab-
lish a line in the northern edge of the woods just out of the 
southern edge of town. They were to be prepared to reenter 
the town as soon as supporting tanks, which had been prom-
ised, arrived, or to fight an orderly withdrawal if necessary. 
The line was accordingly built up in the woods where enemy 
tanks could not be effectively employed against our troops. 
From the positions established in the woods, artillery fire 
was thrown into the town, inflicting heavy casualties on the 
enemy. Men volunteered to go forward into enemy territory 
to direct fire. Radio operators climbed to the attics and top 
floors of houses to achieve the best radio reception. One vol-
unteer who had moved forward into town called to the Bat-
talion CO, who was coordinating all the artillery fire, and 
ordered a barrage on his own position to halt an enemy tank 
thrust which was forming. 
The enemy force which had captured the Company M 
machine gun platoon continued its attack against the base of 
the bridgehead in an attempt to cut off the entire operation 
and sever all lines of communication and supply. The rest 
of Company M-one machine gun platoon and the mortar 
platoon-were deployed to meet the assault. Only a min-
imum number of men were left on the crew-served weapons, 
while the remainder, including Company M Headquarters 
personnel and the Company I platoon and stragglers from 
the armored infantry, built up a defensive line. As the 
aggressive enemy force moved toward the improvised line, 
orders were issued for the personnel to hold their fire until 
the command was given. Heavy volumes of artillery and 
mortar fire and direct fire from at least two enemy tanks be-
gan softening up the friendly position. Fully understanding 
the consequences of an enemy penetration through their posi-
tion, they absorbed the fi re and waited. 
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When the main body of the assault force was in an open 
field 150 yards away, the machine guns and riflemen opened 
fire. Their rapid bursts inflicted a heavy toll on the enemy 
and pinned the remainder, more than 200, to the ground. 
Mortar observers who remained in their observation posts 
on the second floor of a house, although it had been struck 
three times by direct fire from the enemy tanks, then directed 
and adjusted a devastating series of mortar barrages onto 
the pinned-down troops. Their excellent coordination and 
fearless deportment caused additional casualties to the enemy. 
The enemy troops, completely demoralized and disorganized, 
hastily fled in disorder. They reorganized and again at-
tempted to attack, only to be ~et by the same deadly fire. 
After another reorganization and third disastrous attempt to 
break through, the enemy force, badly depleted by the high 
casualties (over 60) which they had sustained, fled from 
the field , abandoning equipment, wounded, and weapons in 
their flight. 
The Battalion CO had requested support for the outnum-
bered troops at his position, but none was available. At 
noon, after a sustained shelling of our positions by enemy 
artillery and tanks, the enemy threatened to encircle the Bat-
talion from the right. The Battalion was immediately or-
dered to begin a gradual withdrawal to the town of Grune-
walde, which was held by the First Battalion of the 41st 
Armored Infantry, for the purpose of reorganizing, and 
gaining support for a counterattack back into Elbenau. En-
emy troops were then observed occupying the area to the 
left of the Battalion, which should have been held by the 
Third Battalion, 41st Armored Infantry. A report was re-
ceived that the positions of that Battalion had been overrun, 
and that there remained only 15 survivors. 
Company L was completely surrounded in the town and 
had moved into the cellars. Believing capture to be inevita-
ble, all items of intelligence value in the Company were de-
stroyed, as were the radios, and the radio of an attached ar-
tillery observer. The deadly, smothering barrage of artillery 
which rocked the town was directed by volunteers from 
Company K. This fire was so effective that the enemy troops 
and armor took cover themselves, and Company L's pres-
ence remained undetected. 
The batteries of the artillery radio with the Battalion CO 
finally began to fail, and the forward elements were without 
artillery support. Meanwhile, the small groups of Head-
quarters and supply personnel who had established the Bat-
talion rear CP on the west bank of the river observed a force 
of enemy infantry (company strength) surge forward from 
a patch of woods behind the abandoned bridge site and dash 
across the open toward the river. I t appeared that they were 
attempting to cross the river on the wrecked bridging equip-
I !~ 
A tank and infantry race through the streets of Magdeburg, mopping up 
ment. Every available man took up positions along the river 
bank and opened fire on the swiftly advancing enemy. A 
mortar which Company M had been forced to leave behind 
because of the lack of men to man it, was set up by an im-
provised Headquarters crew and put into action. In the in-
tense struggle that followed, the enemy force suffered serious 
losses and was forced to withdraw. 
When the Commanding Officer of CCB arrived in Grune-
walde and viewed the situation, he ordered the bridgehead 
abandond and a withdrawal to defensive positions on the 
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west bank of the Elbe. Company L was assumed to have been 
either captured or annihilated in the town of Elbenau. The 
return crossing was effected despite volumes of enemy artil-
lery which were directed at our troops. In the early after-
noon Company L discovered that the enemy was still unaware 
of their presence in the town. Three volunteers were sent 
to scout the town and locate a rout of withdrawal. The at-
tached artillery observer who, when capture seemed immi-
nent, had broken the crystals, twisted off the frequency 
knob, and run a screw driver through his set several times, 
---1. 
managed to repair the radio and contacted a friendly artil-
lery liaison plane. His request for a smoke barrage on the 
town, to conceal the withdrawal and escape of the Company, 
was complied with. Three scouts led the entire Company 
undetected through the enemy-held town, capturing a startled 
enemy officer on the way. 
They succeeded in crossing the open area and were enter-
ing a woods which led toward the river, when an enemy 
tank moving through the smoke began to fire at them. 
Friendly fighter planes which 'were over the area flew di-
rectly over the Company, and under the threat of air attack, 
the enemy tank withdrew. Covered by friendly planes, 
Company L reached the river after having remained behind 
the enemy lines 11 hours. When the Battalion had been or-
dered to withdraw from Elbenau, the men pleaded with 
their commanders to be given the opportunity to assault the 
town to attempt to rescue their comrades who had been cut 
off. Their miraculous appearance at the river bank was re-
ceived with rejoicing. The Battalion returned to Regimen-
tal control and assembled in the vicinty of Gr. Rodensleben. 
During the same day, the Second Battalion had crossed the 
Elbe farther south, while TFR had remained in a defensive 
line was of Magdeburg in the vicinity of Hohendodeleben. 
CDmpany E, ith the exception of one platoon which tied in 
with Company F, moved into an assembly area in Gutergluck 
while troops of the 17th Armored Engineers defended the 
town. On the morning of the 16th of April, Company E 
received word that the defensive positions held by the Engi-
neers to the northeast of the town had been overrun by a 
strong German counterattack. At 0800 the attack hit the 
right flank, with one prong striking the rear of the Com-
pany. \Vith the Company solidly engaged with the enemy 
to the front, only the CP group was left to meet this at-
tack. One officer and three men picked up their weapons and 
met the enemy. They took positions in the second story of a 
building and brought nre down on 40 enemy infantry ad-
vancing up the street. The aggressive enemy force continued 
to advance, laying down heavy fire as they drove nearer to 
the small group. One man stood exposed in the window and 
shot down four of the enemy. The sheer weight and force 
of the enemy drive had carried them to within 200 yards of 
these four men. 
When the accurate small arms fire slowed the enemy's 
advance, they brought up a self-propelled gun. A friendly 
tank located in the yard below was abandoned by its crew 
because they considered the stand useless and hopeless. Al-
though faced with W-to-1 odds, the men remained to protect 
their Company's rear. Sergeant Vannice ran back through 
the enemy fire to obtain a bazooka. Returning with it and 
an arm full of rockets, he took his positin back in the win-
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dow. He opened fire at the SP gun and missed. His fire 
drew the attention of the gun crew and they immediately 
fired four rounds of HE back at him. Although his expo-
sure at the window continued to bring fire, he again took 
aim and fired another rocket. This time he knocked out the 
gun and killed two of the enemy who had been following it. 
The gun commander quickly emerged and was instantly 
killed by Sergeant Vannice. In the hours of close-range 
fighting that followed, both the officer, Lieutenant Holycross, 
and Sergeant Vannice were wounded, but neither man left 
his post until the last enemy before them had been either 
killed or wounded. Sergeant Vannice, exhausted from the 
loss of blood, then fainted at his post. 
Meanwhile, the major portion of the Company was fight-
ing the same type of battle. The enemy, by the sheer weight 
of his armor, pushed into the town. Our forces, although 
outnumbered, fought a gallant battle, outwitting and out-
fighting the Jerries at every turn. The enemy found every 
effort stopped. He swung from the north and came in from 
the east. When that failed, he swung in from the south and 
tried coming in behind the Company. His every drive was 
met by a small group of men who seemed to materialize from 
nowhere. The enemy recklessly shoved self-propelled guns 
up the streets, only to have four of them knocked out by 
crafty bazooka men. Contact was made with the 83rd Di-
vision on their right, and they promised that support would 
be on its way won. This support arrived after the enemy 
attack had been stopped, but in time to help clean up the en-
emy resistance in the east side of town.' This lone Company 
had thoroughly defeated a vastly superior enemy force. The 
enemy dead alone (99) was almost equal to the Company's 
fighting strength. To add to the German losses, 125 pris-
oners we~e mopped up. This battle crushed the last major 
enemy offensive action which we were to see during the 
war. 
Late that day, the Second Battalion returned to Regimen-
tal control and assembled in the vicinity of Schnarlslegen. 
At midnight the night of the 16th, the Reg:ment, minus the 
First Battalion, returned to 30th Division control. The next 
day the Regiment, minus the First Battalion, and a battalion 
of the 66th Armored Regiment (tanks) attacked east to take 
Diesdorf, a suburb of Magdeburg. Little serious resistance 
was met until the troops had taken Diesdorf and were con-
tinuing east. Dug-in 88's gave stiff resistance for several 
hours until they were knocked out by mortar fire. Contact 
was made with the 117th in the western edge of Magdeburg 
at 1600. The First Battalion, as part of a task force, was 
also in the outskirts, having a rough time of it. 
Other units of the Second Armored had not been so suc-
cessful, and the Regiment was ordered to dig in for the night. 
Tedious occupational duties 
The Regiment jumped off at 0630 the next morning only to 
be later pinched out by the advance of the 117th across our 
front. The First Battalion continued its fight in the town. 
The 19th passed with the Regiment holding its position. 
On the 20th we relieved the Second Armored Division and, 
with the return of the First Battalion, occupied wide defen-
sive positions in the town and along the river to the south. 
The remaining days of the month and of the war passed 
quietly. We soon became involved in the complexity of mil-
itary government and occupation while we waited for the 
Russans to join us. Thousands of enemy troops in the terri-
tory between the two armies continued to flee west toward 
the Elbe. Their main object in life now was to escape the 
Russians and to be captured by us. They tried a variety of 
tricks and even offered wholesale surrender. Our Division 
already had taken thousands more than could be properly 
processed, and we were forced to refuse their offer. Our out-
posts on the river turned them back to await the well-known 
Russian hospitality. 
MAY 
Schonebeck-W elsleben-Swhwaneberg-Occupational Du-
ties-Contact with the Rusisans-V-E Day. 
May first found the Regiment actually enjoying the 
war. With the exception of motorized patrols and guard, 
duty was light. Food and drink were more or less plentiful, 
though of dubious quality. We realized for the first time 
that Spring was about us and that nature and life had con-
tinued in spite of the war. Peace rumors flitted about in 
abundance, and we wondered how it would feel to live in a 
world of peace again. PEACE-a word lost from our vocab-
ularies and minds-had a strange, almost forgotten meaning. 
The Russians reported substantial gains in Berlin itself. 
Peace feelers extended to the British in the north appeared 
promising, while the Italian front was folding up rapidly. 
Our sector had stagnated; the silence and inactivity rasped 
Contact 
on our nerves. After months of tenseness and fatigue, the 
let-down was staggering. Many of us found ourselves aged 
beyond our years-old mentally, in body, in spirit. We 
could only look forward to months more of combat with 
Japan, or at the best, in occupation in Germany. To an 
American neither prospect was pleasant. 
The few survivors of our original Regiment, who had 
lived on borrowed time so long, accepted fate as inevitable, 
while the newer members griped. We all knew that an in-
fantryman's end is only a matter of time. In any case, we 
had learned to appreciate and to thank God for our existence. 
Every minute, every hour had become sacred-a gift to be 
extended miserly and enjoyed to the fullest. 
Our positions were gradually extended south until we 
occupied the area in the vicinity of Schonebeck. Occupation 
difficulties were aggravated by the lack of civilian transporta-
tion and municipal utilities. Thousands of civilians were 
on the move-our road blocks were swamped with women 
and crying children. 
The third brought news that the Russians were only 92 
miles away. Excitement ran high on both sides of the river. 
The Germans were in panic. They attempted to swim and 
boat across, and in our excitement, we almost let them do it. 
Observers reported that Russian columns could be seen on 
the fourth. At 0630 May fifth, G Company made contact 
with an advance Russian element. The First Battalion con-
tacted another column near Grunewalde at 1530. 
Two great armies joined; to us it was the symbol of the 
end. Infantrymen of two nations had fought their way across 
2,000 miles of swamps, rivers, mountains, and plains to 
greet each other warmly and then stand and look at one 
another foolishly. A few drinks and common interests soon 
overcame the hesitancy, and warm friendships were born. 
We found the Russians direct and aggressive. They knew 
what they wanted and only considered the cost after their 
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ends had been achieved. The common soldier was a likeable 
chap, rough and crude by nature. He had a fine sense of 
humor, though it sometimes had a sadistic twist. After see-
ing the Russian soldier, it was easier to understand how 
their country could absorb such terrible defeats and losses, 
and still survive. 
They marveled at the quantity of our equipment, and we 
at their lack of it. It was hard to believe that they had done 
so much with so little. This junction sealed, beyond doubt, 
the door of doom of Naziism. As General Patton's ad-
vance closed the Southern Redoubt, this junction split Ger-
many through the heart. 
Enemy resistance in the entire country disintegrated and 
crumbled to dust. Companies, regiments, and divisions 
laid down their arms and surrendered. 
On the sixth, semiofficial channels reported that hostilities 
would cease at 0001 that night. Late that afternoon this 
report was officially cancelled. At 0900 on the seventh, the 
official order was received. Hostilities would officially cease 
at 0001 on the mornin·g of the eighth. Surprising as it may 
seem, the news created very little excitement. After our junc-
tion with the Russians, the official end served only as an anti-
climax to that which we already knew. The German civil 
population celebrated jubilantly while we watched and tried 
to figure out why a country should celebrate defeat. We 
had a few drinks, lost interest, called i~ off, and let just 
another day pass. That night men retired early, to lie for 
hours in their blankets-mulling over the past and dreaming 
of the future. There was little happiness, one way or the 
other. 
Two more months of occupation and we were on our way 
home to train and equip for the Pacific. Fortune smiled on 
us again, foT Japan surrendered and our task came to an end. 
The Regiment returned to this country to be deactivated at 
its original station-Ft. Jackson, S. C.-in December, 1945. 
We have a record to be proud of-five campaigns behind 
tis with honor and glory enough for three regiments. 2,864 
of our officers and men wear decorations from five Allied 
countries. A grateful Belgian Government presented us 
the Belgium Fourragere. Grateful Army, Division, ana 
Regimental Commanders have added their praise to that of 
foreign nations. 
Our battle standard, hallowed by sacrifice, blood, and 
costly victory, is again in its sheath. Honored with battle 
streamers, it shall rest peacefully only if those of us who 
remain perpetuate the comradeship, righteousness, and free-
dom whose cost has been so dear. 
S E L E [ T E D l:OMMENDATIONS 
HEADQUARTERS NINTH U. S. ARMY 
Office of the Commanding General 
APO 339 U. S. Army 
15 March 1945 
330.13 GNMCS 
SUBJECT : Commendation. 
THROUGH: Commanding Genero.l, XIX Corps, APO 27 0, U. S. 
TO 
Army. 
Commanding G :.n e ral. 30th Infantry Divis:on, 
APO 30, U. S. Army. 
1. It was a distinct pleasure to me last October when I 
learned that t h e 30th Infantry Division was b e ing assigned to 
the Ninth Anny; a pl easure all the more l\:eenly felt because of 
the fact of n1y previous association as one-t iln e con1n1ander 
of the Division . I have b en happy to share with you the 
pride of accon1plishm ent that has characterized the l1"istory of 
your Division since the initiation of ope1·at ion s on the Continent. 
2. The operation just concluded again furnished your Division 
with an opportunity to d istingu ish itse l f. I scarc : ly n eed point 
out that th is opportunity was accepted and completel y exploited 
by the Div ision, th ereby adding another glowing chapter to the 
re cord. 
3. Particularly gratifying to me was the surprise which was 
achL ved in your crossing of the Roer Riv e r at an unsuitable 
site, and the ingenuity with which your organization overcame 
the difficulties of b uildin g u.p a bridgehead d espite meager 
access and egress roads. Your expeditious c learing of Hambach 
Forest and the firm protection which you furnished for the 
Army right flank, materially assisted th e Army to successfully 
execute th e n1an uve r by wh ich the e n emy was turned out of 
his positions and drive n to r e treat across his own lines oP 
com1n unication. 
4. rt was c h aracteristic of your Division that, with the ori-
ginal tnission accomplished, you were rea dy and waiting to 
execute anoth ~ r n1ission-that of furth er securing the Army's 
right flank and facilitating t h e capture of the key strongpoint 
of Neuss. 
5. It is with great personal pleasure that I acknowle dge the 
splendid job perforn1 :: d by th e 30th Infantry Div ision a nd 
express n1y commendation of the individual contribution n1ade 
by eve ry officer and n1 a n. 
/t/ W. H. SIMPSON 
Lieutenant Gene ral. U. S. Arn1y 
Comn1anding 
HEADQUARTERS NINTH U. S. ARMY 
Office of the Commanding General 
APO 339, U.S. Army 
9 April 1945 
330.13 GNMCG 
SUBJECT : C'om1nendation 
THROUGH: Commanding General, XIX Corps, APO 270, U. S. 
TO 
Army. 
Major General Leland S. H obbs 
Command ing General, 30th Infantry Division, 
APO 30, U. S. Army. 
1. I should feel r e miss in 1ny duty as a soldier w er e I to fail 
to nlal\:e r ::: cord of my admira tion of the spl endid manner in 
whic h your division once again distinguished itself in the 
Rhine c1·ossing ope r ation. 
2. I scarce ly need point out that the Rhin e crossing con-
stitutes one of th e most important accomplishments sin ce 
D-Day. Mor ::- over, I feel that it will be treated in military 
history as an outstanding exploit of American arms representing, 
as it does. th e last critica l turn ing point on the road to 
victory in this Theate r. 
3. It was with a feeling of pride that I se lected your division 
as one of th e two assault units for the initial crossing. The 
splend id performance of th e Division in accomplishing this and 
th e subsequent tasl\: of exploitation stands without need of 
en1bell ishment in the form of verbal a n alysi& or praise. I can 
only state once again that I de .m it a privilege to have this 
opportunity of congratulating you upon another magnificent 
achievement. 
4. Once again may I asl{ that you transmit to your officers 
and men my hi ghest comtnendation for a job w e ll done and 
tny most sin cere appreciation of the contribution n1ade by each 
member of your fine Division. 
/t/ W. H . SIMPSON 
Lieutenant General, U. S. Army 
Com1nanding. 
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1st Ind. 
HQ XIX CORPS, APO 270 
330.1 3 (A) 
TO: Commandin g General, 30th Infantry Division, APO 30. U. S. 
Army. 
1. The op ~ ration to wh ich the Army Commander's commen-
dation is directed was, in e ffect, a flanking movement, swinging 
w id e of the strongly s ituated Munchen-Gladbach area a nd 
driving against the Rhine, then splitting the industrial area 
along the west bank of the R hine. This was accomplished by 
this Corps quicl<ly and well ahead of schedule, c lear in g twenty-
s ix (26) miles of the west side of the river. As such it is a 
classical as well as a historic achieve1nent. The smoothness 
of this successful operation was vitally influenced by the 
thorou gh and rapid action of your division, b y which the blow 
never lost its n1om entum. a nd th e enemy mov s to check the 
advan ce were overrun before they got underway. 
2. This can easil y be consider:d an outstanding operation of 
the war. and the remarks of the Army con1mand.er are there-
fore of hi gh significance. 
/t/ RAYMOND S. McLAIN 
l\1ajor General, U . S. 
Commanding 
2nd Ind. 
HEADQUARTERS 30TH INFANTRY DIVISION, 
APO 30, 25 March 1945. 
330.13 
(15 Mar 45) 
TO: Commanding Officers, A ll Units, Assigned and Attached, 
30th Infantry Division. 
This con1mendation is YOURS-each of you who participated 
so fully and so well in this splendid ach ievement. It is with 
g reat pleasure and pride that I forward it to you who n1ade it 
possible. 
/ t / L. S. HOBBS 
Major General, U. S. Army 
Commanding 
1st Ind. 
HQ XIX CORPS, APO 270, U. S. ARMY 
330.13 (A) 
TO: Commanding General, 30th Infantry Division, APO 30. 
I am very pleased to note and transmit the above commen-
dation. 
/t/ RAYMOND S. McLAIN 
Major Gene ral. U. S. Army 
Comn1anding. 
2nd Ind. 
HEADQUARTERS 30TH INFANTRY DIVISION, 
APO 30, 27 April 1945. 
330.13 
(9 Apr 45) 
TO: Officers and Men, Ass·igned and Attached U nits, 30th In-
fantry Division. · 
1. It is with th e deepest satisfaction a nd pleasure that I 
add to this fine commendation from Li -:- ute nant General W. H. 
S impson, Commander of the Ninth United States Army, my 
congratulations to each of you. Your brilliant performance in 
this operation has added new laurels to the outstanding rep-
utation of the Division. 
2. This commendation will b ~ read to a ll troops at the first 
opportunity after receipt. 
/ t / L. S. HOBBS 
1\Iajor General-D. S. Army 
Commandin g 
F R D M REGIMENTAL F I L E S 
RESTRICTED 
HEADQUARTERS 2D ARMORED DIVISION 
O ff ice of the Division Commander 
SUBJECT 
TO 
THRU 
Commendation. 
18 April 1945. 
A P 0 252 
Lt. Col. Carlton E. Stuart, Comman din g Officer, 
Third Battalion, 119th Infantry Regiment. 
Commanding General, 30th Infantry Division. 
1. I desire to commend you and your Battal ion for your 
ga:lant and h e roic action during the establishment of a bridge-
head across the Elbe River, Ger many, by the Second Armored 
Division . Having forced a crossing of the six hundred foot 
w ide r iver in assault boats on t h e n ight of April 13th, you 
successfully executed the difficult night maneuver of slipping 
your bridgehead south for several 1nil es through host il e and 
unfamiliar terrain to a more favorab le crossing site. Then at 
first light, against a n u n1erically su perior enemy supported by 
tanks and s :: lf-propelled guns, you repelled a v iciou s attack 
designed to eradicate the brideghead. Men, c u t off from their 
command during th is attack by enemy armor. courageously and 
ingeniously made their way to the river and swam back to 
safety. 
2. Throughout t h e action, your esprit de corps, sol dierly 
skil l, and gallan try u n der fire we r e outstand ing. The entire 
D ivision takes pride in the galla n t and hero ic s tand made by 
you r cmumand. 
t/ I. D. WHITE 
Major General, U. S. Arn1y 
Commanding 
RESTRICTED 
HEADQU ARTERS 66TH ARMORED REGIMENT 
SUBJ ECT : Comme ndation. 
19 April 1945 
APO 252 
TO : Commanding Officer, 119th Infantry Regiment, APO 
30 (Thu Chann ~) 
1. Th e Second Battalion, 119th I nfantry Regimen t , was a part 
of Task Force "B" under my comn1and . in its advance frotn 
A u gustdorf to Magdeburg, Gennany, durin g the period 2-14 
April 1945. 
2. I desi r e to commend Lt. Col. Hal D . McCown, command-
ing for his splendid cooperation, aggressive I .ader ship, and 
outstanding professional skill, and through h im, h is entire 
Battalion for its teamwork, aggressiven ess, and a ll - r ound pro-
fic iency in combat. 
3. It was a p leasure having th is Battalion associat ed with 
u s and it is hoped that in the future we may gain other 
objectives together. 
(t) WILLIAM M. STOKES. JR., 
Colonel. 66th Armored Regiment 
Commanding 
1st I n d. 
HEADQUARTERS COMBAT COMMAND " A", 
2d Arm'd Div, 19 April 45 
JHC/hjn 
TO: Commanding Officer, 119th Infantry Regiment, APO 30. 
I t is a p leasure to forward this conuuendation and to empha-
s ize the sentiments exp r essed by Colonel Stokes. 
(t) J . H . COLLIER 
Brigadier Gene ral, USA 
Commanding 
2nd Ind. 
HEADQUARTERS 2D ARMORED DIVISION, 
APO 252, 19 April 1945. 
TO: Commanding Officer, 119th Infantry Regiment, APO 30 
ll have personal knowledge of the excellent work performed 
by Lieutenant Colonel McCown and his Battalion during the 
recent operation and forward this commendation with real 
pleasure. 
<(t) I. D. WHITE 
Major General, U S Army 
Commanding 
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1st Ind. 
HEADQUARTERS 30TH INFANTRY DIVISION, 
A PO 30, U . S. A rmy, 21 A pril 1945 
201.22 
(18 Apr 45) 
TO : Commanding Officer, 3d Battalion, 119th Infantry, APO 30; 
THRU: Commanding Officer, 119th Infantry, APO 30. 
It is with pride that I forward th is letter of comtnendation . 
and I desire to add 1ny congratulations for the skill and heroistn 
demonstrated by you and your men during this en~agen1cnt. 
You r actions are worthy of the high traditions and reputa-
t ion of this Division. 
t/ L. S. HOBBS 
Major Gen eral-D. S. Army 
Com1nanding 
2nd Ind. 
HEADQUARTERS 119TH INFANTRY, 
A PO 30, U. S. A rm y, 9 May 1945. 
201.22 
(18 Apr 45) 
'1'0: Commanding Officer, 3rd Battalion, 119th Infantry, APO 30. 
U. S. Arn1y. 
1. Gallantry and combat efficiency as cited in this fine letter 
have r esulted in the uncondit ional surrender of Germany today. 
The part p layed by you and your battalion in ga ining this final 
obj ective h as been consistently ou tstanding. 
2. P lease accept and convey to those under your command 1ny 
since1·e c ongratulations. 
t/ R. A. BAKER 
Colonel, Infantry 
Commanding 
RESTRICT E D 
3rd Ind. 
HEADQUARTERS 30TH INFANTRY DIVISION, 
APO 30, U. S . A rmy, 25 A pril 1945. 
201.22 
(19 Apr 45) 
TO: Commanding Officer. 2nd Battalion, 119th Infantry, APO 
30. U S Army: THROUGH: Commanding Officer, 119th 
Infantry, 
It is indeed gratifying to rece iv~ this letter of commenda-
tion for the splendid wo rk you d id while your organization 'vas 
attached to a n other division. I desire to add my personal com-
mendation to that contained in basic commu nication for each 
officer and man of your command for an efficiently accomplished 
tasl.;:. 
301.22 
(19 Apr 45) 
L. S. HOBBS 
Major General-D. S. Army 
Commanding 
4th Ind. 
HQS. 119TH INF., 
A PO 30, U . S. A rmy, 28 April 1945. 
TO: Lt. Col. HAL D. McCOWN, 2nd Battalion, l19th Infanti·y, 
U. S. Army 
All n1embers of the Regiment are honored and share my 
pride in forwarding this fine l e tt ~ r which r ecogn izes the out-
standing performance of your Battalion caring re cently opera-
t ions. 
R. A. BAKER 
Colonel, Infantry 
Cotnmanding 
RESTRICTED 
HEADQUARTERS COMBAT COMMAND "A" 
2d Armored DiYision 
RESTRICTED 
2nd Ind. 
A P 0 252 
HQ XIX CORPS, 
20 April 1945 330.13 (A) 
APO 270, U. S. Army, 29 April 1945 
SUBJECT: Commendation 
TO : Commanding Officer, 119th Infantry Regimental TO: CG, 30th Inf. Div., APO 30, U . S. Army. 
Con1bat T atn. 
1. The 119th Infantry Regimental Combat Team (less Third 
Battalion) was attached to Combat Com_mand "A" in its ad-
vance fron1 the Teutowberger-Wald to the Elbe River, Germany, 
during the p eriod 2-17 April 1945. 
I am pleased to note and forward th 3 above commendation. 
. t/ RAYMOND S . McLAIN 
Major General, U. S. A rmy 
Commandin g 
3rcl Ind. 2. I desire to commend Colone l Hugh D. McHugh, 2-4 April 
1945. and Colonel Russell A. Baker, 4-17 April 1945, for their 
exemplary leadership of the C'om1nand during the periods in-
dicated and a ll mem hers of their Command of their excep-
tional soldierly skill. Throughout the operation, the aggres-
sive and cooperativ e spirit of the Command and its l eaders was 
of ines-tin1abl J assistance in over coming the difficulties in-
herent in the fluid, rapidl y moving situation. 
HEADQUARTERS 30TH INFANTRY DIVISION, 
330 .1 3 
APO 30, 2 May 1945. 
(20 Apr 45) 
3. It was a real pleasure to have worked with this "'Regi-
Inelltal Combat Tean1. It is n1y sincere hope that we may 
be associated tog·ether in future operations. 
TO: Commanding Officer, 119th Infantry. APO 30. 
This commendat ion h as been read with the keenest pleasure 
and in forwarding it, I desire to add my own congratulations 
for this outstandin g performance. 
t/ J. H. COLLIER 
Brigadier General U. S. Artny 
Commanding 
1st Incl. 
t/ L. S. HOBBS 
Major General, U. S. A rmy 
4th Incl. 
HEADQUARTERS 2D ARMORED DIVISION, 
APO 252, 25 April 1945. 3 30.13 
HEADQUARTERS 119TH INFANTRY, 
APO 30, U. S. Army, 5 May 1945. 
(20 Apr 45) 
(20 Apr 45) 
/cljb 
TO: Commanding Officer, 119th Infantry Regimental Combat 
Team. (THRU CHANNELS) 
TO: Commanding Officers, All Units, 119th Infantry Combat 
Team 
1. Th is gen erous commendation. I hope, covers our last 
operation. Again I extend hearty congratulations to every 
officer and enlisted man of our combat team for his valian t 
e fforts which made possible the successful accomplishment of 
this important mission. 
This commendation is forwarded with sincere pleasure as I 
have personal knowledge of the work of this Regimental 
Combat Team and its commanding officers. Their performance 
of duty wae at all times superior and reflected great credit 
UJ)Oll themselves a nd upon the Division of which they are a 
part. 
t/ I. D. WHITE 
2. The Third Battalion has been commended for its out-
standing performance during this operation in a separate 
l etter from C. G. CCA, Second Armored Division. 
Major General, U S Army 
Commanding 
HEADQUARTERS 30TH INFANTRY DIVISION 
GENERAL ORDER: 
NUMBER 96: 
BATTLE HONORS 
APO No. 30 
5 May 194 5 
Under the proVISions of Section IV, Circul ar Number 333, 
War Department, 1943, and pursu a n t to a uthority granted by 
Commanding General, Ninth Un ited States Army, the follow-
ing Battle Honors are anounccd: 
The First Battalion, 119th Infantry Regiment, United S t ates 
Army, rei n forced, is c ite d for outstanding performance of duty 
in action against the enemy fro m 19 December 1944 to 21 
December 1944, in Belgium. The Battalion occu p ied positions 
along a route through whic h a strong German a rmored in-
fantry column was attem pting to pass, having overrun a ll 
organized resistance w hich had b locked their a d vance. Despite 
numerically superior e nemy forces a n d badly depleted person-
nel of t h e ir own companies, the n1en of the Battalion, realizing 
that t h eirs was t h e l ast line of r esistance, fou ght heroically. 
During three fanatical a nd f urious enemy counterattacl\:s the 
Battalion, w ith two coinpanies accountin g for approximately 
only sixty men each, and using clerks, messen gers, and drivers 
as riflemen, fought heroically and drove the e n emy back. Non-
commissioned officers and privates assu1ned command unhesitat-. 
ingly after their leaders had been killed or wounded, a nd though 
the Battalion suffered 148 casualt ies durin g this engagement, the 
men never faltered. After repulsing an attack and though 
suffering h eavy losses they immediately reorganized under 
paralyzing enemy fire to s u ccessfully w ithstand subsequent 
attacks by the enemy in this all out effort. All participants 
fought with dogged determination of giving no ground and in 
the face of almost continuous h eavy fire, stood fi rm, d oing their 
duty unhesUatingly and w ith unexcelled individual courage. 
L. S. HOBBS 
Major General - U. S. Army 
Commanding 
132 
t/ R. A. BAKER 
Colonel, Infantry 
Commandin g 
~ THE ll!ITH INFANTRY 
Composed and Dedicated to the Regiment 
by 
FRED G. KNOX 
The war lords of the Rising Sun 
Deeming the war in Europe won, 
Trusting the Western Eagle_ Slept, 
At our Pacific outposts lept-
Tore our unconquered flag to strips-. 
And in our harbors sank our ships. 
Then formed the lads of victory 
The Hundred Nineteenth Infantry. 
Colonel Ednie trained you for the wars. 
You saw both France and England's shores, 
Received your baptism of fire 
When Hitler's Panzers l9st the Vire. 
With Colonel Sutherland attain 
Pont Hebert, Troisgots and M ortain. 
There the SS Troop·s in counter meet 
And make them taste their first defeat. 
At Aachen broke that hope and sign 
Of German power, the Siegfried Line/ 
Again the First Shock Troops in fierce attack 
At Stoumont you meet and drive them back. 
On Christmas Baker took command 
Squeezed out the Bulge and led his band 
To cross the flooded Roer and Rhine. 
There with the Second Armored you combine. 
Sweep the Wesser and the Rhineland plain, 
Proving all Bosche resistance vain. 
This combination proved so rough-
The ferries cried enough- enough. 
You sacrificed to keep us free 
By your unshaken bravery. 
The Nations praise and honor thee 
For courage and fidelity/ 
Pattern of all our force should be 
THE HUNDRED AND NINETEENTH INFANTRY. 
GfJ 
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Henri-Chapel Military Cemetery 
Heavenly Father, for ou~ most honored dead the strife is over,· those whose lives and 
deeds once mingled with ours, and who always will live deep in our memory. May 
we never forget their noble sacrifice. Help us by thy strength to maintain the free-
dom for which they fought and died. They have not died in vain, but in the hope 
that thy will may be done on earth as it is in Heaven. May their deeds challenge 
us, their lives inspire us, and their achievements live after us. In the name of our 
Lord and Saviour Jesus Christ we pray. 
137 
Amen. 
CHAPLAIN R. s. STANSFIELD 
Regimental Chaplain 
- ~1'1 (f"RD;HB£~<;-
COPYRIGHT, 194'6, BY 
THE 119TH INFANTRY REGIMENT 
Typography, engravings and printing by 
Army & Navy Publishing Company 
Army and Navy Publishing Company Building 
234 Main Street Baton Rouge, Louisiana 
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